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Summary
Algorithms: The study focuses on algorithms that are used for data processing and the semi- or fully-
automated implementation of decision-making rules to differentiate between individuals. Such 
differentiations relate to economic products, services, positions or payments as well as to state decisions 
and actions that affect individual freedoms or the distribution of services.
Discrimination: Algorithm-based differentiations become discriminatory if they lead to unjustified 
disadvantaging of persons with legally protected characteristics, in particular age, gender, ethnic origin, 
religion, sexual orientation or disability. The study describes cases in which algorithm- and data-based 
differentiations have been legally classified as discrimination or which are analysed and discussed as risks 
of discrimination.
Surrogate information: Algorithm- and data-based differentiations often exhibit the characteristics of so-
called statistical discrimination. Typical for this kind of discrimination is the use of surrogate information, 
surrogate variables or proxies (e. g. age) to differentiate, because the original distinguishing characteristics 
(e. g. labour productivity) are difficult for the decision-makers to determine by examining individual cases. 
These surrogate variables can be protected characteristics, or there can be correlations with them and 
protected characteristics. With algorithmic methods of data mining and machine learning, complex 
models with a large number of variables can be used instead of one or a few surrogate variables.
Societal risks: The legitimacy of such differentiations is often justified on the grounds of efficiency in 
overcoming information deficits. However, they also involve societal risks such as injustice by generalisation, 
treatment of people as mere objects, restriction of the free development of personality, accumulation 
effects and growing inequality and risks to societal goals of equality or social policy. When developing and 
using algorithms, many discrimination risks result from the use of data that describe previous unequal 
treatment.
Needs for societal considerations: Although overcoming technically-based discrimination risks of 
algorithms and data is fundamental, the legitimacy of different forms of algorithmic differentiation 
requires societal considerations and decisions that take into account the aforementioned societal risks, the 
benefits of differentiation and, in particular, their distribution in society. This should lead to definitions of 
socially acceptable differentiations. Since in most cases such differentiations are based on the processing of 
comprehensive amounts of personal data, risks to the right to informational self-determination must be 
considered as well.
Data protection law: The current data protection law needs clarifications and corrections that would also 
serve anti-discrimination purposes. These relate to so-called informed consent, where affected persons 
must assess far-reaching potential consequences, including possible unequal treatment, at the time of 
consent. This approach no longer seems adequate in light of the actual practices of collecting, merging, 
transferring, and using personal data and the emerging risks of unequal treatments based on these practices.
More detailed regulation of decisions: Furthermore, a more detailed regulation of algorithmic and data-
based decision-making in addition to the current regulatory focus on data processing has been suggested. 
Anti-discrimination law, which sets out the protected characteristics that may be used in certain decision-
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making situations, can already be seen as a regulation of decisions. Improvements in regulation can range 
from more detailed provisions on the permitted use of certain decision-making criteria, e. g. by clarifying 
exemptions from the prohibited use justified on objective grounds, or the use of recognised computation 
methods, to the prohibition of certain algorithmic and data-based differentiations for certain types of 
high-risk decisions. The prohibition of automated decision-making under data protection law can be 
improved in several areas. Regulatory instruments should be designed according to the specific level of 
societal risks attributable to different types of algorithm-based differentiations.
Tasks and duties of equality bodies: In particular, the difficulty in detecting and proving algorithm-based 
discrimination by persons concerned suggests, according to the principle of subsidiarity, that representative 
bodies should take action on behalf of the persons concerned and collective redress should be used.
 — Many examples illustrate that detecting and proving discrimination with algorithms is also possible 
without direct inspection of the algorithm or “opening” the software system. Instead, evidence of 
unequal treatment or discrimination can be provided by collecting and investigating publicly available 
data on the outcomes of differentiation decisions, which are derived from the interactions and 
transactions of the services and products investigated. Where the outcomes cannot be determined, 
however, such a procedure has its limits.
 — Investigations into the outcomes of algorithm-based decision-making along with requests and 
information from affected individuals and the media can also serve as starting points for equality  
bodies tasked with advising and supporting those affected by discrimination; this also applies to the 
internet and computerised decision-making. If there is not enough information publicly available on  
the outcomes of decisions, the access options and rights of equality bodies should be extended so t 
hat they can fulfil their mandate to identify and reduce discrimination.
 — With algorithm-enabled, customised offers and services, it can be difficult for persons concerned to 
detect differentiations of persons and make the required comparisons in order to provide evidence  
of unequal treatment. Equality bodies generally have expertise and experience with regard to groups  
of people, situations and treatments that are prone to discrimination, the causes of discrimination, 
seemingly neutral criteria and correlations with protected characteristics. Such expertise can also be the 
starting point for systematic empirical investigations, anti-discrimination testing and algorithm audits.
 — The entities using artificial intelligence algorithms and applications in automated decision-making  
in particular may be required, under the legal provisions, to assess potential discrimination risks and 
ensure that the algorithms can be explained; they may also be obliged to document the functioning of 
the algorithms, the decision-making rules and their impact on persons concerned, including possible 
discrimination. Such documentation should be accessible to equality bodies in cases of suspected 
discrimination, with the right of access being regulated by law.
 — Other (potential) tasks of equality bodies include advising entities that develop and use algorithms  
for the prevention of discrimination and (mandatory) involvement in public procurement procedures  
of algorithm-based systems that are particularly prone to discrimination.
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1. Introduction
1 Given this problem-oriented view, the numerous non-discriminatory applications of algorithms are not taken into account. The 
study also does not deal with the effects of systems that, through the algorithm-based control of information, have an impact on 
information perception (“filter bubbles”), freedom of opinion, opinion formation or voting behaviour in democratic processes. Although 
examples from the field of government action are also given, the conclusions and the required or potential actions derived thereof apply 
mainly to the private sector.
Algorithms and extensive data sets are increasingly involved in decisions that not only have trivial 
consequences for people, but also influence their way of living and personality development to a larger 
extent. Algorithms produce conclusions and outcomes that are used by human decision-makers as an 
information basis for their decisions, or the implementation of decision-making rules is completely 
delegated to algorithms or the computer systems containing them.
Apart from some early analyses of bias and unequal treatment through the use of computer systems 
(Friedman & Nissenbaum 1996; Bruce & Adam 1989), the risks of discrimination in connection with 
information and communication technologies have only been comprehensively addressed in this decade. 
Particularly in the course of the big data development, researchers and policy-makers have pointed out the 
associated risks of discrimination (e. g. Crawford 2013; Dwork & Mulligan 2013; The White House 2014; US 
CEA 2015; FTC 2016; Schneider & Ulbricht 2018). Researchers and journalists have uncovered numerous 
cases of unequal treatment and discrimination resulting from the application of algorithms, which will be 
discussed below.
This study takes a problem-oriented view on the consequences of the use of algorithms for the differentiation 
of individuals. The study focuses on algorithms that are used to differentiate individuals with regard to 
differentiated information, products, services, payments, positions, etc.1 Such differentiations can lead to 
unjustified unequal treatment or discrimination. It is therefore a societal task to define what unequal 
treatment is considered unjustified and to regulate unjustified unequal treatment. This task also concerns 
the forms of differentiation that are put into practice with the use of algorithms.
After a brief introduction to algorithms, relevant developments in data processing and algorithm-based 
differentiation (Chapter 2), relevant types of discrimination are presented (Chapter 3). Discrimination 
caused by algorithmic and data-based differentiation is mainly a reflection of statistical discrimination, 
which is also evident from the examples described in Chapter 4 The causes of risks of discrimination should 
not only be seen in the way algorithms and data sets are generated, selected and used, but also in the way 
that differentiations are used themselves (Chapter 5). This is followed by considerations of the required and 
potential actions whose primary aim is to prevent discrimination, and calls for societal consideration 
processes that extend beyond this context (Chapter 6).
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2. Terms and Basic 
Developments
2.1 Algorithms
2 For a discussion on the term algorithm and its delimitation, see e. g. Hill (2016), Cormen et al. (2010: 5-15), Mittelstadt et al. (2016)  
or Yeung (2017).
3 Cf., e. g., Schinzel (2017), Zweig, Fischer & Lischka (2018) or Kitchin (2017).
4 Here according to Brey (2000), (2009) and Kitchin (2017).
In this study, the term “algorithm” is used from an information technology perspective.2 According to this, 
algorithms are basic, formalised and precisely defined computation rules or rules for a sequence of 
computation steps that are set up to execute a given task. For a computable task, such as sorting lists, there 
are often many different algorithms.
Algorithms have to be implemented or programmed in one of the many programming languages (such as 
Python, Java, JavaScript, C++, etc.) in order to be executed by a computer. They are subsequently available 
as programme parts, which are combined with data structures to form software or software systems. 
Algorithms in software then carry out the task of generating an output – usually in other data formats – 
from an input, usually in the form of data. When we talk about algorithms below, we always mean 
implementations of algorithms as possible components of software.
Algorithms are implemented in software, combined and organised to fulfil specific purposes. These 
purposes are primarily determined by humans, in particular software developers and contractors, who also 
determine the interpretations, values, prioritisations and exclusions contained in algorithms.3 Their 
purposes and applications may also have unintended consequences4 both for those directly affected and 
for indirectly affected third parties. This makes it more difficult to implement societal and fundamental 
values such as the protection of human dignity, the preservation of the free development of personality 
and informational self-determination, the avoidance of discrimination or the safeguarding of the rule of 
law.
Algorithms only display their societal consequences once they are deployed in software applications using 
specific data sets in economic, social, administrative and legal practices. Consequently, there is a greater 
emphasis in this study on the applications of algorithms in software systems for specific purposes than on 
algorithms per se.
Algorithms are currently the subject of much attention, especially in the social sciences and humanities, 
public life and politics, which can be explained by the fact that (a) IT systems with algorithms are used 
almost ubiquitously in all areas of life, not only in production processes, office applications and economic 
transactions, but also in social interactions and communication, (b) their widespread use for the automated 
handling of large amounts of data, accelerated interactions and transactions appears indispensable and 
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inevitable to some extent, due to economic network effects,5 (c) they are increasingly used in decisions that 
have consequences on the life opportunities and personality development of people and (d) they are 
sometimes expected to have a certain ability to act and make decisions, or a shift of responsibility to 
algorithms is even implied. For this study, algorithms will be divided into several types:6 (1) algorithms 
whose rules are developed entirely by human logic and whose rules are implemented as “direct 
programming”, virtually “by hand” by the developers, and (2) data mining or machine learning algorithms 
whose rules are based on correlations generated by data analysis.
The latter are also referred to as “learning algorithms” and are usually assigned to the field of artificial 
intelligence (see Sections 2.2.2 and 3.4 for details).7 Also for this type, “learning” does not take place without 
people, since entities developing and using machine-learning methods have to make many design 
decisions. In many cases, human decisions are also the source of risks of discrimination (see Chapters 4 
and 5 for more details).
Algorithms are used today not only to automate data processing, including data analysis and inference, but 
also to automatically apply and enforce decision-making rules. For illustrative purposes, algorithms can 
therefore be further subdivided into (1) those for automatic data processing and analysis and (2) those that 
execute decision-making rules automatically8 (Ernst 2017; Kleinberg et al. 2019). Many of the software 
systems of interest here contain both, but for later considerations it is useful to distinguish between them 
in their representation. After all, not every application of algorithms means a fully automated decision. 
Algorithms are also often only used for data analysis, whose outcomes are used as recommendations or 
support for human decisions.
5 In the case of economic network effects, the benefit for a single user increases with the number of other users, as the possibilities for 
communication or exchange between the users increase. This can lead to concentration or monopolisation tendencies or the dominance 
of one system. For individual users who want to participate in the communication or exchange, the options can be drastically reduced and 
the use of one system can become almost inevitable. Network effects occur in particular in telecommunication networks, on 
“matchmaking” platforms (e. g. job market platforms, e-commerce platforms such as eBay, dating platforms) or “audience-making” 
platforms (e. g. social networks, search engines), in transaction systems (e. g. electronic payment systems such as PayPal) and on software 
platforms (especially operating systems). For an overview and discussion see e. g. Dewenter & Lüth (2018).
6 Here according to Lehr & Ohm (2017), Selbst & Barocas (2018).
7 Unfortunately, in the discussion about algorithms, it is often the case that the term “algorithms” only refers to the machine-learning 
algorithms. However, this meaning is not pursued in this study, given that risks of discrimination can also arise from the use of a variety of 
algorithms.
8 For more details, see Section 2.3.3.
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2.2 Developments in data processing
9 See details in Section 3.4 and Section 5.1.
2.2.1 Increasing the amount of data relating to an identifiable 
person
In recent decades, the amount of personal data and data relating to an identifiable person that is generated 
as a product or by-product of computerisation (now increasingly referred to as “digitisation”), not only by 
and between organisations but also in public and private spheres of life, has grown significantly. The 
collection of usage, location and movement data from mobile devices, the recording of the diverse uses of 
the internet, such as communication in online social media, search engine queries, website visits and 
evaluation of browser histories, the use of online commerce and other internet services (e. g. streaming 
services) and electronic financial transactions and payment systems are all significant sources of personal 
data (Christl & Spiekermann 2016; Christl 2017; Constantiou & Kallinikos 2015; Weichert 2013; Pasquale 
2015). The collection and commercial analysis of personal data are often obtained in return for the “free” 
use of internet services such as search engines or online social media (“personal data as counterperformance”) 
(EDPS 2017). Moreover, due to the progressive spread of so-called “smart” devices (“smart homes”, “smart 
cars”, “wearables”, “fitness trackers”, “personal assistants”, virtual assistants or speech assistants, etc.) or the 
implementation of the “Internet of Things”, extensively equipped with sensors and networked objects, very 
large volumes of personal data are collected whenever products and services are used.
This increase in the amount of personal data has led to several consequences in terms of differentiations 
and risks of discrimination that are relevant to this study. The growth in volume of available data enables 
many differentiations of persons through the use of algorithms. In particular, the consolidation of data – 
either within the company or with the help of data trading or data brokerage – enables differentiation on 
the basis of extensive personal profiles. New forms of data analysis, and much of machine learning in 
particular, only work meaningfully when based on large volumes of data.
2.2.2 Expansion of algorithm-based analysis methods
The following section outlines some of the developments that are particularly relevant to this study and 
which have taken place over several decades and are still ongoing. It should be noted that some of the 
terms used may relate to the same developments with a large degree of overlap, or the terms may describe 
developments at different levels of representation, and therefore cannot be clearly distinguished from one 
another.
The purpose of the data mining methods is to identify findings or statistical correlations in large data sets 
(Custers 2013; Calders & Custers 2013; Linoff & Berry 2011: 2). Automated procedures that reveal patterns 
or regularities in the data sets are characteristic here and also – unlike in classical statistical analyses – that 
there are no hypotheses to be tested about possible correlations between variables as the basis for the 
procedure. The outcomes, which are generated as a set of calculated relationships, are also called models. 
Outcomes or models can be used to create classes or categories to which people can be automatically 
assigned. In many cases, the formation of categories is based solely on the automated generation of 
correlations (Barocas & Selbst 2016: 677).9
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The developments that have taken place under the vague umbrella term “big data” are mainly aimed at the 
merging and processing of large and different data sets, i.e. which may be heterogeneous in their formats 
(e. g. numbers, images, text, video and audio formats) and which have been collected in different contexts. 
Algorithms serve here primarily for data analysis. If personal data is used, algorithms from big data analytics 
help to create and maintain comprehensive personality profiles that are often used to predict behaviour 
(e. g. expected buying behaviour). In a narrow, technical sense, big data techniques or big data analytics are 
primarily used for the automated collecting, processing, management and analysis of large volumes of 
data (Chen, Mao & Liu 2014).
In a broad sense, the term “big data” also encompasses the organisational arrangements, practices and 
business models in which the connecting processing of large, sometimes heterogeneous volumes of data 
plays the central role and is primarily aimed at forecasts and reactions in real-time (e. g. Zuboff 2015; see 
also Kolany-Raiser et al. 2018; Hoeren & Kolany-Raiser 2018).
The transition between data mining and machine learning, which is usually considered a subset of AI,10 is 
fluid. Machine learning is a vague umbrella term for very different concepts and methods, which may even 
include conventional statistical analysis methods.11 The term machine learning refers to procedures for 
automatically finding correlations – also known as relationships, regularities or patterns – between 
variables in a data set. In doing so, one tries to reproduce the human process of learning by using machine 
methods (but not without the involvement of humans) to identify the relevant patterns or characteristics 
for the object to be analysed from a large number of examples in the form of learning or training data sets. 
The patterns or characteristics are generated as a model. In most cases, machine-learning methods are 
used to generate predictions or estimates of outcomes (according to Lehr & Ohm 2017: 671). Together with 
the further increase in the performance and cost reduction of computers and the widespread use of cloud 
data centres, the growth in volume of personal data available in sufficient quality and quantity has 
contributed to the fact that machine-learning systems are now being applied to an increasing number of 
situations involving people. There are many such applications aimed at pattern recognition in databases 
(e. g. patterns of fraudulent behaviour in financial data), computer vision or text or audio processing of 
speech, including natural language processing. In the field of computer vision, facial recognition systems 
are particularly noteworthy; these are not only designed to recognise people, but also to recognise states 
(e. g. emotional states, see below) and behavioural patterns of people.
Machine learning overlaps with other methods of statistics and data processing like data mining. The basic 
algorithms, which are combined to new systems with AI, have in some instances been known for decades 
(e. g. regression methods). In other instances, new learning algorithms have been added. In the latter case, 
the so-called “artificial neural networks”, in particular “deep learning”,12 have attracted attention in the last 
few years.
10 A generally accepted definition of artificial intelligence (AI) has yet to be established. Many authors describe AI as a technical means 
to reproduce human intelligence.
11 For example, see Domingos (2012), The Royal Society (2017), Jordan & Mitchell (2015), Alpaydin (2016), Leis et al. (2018), Mullainathan 
& Spiess (2017), Strauss (2018), WIPO (2019).
12 Deep learning methods belong to the procedures of “artificial neural networks” and use several “node layers” of computational stages 
(“neurons”), which are connected to each other in a weighted manner in order to identify patterns or correlations in a data set (e. g. a digital 
image of a dog). Each layer is dedicated to learning with a different level of abstraction. During the training process, the weighting of the 
links is adjusted. In the example of the dog image, the bottom layer learns simple details such as the values of a pixel, the next layer up 
tries to learn edges and upper layers learn to interpret the combination of edges as a dog’s nose, for example. Cf. Alpaydin (2016),  
Beck et al. (2019).
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Data mining, big data analytics and machine learning can be used for profiling. The term profiling covers 
algorithm-based techniques and practices of processing large volumes of data to create and link, update 
and use records on natural persons in order to produce a comprehensive picture of a person or group of 
persons, which is mainly used for categorisation, assessment, forecasting and decision-making. Profiles are 
often created in order to form categories based on known characteristics or persons and correlations, in 
which the category affiliation of unknown persons is deduced by identifying common characteristics. Best 
known examples of the use of profiling are law enforcement, border controls, commercial and governmental 
web tracking, marketing and insurance (Hildebrandt & Gutwirth 2008; van Otterlo 2013; Helberger 2016; 
FRA 2018; Hänold 2018).13
Scoring is understood as the assignment of numerical values to persons, usually with the assignment of 
persons on a scale and by calculating probability values for a certain future behaviour (ULD & GP 
Forschungsgruppe 2014; Dixon & Gellman 2014; Weichert 2018; in detail SVRV 2018). Applications of 
scoring, which are currently attracting particular attention with regard to possible unfair treatment or 
discrimination, are credit scoring in the granting of loans, scores of labour market opportunities in the 
employment service or risk scores in the judiciary system.
The above-mentioned data processing procedures are increasingly used for personalised data forecasts. 
Unlike ex-post evaluations, which examine whether or not a target value or target state of a differentiation 
objective has been achieved, forecasts are designed to classify people ex ante into classes formed according 
to a differentiation objective on the basis of calculated probabilities, or to assign individual values to 
express how likely it is that certain states will be achieved in the future. In this study, the focus is mainly on 
algorithms for forecasting.
In particular, developments in machine learning as a sub-area of AI have enabled analyses of the automated 
identification of personality traits – for example, the health status or sexual orientation of a person – to be 
carried out in an increasing breadth, with (presumed) better accuracy, in (near) real time and on the basis 
of previously unusual data material. For example, while the recording of the personality trait 
“trustworthiness” when determining credit scores was mainly based on payment history and other 
financial information for many years, credit scores are now also generated using data on communication 
and relationships in “social” online networks (Wei et al. 2016).14 In addition, there are many descriptions 
and experiments by researchers and developers on the identification of personality traits, including:
 — The recognition of emotional states using keyboard strokes (Epp, Lippold & Mandryk 2011);
 — The derivation of sensitive information (including health status) from telephone metadata  
(Mayer, Mutchler & Mitchell 2016);
 — The determination of naivety or sophistication and its use in loan offerings (Ru & Schoar 2016);
13 Article 4 para. 4 GDPR provides a legal definition of profiling, which refers to profiling as “any form of automated processing of 
personal data consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in particular to 
analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, health, personal preferences, 
interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements [...]”.
14 One of the international leaders in credit scoring, Lenddo, claims to process data from online social networks, telecommunications 
data, browser data, mobile data, data from e-commerce and financial transactions, data from the analysis of application completion and 
psychometric data. Cf. https://lenddo.com/ (last retrieved on 17 April 2019). See also the patent filed by the company Facebook, which 
describes a method of calculating the creditworthiness of people from the credit scores of “associates” in the network (Meyer 2015).
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 — The recognition of emotions and development of psychodemographic “profiles” based on data  
from the online network Twitter (Volkova & Bachrach 2015);
 — The detection of criminal inclination (Wu & Zhang 2016) and genetic diseases with automated  
facial recognition (Gurovich et al. 2019);
 — The determination of sexual orientation on the basis of Facebook contact lists  
(Jernigan & Mistree 2009);
 — The determination of “racial” or ethnic origin on the basis of personal pictures (Fu, He & Hou 2014);
 — The identification of psychological characteristics (extroversion, introversion, openness to innovation) 
from “digital footprints”, such as “likes” or posts on the online network Twitter (Matz et al. 2017);
 — The determination of various personality traits, such as sexual orientation, ethnicity,  
religious and political attitudes, age, gender or intelligence from “likes” on Facebook  
(Kosinski, Stillwell & Graepel 2013) or;
 — The recognition of sexual orientation, especially homosexuality, from images of persons  
(Wang & Kosinski 2018).15
The extent to which such methods of analysis are already being used in practice is in most cases unclear, as 
there is no systematic survey of this. However, what these examples make clear once again is that there is 
no such thing as “unimportant” data (belangloses Datum) – as the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG 
1983) enshrined in 1983 – and that seemingly “harmless” communication and behaviour can potentially 
provide the basis and criteria for unequal treatment and discrimination.
15 See also Matz & Netzer (2017) for overviews on psychological analyses based on big data techniques, or Yue et al. (2018) on sentiment 
analysis/sentiment detection.
172. Terms and Basic Developments
2.3 Algorithmic and data-based differentiations
16 Cf. also Mittelstadt et al. (2016). For business applications in the context of marketing or business relationship management see, e. g., 
Vercellis (2011).
2.3.1 Types of differentiation
Algorithms are used within applications of statistical data analysis, data mining, big data analytics and 
machine learning for differentiating individuals, either to enable new forms of differentiation or to 
rationalise or refine existing differentiations.16 Differentiation of persons means the division of a population 
of persons by assigning them to classes, categories, groupings or (market) segments, or by identifying 
“outsiders”. At the same time, different objects of differentiation are provided or carried out for the 
differentiated groups of persons or individuals. An extreme form of differentiation is individualisation, i.e. 
differentiation targeted towards a single individual. Fundamentally, the individuals or groups of individuals 
need to be identified by using the wide range of options available today for processing personal data and 
drawing conclusions from it (Gandy Jr. 2010: 30). Differentiations are aimed at providing information, 
goods, services, payments, positions, granting of freedoms etc. to specific groups or individuals (see Table 1).
Table 1: Objects of algorithmic and data-based differentiations
Objects Examples
Information Website content, advertising, search results, (partner) contacts
Products and services Goods, including information or media products, real estate, insurance, 
loans, education, medical treatment, infrastructure services
Payments Prices, premiums, tariffs, interest, wages, wage replacement benefits
Development opportunities 
and positions
Training, working positions, working conditions, offices, other positions
Freedoms (Non)restrictions (detention, control, penalties)
Source: own compilation
There are many different reasons behind differentiations and the resulting unequal treatment of persons: 
(1) in order to manage different risks of persons and groups of persons, risk classes or risk measures (e. g. risk 
scores) are determined (e. g. risk of recidivism if a crime was committed, risk of credit default, risk of job 
change, risk of unsuitable staffing); (2) in order to determine the different value of the clientèle or strategic 
value of persons in economic relations and to use them to generate profit, classes and measures of economic 
potential (e. g. labour productivity, demand behaviour, sales potential or willingness to pay) are formed; 
(3) similarly, persons may be differentiated on social grounds, for example, on the basis of need, distribution 
of opportunities or solidarity, as is the case with special awards for students or pensioners and support 
programmes for certain groups of persons.
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Algorithm-based differentiations can also serve to differentiate behaviour controls.17 A distinction must be 
made between “hard” and “soft” behaviour controls. “Hard” behaviour controls are aimed at the technical 
exclusion of rule deviations and effective rule enforcement, e. g. through programmed access and usage 
rules for media products with digital rights management or programmed contract components for smart 
contracts or other block chain applications. “Soft” behavioural controls take place through financial 
incentives, information provided, recommendations, other “nudges”, etc.18 or “dark patterns”,19 which can 
be offered and administered with algorithms. These include, for example, incentives to reduce risky 
behaviour through personalised insurance rates, the selection of recipients of certain information or the 
design of the user’s options, such as personalised advertisements on websites or product recommendations 
in online trading. A characteristic of algorithmic systems is that they execute behavioural controls 
automatically on a large scale, i.e. not only for a single user, but for the entire number of relevant users 
(Yeung 2017, 2018: 19, 29).
Economic differentiations through the design of products, services and payments relating to groups or 
individuals have a long tradition in market economies. Nevertheless, the societal effects and the acceptability 
of such differentiations are the subject of controversy and repeated discussions. Algorithmic and data-
based differentiations bring these controversies about the advantages and disadvantages of differentiations 
to light. One of the advantages is that differentiated information, products or services can better meet the 
different preferences of demand. This can not only increase the demand, customer satisfaction and the 
identification of members of the clientèle with the offers and goods, but also reduce the costs of advertising 
by avoiding “unused” information or wastage in advertising. In principle, lower prices can also be conferred 
to certain groups. However, economic differentiations are also subject to criticism regarding a number of 
disadvantages that they bring – in particular, that they take unreasonable advantage of the willingness to 
pay and unilaterally reduce the consumer surplus.20 Differentiations, especially in the form of 
individualisations, can also limit the choices of the individual and thus their autonomy (Barocas & 
17 For a discussion based on various keywords, see “Lex informatica” Reidenberg (1998), “Code is Law” Lessig (1999), (2006), “Regulation 
by Software” Grimmelmann (2005), “Regulation by Design” Yeung (2008), “Software as Governance” Shah & Kesan (2010), “Regulating 
Code” Brown & Marsden (2013), “Governing Algorithm” Barocas, Hood & Ziewitz (2013), “Governance by Algorithm” Just & Latzer (2016), 
“Algorithmic Regulation” Medina (2015), Yeung (2017), Hildebrandt (2018), “Governing through Technology” Kallinikos (2011), 
“Verhaltenssteuerung durch Algorithmen” (Behavioural Control through Algorithms) Hoffmann-Riem (2017) or “Software als Institution” 
(Software as an Institution) Orwat et al. (2010), Orwat & Bless (2016). An overview of relevant research strands can be found in von 
Grafenstein et al. (2018), for example.
18 “Nudging” refers to entrepreneurial and political measures and instruments for influencing behaviour, which are mostly based on 
findings from behavioural research. They attempt to take the behavioural characteristics of people as a starting point and to prescribe  
their “decision-making and selection architecture”. This usually occurs without restricting their freedom of choice. The latter distinguishes 
them from commandments or prohibitions. Sometimes they also covertly target unconscious behavioural traits or exploit certain human 
characteristics, such as the tendency to avoid extra effort or to follow social norms and expectations. Examples include the default settings 
of computer systems or online services, specific ways of presenting or arranging goods (e. g. healthy food before unhealthy), pleas that 
appeal to social norms, certain ways of representing information on websites, or political or business measures designed as games 
(“gamification”). The boundaries between the longer known financial incentives or information policy measures are not always clear and 
may include them. Cf. Sunstein (2014), Smeddinck & Bornemann (2018), von Grafenstein et al. (2018).
19 “Dark patterns” are practices of designing the elements of computer systems, online services, e-commerce platforms or websites  
at the interface with the users, which attempt to steer users towards unintentional behaviour and decisions that are harmful to them. In 
terms of content, there is a strong overlap with “nudging”, whereby “dark pattern” refers primarily to the manipulative practices that lead 
to harm among the users. Examples include tracking-intensive default settings, restricting choices or making it more difficult to choose 
privacy-friendly settings, forcing registration, hiding cost information or providing information that creates a sense of urgency about a 
decision. Cf. Forbrukerrådet (2018), Mathur et al. (2019).
20 The so-called consumer surplus is the difference between the price that a consumer would be willing to pay for a product or service, 
and the market price that has actually formed for the product or service in the market. The greater the difference, the greater the financial 
benefit for the person on the demand side. One of the objectives of price differentiation is to impose higher prices on those customers who 
are willing to pay a high price for the product or service.
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Nissenbaum 2014: 54). The question of whether and how risks of discrimination can arise from 
differentiation will be considered in the course of the study.
Overall, technical, methodological and organisational developments have led to the fact that algorithmic 
and data-based differentiations can be carried out at lower costs, in a finer degree of detail and above all 
along new features, such as presumed determined characters and personality traits, compared to 
conventional forms of differentiation (Agrawal, Gans & Goldfarb 2016, 2018). For example, developments 
in digital technologies, including the internet, have reduced the cost of identifying and tracking individuals’ 
behaviour, characteristics and conditions, and have enabled better verification of identities (Goldfarb & 
Tucker 2017). Technically, the various possibilities of more or less unnoticed tracking21 (e. g. visits and 
behaviour from websites, in social networks and online trading platforms, when using apps), registrations 
and user accounts (and/or accounts or logins) serve this purpose. Identification of persons not only means 
the recognition of an individual; to an increasing extent, it also means the identification of characteristics 
and conditions such as age, emotional states, social status or sexual orientation. For applications with 
continuous data streams (e. g. posts on online social networks) and their analysis, the providers can also 
implement differentiations with constant adjustments and experiments within the business models 
(Varian 2014).
Differentiation or personalisation related to groups or individuals can be better implemented by computer-
based means, and better online than offline, not only because that the necessary database of identified 
persons or groups and their behaviour or states is available or can be obtained, but also because the separate 
group or person can be addressed in a more optimal manner from a technical standpoint. This is because 
information and communication technologies and automation have also reduced the costs of adaptation, 
such as menu costs or the costs of presenting information in a way that is adapted to people (e. g. Varian, 
Farrell & Shapiro 2004: pp. 12ff.). Personalisation can then be achieved, for example, on websites or in apps, 
in that the persons concerned only perceive “their” offer or the decision relating to them and do not have 
the opportunity to make direct comparisons. Comparability can be improved, for instance, with the help 
of comparison portals or by exchanging information with other users.
2.3.2 Scope of application
In the meantime, a wide range of international applications can be found in which systems with algorithmic 
and data-based differentiations are used, which have consequences on the way people live and their 
opportunities for development.22 Chapter 4 provides examples of cases of unequal treatment and risks of 
discrimination.
When it comes to working life, algorithms and data-based differentiation occurs within the context of 
selecting job applicants and determining different salary levels and working conditions for employees. The 
systems used for this purpose are called “talent analytics”, “people analytics”, “workplace analytics” or 
“human resources analytics”. The personal data collected includes data from job seekers’ application 
documents, from work processes including communication, and from the work results of the employees. 
In addition to determining the applicant’s suitability for the hiring organisation, the purpose of the systems 
is to check compliance with work regulations and organisational guidelines, to determine productivity for 
sanctions or rewards or promotions, and to determine the likelihood of absenteeism or leaving the 
21 See, for example, Klebert et al. (2012).
22 Lischka & Klingel (2017), Spielkamp (2019), Matzat et al. (2019) also provide overviews.
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company.23 An example of “talent analytics” is the digital recording of job interviews, which are evaluated 
using machine-learning methods of “social sensing” (Chamorro-Premuzic et al. 2017). Artificial intelligence 
algorithms are used for pattern recognition in the machine review of digitally available application 
documents, for voice and word choice analysis in (electronic) job interviews or for the recognition of 
certain facial expressions (e. g. when lying) in video job interviews. Another area is online platforms such as 
“social” online networks or online job market services, on which differentiated job advertisements can be 
placed, but which are also used to manage and evaluate the provided services by the service users or the 
platform company.24
Within trade, attempts are being made with algorithmic and data-based business practices to achieve price 
differentiation in various forms, in addition to targeted product recommendations and advertising 
(e. g. Lecuyer et al. 2015).25 Only a few examples of price differentiation with individualised prices for single 
individuals using personal data26 can be found in some online shops, more common is the granting of 
individual discounts, premiums or coupons in customer loyalty programmes (e. g. Payback) (US CEA 2015; 
Schwaiger & Hufnagel 2018). Price differentiation can take a further form by creating different versions of 
a product or service (“versioning”) and different market segments (“market segmentation”), on which 
products and services are offered at different prices depending on different quantities sold, at different 
times of the offer or in different (quality or feature) variants. Usually, the demanders assign themselves to 
certain market segments (self-selection), or can choose between different versions.27 Here, algorithmic 
procedures play a role above all in data analysis for the formation of market and customer segments, which 
can also be performed with anonymised data. In a third form of price differentiation, providers charge 
different prices for different groups (e. g. senior citizens’ discounts).28 Furthermore, algorithms and 
computer systems are used in customer management to calculate the so-called “customer lifetime value”, 
the economic value of a person as a customer over the entire (potential) life cycle of the customer 
relationship, in order to determine individual or group-related offers and advertising, to prevent customer 
churn or to selectively terminate relationships (“demarketing”) (Blömeke & Clement 2009; Vercellis 2011).
In the banking industry, new forms of credit scoring are applied, in which the data basis for credit score 
creation is expanded and new analysis methods are applied. While risk scores have long been used in 
lending, the current discussion is mainly focused on the extent to which the current regulation adequately 
addresses the risks of the new procedures.29 In the insurance industry differentiated insurance tariffs are 
offered which are based on new methods of collecting and analysing personal data. These include telematics 
tariffs for motor vehicle insurance, which include the recording and analysis of individual driving 
behaviour.30
23 See Rosenblat, Kneese & Boyd (2014), Burdon & Harpur (2014), Marler & Boudreau (2017), Chamorro-Premuzic et al. (2016), 2017), 
Dzida (2017), Weichert (2018): 59-61), Angrave et al. (2016), Kornwachs (2018), von Grafenstein et al. (2018: 25-26).
24 See overview e. g. in Bogen & Rieke (2018).
25 For a discussion of data-based price differentiation see US CEA (2015), Miller (2014), Ezrachi & Stucke (2016), Steppe (2017), Acquisti, 
Taylor & Wagman (2016), Zuiderveen & Poort (2017), Christl & Spiekermann (2016: pp. 41ff.), Schwaiger & Hufnagel (2018), Zander-Hayat, 
Reisch & Steffen (2016), Tillmann & Vogt (2018a), (2018b). For a discussion of price differentiation by gender and from the perspective of 
anti-discrimination law, see an der Heiden & Wersig (2017).
26 Also known as first-degree price differentiation. It is generally criticised that personal data is required for its implementation and that 
the privacy of the data subjects is curtailed. Cf. Varian, Farrell & Shapiro (2004: 14).
27 Also known as second-degree price differentiation.
28 Also known as third-degree price differentiation.
29 See Citron & Pasquale (2014), Weichert (2014), ULD & GP research group (2014), Hurley & Adebayo (2016), Ferretti (2017), Wei et al. 
(2016), Christl (2017), Eschholz (2017), Dorfleitner & Hornuf (2018).
30 See, for example, SVRV (2018), Hänold (2019).
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In health care, behavioural tariffs of (private) health insurance companies, in which personal data in the 
form of transaction data or vital parameters are recorded via wearables or smartphones via apps. In the 
discussion, not only legal concerns are raised, but also ethical ones, such as negative effects on the principle 
of solidarity and redistributive effects.31 Applications using algorithmic procedures, including machine 
learning, in particular for the analysis of image material, are found in medical diagnostic procedures. 
Systems are also used to assign patients to specific treatments and programmes.
In the public domain, systems are used for border control and predictive policing,32 to support court 
decisions, for the surveillance of public spaces, to identify potential criminals or terrorists and to manage 
social benefits, schools and universities or study places.33 According to Matzat et al. (2019: 28), various 
decision-making support systems are currently being tested or are in the pipeline in the job centres of the 
German Employment Agency (Arbeitsagentur).
From the above-mentioned algorithmic and data-based differentiations in the various areas of life, it does 
not necessarily follow that discrimination takes place. However, Chapter 4 gives examples of cases of 
unequal treatment and discrimination in individual areas of life.
2.3.3 Automated decision-making
The use of the term “automated decision-making” has become common in scientific discussion and (legal) 
practice. The term addresses both the use of algorithms for decision-making support of human decision-
makers and the automated execution of decisions, although these are not always clearly differentiated 
from each other. For both types, the terms “automated decision-making systems” (ADM Systems) or 
“automated decision systems” are also used (e. g. Zweig, Fischer & Lischka 2018; Zweig 2019).
For illustration purposes, the decision-making process can be divided abstractly into several steps, ranging 
from the recording of the outcomes of the data analyses, the evaluation of the situation and the alternatives 
including the reconciliation of predefined conditions, the selection between alternatives, to the triggering 
of an action.34 In a fully automated decision, all steps of the decision-making rules are executed by software. 
Humans are the ones to set the decision-making rules or, in the case of machine-learning methods, 
algorithms generate parts of the decision-making rules based on the analysis of data. Examples of fully 
automated decision-making systems are automated (online) bank lending, negative selection in systems 
for managing applications in the personnel sector, recommendation systems in electronic commerce, 
automated price adjustments, application and processing procedures in the insurance sector, spam filters 
in email programmes or (expected) automated administrative acts in public authorities, such as fully 
automated tax assessment notices (Busch 2018; Weichert 2018; Straker & Niehoff 2018; Hänold 2019).
How data analysis and decision-making processes relate in practice is very different and can, for illustration 
purposes, be divided into several types: (a) automated data processing and the decision-making process are 
separated and the outcomes of the data processing are virtually “manually” transferred to automated 
31 See Weichert (2018), German Ethics Council (2017), ten Have (2013), Christl & Spiekermann (2016: pp. 35ff.), Arentz & Rehm (2016), 
Bitter & Uphues (2017), Swedloff (2014), Selke et al. (2018).
32 On predictive policing see, for example, Merz (2016), Robinson & Koepke (2016), Selbst (2017), Richardson, Schultz & Crawford (2019).
33 Overview e. g. in Spielkamp (2019).
34 See also Parasuraman & Riley (1997: 232) (with further references), which indicate that automations are to be understood rather as 
specific manifestations within a spectrum between the extremes of manual handling on the one hand and complete automation on the 
other, where the machine controls all aspects of the function. Similarly, Cummings (2004a), Vercellis (2011: 25-28). For the decision-
making process, see similarly Kornwachs (2018: 174-179).
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decision-making processes or programmed there as decision-making rules or (b) the data processing is 
integrated into the decision-making process. With data mining and machine learning methods, for 
example, the outcomes in the form of optimised models can be directly embedded in decision systems as 
programme components as rules of differentiation (Barocas & Selbst 2016: 677; Lehr & Ohm 2017; Kleinberg 
et al. 2019). The distinction between these two types is important for the identification of discrimination, 
since in the case of the latter, the outcomes are often less comprehensible.35 For further considerations, an 
additional distinction is to be made between: (a) static systems, which perform data analyses once or at 
intervals separated by time and adapt the decision-making rules, and (b) dynamic systems, which constantly 
adapt and optimise the decision rules or models by continuously analysing data streams 
(e. g. Yeung 2017).
A precise distinction between decision support by automated data processing systems and fully automated 
decision execution is not only important from an ethical perspective36 nor only necessary in terms of 
attributing responsibility, but also from a legal point of view. This is because, in principle, Article 22 para. 1 
GDPR prohibits individual decisions based solely on automated processing, i.e. those that are made without 
human intervention (see Section 6.2.3, also on exemptions and permitted forms of application). In addition, 
there may be a tendency in practice that even in decision support systems, human decision-makers – 
particularly for reasons of efficiency, assumed neutrality or higher objectivity of computer conclusions, or 
because they find it difficult to justify any deviation from computer recommendations to superiors – to 
adopt the computer recommendations directly. As a result, decision support systems also tend to almost 
acquire the character of systems of fully automated decision execution.37 The advantages of semi- and fully 
automated decisions are seen in efficiency gains, avoidance of errors and prejudices in human decisions 
and enabling offers or reactions in “real time”. In addition to risks of discrimination, risks of automated 
decisions include potential manipulation, shifting of responsibility, lack of traceability and contestability 
by data subjects (Mittelstadt et al. 2016; Busch 2018; Weichert 2018; Ernst 2017: 1027-1029; Zarsky 2016).
When comparing human and automated decisions, it should be noted that many human decisions can be 
influenced by prejudices, stereotypes or other biases. Here, the initial expectation is that automated 
decisions made via computer systems are more “neutral” and “objective”, since decision-making rules can 
be executed without human emotions or subjective preferences, and algorithms can process much more 
information in a decision-making situation and thus make “better” decisions. However, it will be shown 
below that the expectations of greater rationality and neutrality are not necessarily fulfilled and that 
partially or fully automated decision-making systems may also give rise to new risks of discrimination.
Another important distinction is the number of decisions that are made. Where human decision-makers – 
such as administrators or company employees – have some scope for decision-making within decision-
making rules, the discrimination that occurs there may be limited to one or a few persons, depending on 
the number of discriminating employees.
In the case of automated differentiation decisions that have a potential to discriminate, all decisions taken 
by the system have the risk of discrimination. Risks of discrimination can thus become a mass 
phenomenon and easily lead to cumulative disadvantages.38
35 See also Section 3.4.
36 However, Wiegerling, Nerurkar & Wadephul (2018) emphasise from an ethical perspective that such decision-making systems are not 
really a matter of the system “deciding”, since such systems do not have an understanding of responsibility for consequences and do not 
pursue their own intentions.
37 A similar phenomenon is “automation bias”, which leads to people trusting the answers provided by computers more than their own 
assessments, e. g. Cummings (2004a).
38 See Gandy Jr (2010).
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3. Discrimination
3.1 Terms and understanding
39 The term “discrimination” is used here, as in general usage in German-speaking countries as well as in European and German federal 
law with its negative connotation as societally undesirable unequal treatment or disadvantaged treatment of persons, see e. g. Berghahn et 
al. (2016: 25). On the other hand, the term “discrimination” is often used in English literature, in particular in scientific papers, to describe 
any form of “distinction” or “differentiation” of persons, which also may be societally beneficial and acceptable.
40 Cf. Berghahn et al. (2014: pp. 57ff.), Schrader & Schubert (2018: AGG Section 3 points 68ff., Sections 8, 9, 10 and 20).
What actions are considered discriminatory is viewed differently in different societies, eras and regions. 
The demarcation is the outcome of societal conflicts, negotiations and agreements. These societal 
enshrinements take place above all in human and fundamental rights as well as in the laws and institutions 
that substantiate and enforce human and fundamental rights.
This study follows the common understanding of discrimination in the EU and the Federal Republic of 
Germany and understands discrimination as disadvantageous, unjustified unequal treatment of persons in 
connection with a protected characteristic.39 The unequal treatment is based on the categorisation and 
attribution of characteristics to persons. The categorisation and formation of characteristics can, for 
example, be based on stereotyping, prejudices or rational calculations, be hidden in rules and practices or 
be unintentional. Various legal catalogues define categories and characteristics as legally protected 
characteristics – synonymously called discrimination grounds – according to which persons must not be 
disadvantaged in unjustified ways. The most important are summarised in Table 2. Unjustified primarily 
means that there is no objective reason or objective justification for the unequal treatment. In other words: 
unequal treatment in itself may also be acceptable from a societal point of view if a recognised objective 
reason40 exists for this (see below).
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Table 2: Legally protected characteristics41
Protected characteristic Article 3 GG Sections 1 and 
others AGG**
Recital 71 GDPR Article 9 GDPR
“Race” or ethnic origin yes yes yes yes





Political opinion or 
viewpoint and other 
opinion
yes yes yes
Religion and belief yes yes yes yes
Disability yes yes
Age yes






Sex life, sexual identity 
or orientation
yes yes yes
Source: own compilation. * According to Article 9 para. 3 GG ** There is a graded use of the characteristics, e. g. “political world view” 
does not apply in the civil law section (see e. g. Wersig 2017)
The objects of differentiation mentioned in the previous Section 2.3 (e. g. goods, real estate, positions, etc.) 
are potentially eligible as objects of discrimination and risks of discrimination, but not all of them are 
regulated by law. Differentiation of products and services always also means that one person or group may 
be deprived of something or access may be made more difficult, while access may be made easier for 
another person or group. Price differentiation means that individuals may be hindered in their access to 
resources, goods and services that serve the economic, social and cultural development of personality or 
the development of skills. Disadvantages are then expressed in concrete economic losses, e. g. in the form 
of loans or prices for products and services, or denial of access to opportunities for personal development 
or development opportunities, such as employment, housing or educational opportunities. Even the 
differentiation of information can be problematic from an anti-discrimination perspective if the 
information relates to goods or positions (e. g. jobs) that serve personal development, social integration or 
political participation (e. g. information and information technologies such as internet access). Last but not 
least, differentiated information or non-information can limit the options available.
41 Other catalogues of protected characteristics can be found in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR), which also cover “property” and “birth”, as well as the open “other status” clause in the ECHR.
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3.2  Types of discrimination
42 Direct discrimination is also called “disparate treatment”, while indirect discrimination is also referred to as “systematic 
discrimination”, “disparate impact” or “unintended discrimination”.
43 In the following, the term “race” is placed in inverted commas or replaced by the term “ethnic origin” if it is used in the cited original 
texts, such as current legal texts or English language scientific literature. This follows the recommendation of UNESCO (1951) as well as 
biologists who point out the lack of a scientific basis for the term. See also e. g. Wersig (2017: 42).
Different types of discrimination are distinguished according to the purpose of research, discourse, 
discussion, and anti-discrimination decisions and measures. The most common distinction is between 
direct and indirect discrimination.42 According to Section 3 para. 1 of the General Equal Treatment Act 
(Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, German abbreviation AGG), direct discrimination occurs “[…] 
where one person is treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable 
situation on any of the grounds referred to under Section 1” (translated by the Federal Anti-Discrimination 
Agency 2009). Section 1 AGG itemises the reasons or characteristics including “race”43 or ethnic origin, 
gender, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation (see also Table 2). Pursuant to Section 3 para. 
2 AGG, indirect discrimination “shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or 
practice would put persons at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons on any of the grounds 
referred to under Section 1, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate 
aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary” (translated by the Federal Anti-
Discrimination Agency 2009).
A further distinction between taste-based and statistical discrimination is geared towards the different 
motivations of the decision-makers who make a differentiation (Lorenz 1993). In the case of taste-based 
discrimination, unequal treatment is based on the personal, prejudiced dislikes or preferences of the 
decision-makers against or for a certain group of people or on dislikes or preferences for certain products 
(Becker 1957/1971; for criticism see Arrow 1998). Taste-based discrimination can be based on affective likes 
and dislikes. It can also be based on other rationales, such as welfare state redistribution targets, for example 
maximum age limits for professors that are not based on statistical evidence but are rather a redistribution 
measure in favour of younger professors or candidates (Britz 2008: 23).
Risks of discrimination that can occur through the use of algorithms and data sets in differentiating 
individuals often have the character of statistical discrimination (Calders & Žliobaitė 2013: 53; Barocas & 
Self 2016: 677, 688-692; Goodman 2016; Williams, Brooks & Shmargad 2018).
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3.3  Statistical discrimination
44 On statistical discrimination, see, for example, Britz (2008), Scherr (2016), Hellman (1998), Schauer (2003), Lippert-Rasmussen (2007), 
Gandy Jr. (2009), Fang & Moro (2011), Schauer (2018).
45 For example, HR decision-makers in law firms have the differentiation objective of avoiding the risk of unsuitable recruitment. 
However, the main characteristic of being a good lawyer is difficult to determine because (a) it is not necessarily clear what characteristics 
and qualities make good lawyers, (b) some clearly relevant characteristics, such as judgment, could only be determined by extensive 
testing, and (c) even for relevant and testable characteristics, such as written expression, the determination requires costly assessment 
procedures. Therefore, it is more efficient for the HR decision-makers to use a substitute figure, such as the fact that applicants must be 
among the 10 per cent best in a year at a prestigious university. Example from Hellman (1998).
The concept of statistical discrimination is understood to mean the unjustified unequal treatment of 
persons on the basis of surrogate information.44 The decision-makers have incomplete information about 
the main characteristic of persons on whom a differentiation decision is to be made. There is a cost and 
(time) effort involved in the detailed examination of the person’s characteristics in order to obtain 
information about the main characteristic of differentiation. Costs or effort are judged by the decision-
makers to be so high that they resort to surrogate information that is comparatively cheaper or can be 
obtained with less effort.45 The surrogate information may also include variables belonging to a group that 
are the protected characteristics (e. g. the age variable) or variables that have a correlation with legally 
protected characteristics (e. g. years of professional experience). It is therefore possible to distinguish 
between two types of statistical discrimination: (1) if there is unjustified unequal treatment, which uses one 
or more legally protected characteristics as surrogate information, this can be referred to as direct static 
discrimination. An example would be the use of the ethnic origin characteristic when a supposed statistical 
link to labour productivity is suspected and people of a certain ethnic origin are excluded from jobs. 
(2) Where there are correlations between apparently neutral variables used and protected characteristics, 
there is indirect statistical discrimination. An example here is the use of the characteristic “part-time 
employment”, where there is a correlation with the protected characteristic gender, as women more often 
work part-time. For both types, the surrogate information is also called “proxies”.
If variables of a group membership are used as surrogate information (e. g. age of employees in the form of 
an age limit), a statistical relationship is often assumed between these variables and the differentiation 
objective (e. g. allocation of employees who are no longer capable of performing to retirement) and the 
main characteristic of differentiation (performance as an employee). This relationship is then generally 
assumed for further decisions about other or all individual group members, i.e. it is generalised and the 
surrogate information is used for generalisation. The assumptions about the “statistical” relationship can 
also be based on (supposed) empirical knowledge (Britz 2008: 8) or on statistical surveys and evidence. In 
the further course of the study, this “statistical” relationship and its changes with the use of algorithms will 
be examined in more detail.
According to Scherr (2016), the form of statistical discrimination also exists when decision-makers in 
markets (e. g. labour or housing markets) claim to have no prejudices or intentions of discrimination. 
However, due to a (supposedly) uncertain information basis about the characteristics, abilities and potential 
of individual applicants, “[...] assumptions about probable differences between social groups to which 
individuals are assigned are instead used as additional information to simplify the decision-making 
process” (Scherr 2016: 5; translated from the German original) (e. g. gender and skin colour instead of 
qualifications). This is often done when the time required to look at the individual case in detail is limited: 
“As a result, more or less plausible assumptions about the probable characteristics of categorically 
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differentiated groups are already a gateway for discrimination [...]” (Scherr 2016: 5; translated from the 
German original).
46 Information provided by employees of the Belgian equality body Unia – Interfederal Centre for Equal Opportunities, by email,  
14 November 2018.
47 Furthermore, the AGG regulates the justification reasons for unequal treatment in other areas: for direct discrimination in 
employment relationships in Sections 5, 8, 9 and 10 AGG, for other civil law relationships in Sections 5, 19 and 20 AGG and for direct 
discrimination in Section 3 para. 2 AGG; according to Wersig (2017: 29-30).
Example and special case
A recent case of statistical discrimination is currently being investigated in Belgium. There, the energy 
supplier EDF Luminus refuses to supply electricity to persons living within a certain postcode area. For  
the energy supplier, this postal code area represents an area with many people with poor payment habits. 
Even solvent potential buyers are excluded from supply without taking into account their individual 
solvency.46 This case represents a special form of statistical discrimination, the so-called “redlining”, which 
is based on the surrogate variable “place of residence” and has been given its name by encircling areas 
with red lines (e. g. Barocas & Selbst 2016: 689).
Some authors point out that statistical discrimination is a type of discrimination based on “rational” 
decisions made by the decision-makers. Therefore, this form is often attributed to rational discrimination 
(Gandy Jr. 2009, 2010; Hellman 2008). In contrast to taste-based discrimination, the decision-makers do not 
have an intrinsic aversion to a particular group as such, but discrimination is based on “rational” calculations 
in order to deal with an information deficit as efficiently as possible. The concepts and theories of statistical 
discrimination were first developed in economics using the example of the labour market (Phelps 1972; 
Arrow 1973). This type of discrimination has later been studied in particular for the housing market, the 
credit and insurance industry and various forms of age discrimination (e. g. Arrow 1998; Hinz & Ausprung 
2017; Britz 2008).
However, not all differentiations based on the formation of categories by statistical methods and analyses 
and the use of surrogate information are discrimination in the legal sense. There are challenges in assessing 
their legitimacy. The law provides standards by which it can be judged whether a form of statistical 
differentiation is considered unjustified. If, for example, it has the characteristic of indirect discrimination, 
the AGG requires that the objective justification and proportionality be examined.47 (1) The use of the 
allegedly neutral characteristic (also procedure, rule, regulation) may be objectively justified by a legitimate 
objective, for example, for reasons of labour market and social policy or for reasons related to the enterprise 
or production. In this context, the sole reference to reasons of costs is not admissible. The objective 
justification must always be assessed on a case-by-case basis. (2) Whether the means of achieving the 
objective is proportionate – i.e. necessary and appropriate – must also be examined. It must be examined 
whether a milder, equally suitable means is not available and whether the means is proportionate to the 
desired objective (here according to Wersig 2017: 26f.) (For details, see Section 6.1.3.2).
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3.4 Changes in statistical discrimination
48 In this context, the terms model and algorithm or learning algorithm are sometimes used synonymously, e. g. Lehr & Ohm (2017).  
For the sake of clarity, however, we will only talk about models in the following.
49 Here, “generalise” means that the model generalises from a given number of training examples to data never used before. “Over-
fitting” occurs when the model is too complex in view of the training data and does not generalise well when applied. One speaks of 
“underfitting” if the model is not complex enough to be able to reproduce complex relationships in reality. Cf. Géron (2018: 17, 26-29).
In data mining, big data analysis and machine-learning methods, the phenomenon of statistical 
discrimination is changed by replacing one or a few surrogate variables with entire models containing a 
large number of variables and their weighted relations to one another. Such models are generated by 
analysing large amounts of data and can be used as decision-making rules for differentiation or unequal 
treatment in software.
In general, machine-learning methods enable that mathematical models,48 which represent the linear or 
non-linear relationships between variables, are optimised on data sets, which are characterised by a large, 
previously unknown set of relevant variables. A distinction is often made between the learning or training 
phase on the one hand and the application or productive phase on the other (Géron 2018). As an outcome 
of the training phase, recognised correlations or patterns are stored as models and, in the application phase, 
incorporated into decision-making rules and transferred to new decision situations.
In simplified terms, machine learning consists of training a model with the following elements (1) collecting 
and compiling a data set, (2) specifying a concrete outcome to be predicted in the data set, (3) deciding 
which possible influence variables are formed and provided to the training algorithm to be considered in 
the final model, (4) constructing a procedure to find the best influence variable that uses all other variables 
to predict the desired outcome (the outcome is the differentiation model or differentiation algorithm) 
which can be used to make predictions about the outcome, e. g. the rating of a person, and finally (5) the 
validation of the procedure with a retained part of the data set (“hold out set” or “test data set”) that was not 
used for training (Kleinberg et al. 2019: pp. 17f.).
In the training phase, a mathematical model with learning algorithms is optimised in an iterative process 
by gradually adjusting the parameters with the aid of feedback until the model is best adapted (or “fit”) to 
the data set. Typically, one or more initial models are used, on which different learning algorithms are tried 
out until one of the learning algorithms produces the best performance of the model in terms of the most 
accurate prediction or estimation of the outcome (Géron 2018: 30). In the test phase, the model is applied 
to the test data set and checked for so-called “overfitting” or “underfitting”. Usually the problems of 
“overfitting” or “underfitting” arise when the generated model “fits” too much only to the training data set, 
does not generalise well, and does not “fit” well to the original data set from which the training data was 
taken.49 After the training and test phase, the generated model can be used in the so-called productive 
phase to actually make predictions or classifications based on new data.
Compared to conventional programming, the use of machine-learning methods can save time and money, 
or enable the processing of complex data processing tasks in the first place. With traditional programming, 
for example, to detect and filter out email spam, you would have to programme rules for individual terms, 
patterns or typical email components that are known to be common in spam email. This would require a 
complex list, which would also have to be reprogrammed at great expense if spammers changed terms or 
components. When using machine learning for spam filters, one takes emails that users have previously 
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marked as spam and lets the learning algorithm detect the relevant words or components (Géron 2018: 
4-6). The example shows that machine-learning methods are particularly suitable for tasks that are too 
complex or too costly for direct programming “by hand”.
Typical characteristics of machine learning are that machine-learning methods are able to process more 
dimensions of variables than conventional statistical methods, they are able to sometimes achieve higher 
accuracy in prediction or categorisation, and there are usually many models that can be tested and from 
which the most appropriate ones can be selected. In particular, with more variables available for 
differentiation decisions, there is some hope that the use of protected characteristics as criteria for 
differentiation may become unattractive and thereby reduce the risk of direct discrimination (US CEA 
2015: 16).
However, it became apparent early on that these characteristics can be regarded as advantages, but also 
have a number of disadvantages. For example, higher accuracy is associated with a loss of simplicity (and 
thus comprehensibility) (Breiman 2001). Or the problem of “overfitting” is caused, so that the machine-
generated categories no longer correspond to those that the user has actually intended (Hand 2006). Other 
issues that may lead to risks of discrimination are discussed in Chapter 5.
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4. Cases of Unequal Treatment, 
Discrimination and Evidence
In the following cases, unequal treatment of persons has resulted from the use of algorithms within 
differentiation applications, which are discussed as potential risks of discrimination or have been 
determined by the courts to be discriminating. In addition, some examples illustrate the general possibilities 
of proving discrimination without proving actual discrimination in the legal sense. The cases were compiled 
within the framework of a literature review, which was carried out between February 2018 and July 2019 
and repeatedly updated. With a multitude of algorithms for differentiation and a very large, almost 
unmanageable number of applications in various systems, it is not possible to systematically record all 
applications. It should therefore be noted that the cases presented cannot correspond to a complete 
systematisation. The examples are assigned and discussed in Chapter 5 and 6. Chapter 5 outlines possible 
causes of risks of discrimination and societal consequences and Chapter 6 needs for action and options.
4.1 Working life
Case 1: Personnel software at Amazon
According to a media report, Amazon has been using a software system under development since 2014 to 
search and evaluate the CVs of potential employees found on the web. The machine-learning process was 
trained on CVs to search for word patterns that would indicate successful employees. During the 
development period, it was noticed that the system was not gender neutral. The system downgraded terms 
with “women’s” and names of two exclusively female (high) schools. CVs from the last 10 years, mainly 
from men, were used as training data. This reflected the male majority of employees in the technology 
sector. Even with adjustments to the system, it was not possible to ensure that the system would not have 
developed other ways of discriminating against applicants. The development team was dissolved in 2017. 
According to the media report, staff members had considered the recommendations of the system but had 
not fully relied on the ranking (Dastin 2018).
Case 2: Online platforms TaskRabbit and Fiverr for freelancers
In a scientific study, Hannák et al. (2016) examined TaskRabbit (an online platform for freelancers) for 
unequal treatment. The online marketplace mediates smaller work services, such as household chores or 
the completion of errands. For the analysis, 3,707 profiles of those offering smaller work services from 
30 cities in the US were collected over a period of five years. They were evaluated with regression analyses 
according to their ratings, the algorithm-based ranking of the search results of the online platform and 
according to the ratings of the clientèle in relation to the characteristics gender and ethnic origin. It was 
found that (1) women – in particular white women – received 10 per cent fewer ratings than men with 
comparable qualifications, (2) black people received significantly lower rating scores than other individuals 
offering services with similar characteristics and (3) the algorithm for ranking search results correlated 
significantly with ethnicity and gender, with the lower ranking grouping varying from city to city. The 
researchers recommended that online marketplaces should proactively identify and reduce bias (Hannák 
et al. 2016).
In a similar scientific study on the online marketplaces TaskRabbit and Fiverr with 13,500 profiles of people 
offering their work services, unequal treatment was also found in the reviews of the people offering their 
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work with regard to the perceived characteristics of gender and ethnic origin (“race”) (Hannák et al. 2017). 
In contrast to TaskRabbit, the online marketplace Fiverr mediates smaller “virtual” work services, such as 
the design of digital documents, help with programming or video editing. The personal data automatically 
collected via web crawling was assessed by human evaluators and assigned to gender and ethnic origin, as 
this concrete information is otherwise not used on the platforms. The evaluators were commissioned 
through the Amazon Mechanical Turk service. As an outcome, it has been demonstrated that black people 
on Fiverr have received fewer reviews and lower ratings. Also, the language used in the reviews, which were 
evaluated through linguistic analysis, differed according to gender and ethnic origin at the Fiverr service. 
In addition, they found an algorithmic bias in the ranking of search results on the TaskRabbit service, 
which resulted in negative correlations between the search result rank on the one hand and gender and 
ethnic origin on the other. However, the cause of the latter outcome could not be determined. Instead, the 
researchers assume that the algorithm for the search results is based on the reviews and ratings of the users 
who have used the services. As these were biased, so were the rankings of the search results (ibid., pp. 1915, 
1927). The risks of discrimination were transferred and reinforced.
Case 3: Gender-biased unequal treatment on online platforms for job seekers
In a scientific study, Chen (2018) investigated gender-biased unequal treatment in specialised online 
platforms or search engines for the field of work in the USA. On the one hand, the online platforms allow 
job seekers to upload their CVs and short profiles to the site, and on the other give those looking for staff 
the opportunity to view the digital CVs that have been automatically sorted and ranked. The study looked 
at the algorithms used to rank the search engine results of Indeed, Monster and CareerBuilder. None of the 
search engines allowed results to be filtered or sorted by demographic characteristics (e. g. gender, ethnicity), 
but they did allow the use of surrogate variables, such as years of work experience, as an indicator of age. To 
generate the survey data, searches for applicants were conducted for 20 cities and 35 job titles using an 
automatic web browser, resulting in data on 355,000 applicants. The researchers were able to deduce the 
gender from the first names.
As a result, gender differences were found in the search results for all three online platforms. With regard 
to individual fairness, which was determined from the ranking according to gender with otherwise 
identical characteristics, a slight disadvantage of women was shown (although with only low effect sizes). 
With regard to group fairness, which would exist if the ranking algorithm assigned an equal distribution of 
ranks for women and men, men were better off in 12 of 35 occupational groups. As the websites did not 
collect any information on gender, the researchers did not consider that there was any direct discrimination, 
but other hidden characteristics (unemployment and institution of higher education) might have been 
taken into account.
The researchers were unable to clearly interpret the outcomes. In the case of individual fairness, according 
to one of their hypotheses, the outcome could also have been obtained if the algorithm had adjusted the 
rank according to how many jobseekers clicked on the respective profile. According to their assessment, 
the outcomes on group fairness can be explained by the structural inequality that already exists in some of 
the occupational groups considered (e. g. software developers). As a result, the cause of unequal treatment 
cannot be seen in the algorithms; instead, the researchers assess the search engines as successful when it 
comes to fairness in the sense of equal treatment of equal applicants. However, they do not see this for a 
fairness interpretation that means a distribution of employees according to the distribution in the overall 
population and would mean an active recruitment of underrepresented employees.
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Case 4: Discriminatory job ads on Facebook
According to the Danish Institute for Human Rights (Institute for Menneskerettigheder), legal action is 
currently being taken against companies that have used or are using Facebook’s differentiation feature to 
place selective job advertisements for men only on the online platform. The action is not directed against 
Facebook itself, but against the companies placing the ads. The unequal treatment was uncovered by a 
journalist who also researched the evidence and provided it to The Danish Institute for Human Rights. 
Further details, e. g. on algorithms for basic profiling and for enabling selective advertising, are not known.
On the basis of The Danish Act on the Equal Treatment Board and the Discrimination Act, the Danish 
Institute for Human Rights is empowered to bring potential discrimination cases to the tribunal without a 
specific complainant.50
Case 5: Age-based discrimination in job advertisements on Facebook
An investigation by the journalists’ association ProPublica and the New York Times (Angwin, Scheiber & 
Tobin 2017) revealed age discrimination on the online platform Facebook. Companies such as Amazon, 
Verizon, UPS, Goldman Sachs and Facebook itself used the opportunity to post job ads on Facebook only 
for certain age groups. This was made possible by the approximately 5,000 options for the personalisation 
of advertisements, known as “microtargeting”. The setting options are based on the detailed, algorithm-
based analysis of data on Facebook users. As the older Facebook users did not see the ads, questions arose 
about the unequal treatment of people over the age of 40, which is prohibited under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act. The prohibition also refers to “assistance” in or “support” for age discrimination. 
Ultimately, the reporting led to a lawsuit filed by the union “Communications Workers of America” and 
others in the San Francisco District Court.
The union “Communications Workers of America” and others then filed a class action lawsuit against the 
companies T-Mobile, Amazon, Cox Communications and Cox Media in 2017 (United States District Court 
for the Northern District of California 2018). The procedural documentation indicates that the plaintiffs 
accused the designated companies and many other companies of having posted age-discriminatory job 
advertisements on Facebook. Together with other court cases, an agreement with Facebook was reached as 
an outcome of the proceedings (see Case 7).
Case 6: Age-based discrimination in job advertisements on online recruitment sites
According to the public prosecutor’s office, the state attorney of the US state of Illinois, Lisa Madigan, 
brought formal action against the online employment websites Beyond.com, CareerBuilder, Indeed Inc., 
Ladders Inc., Monster Worldwide Inc. and Vault for suspected age discrimination. She sent letters to the 
companies warning that older users could face disadvantages when seeking employment due to the 
requirement that users comply with certain age requirements on the websites. For example, companies 
allow education and work experience information in the website menus only from a certain year limit, or 
the information must be provided at intervals from a certain year that do not fit older applicants with 
previous education and longer work experience, so that they can only create incomplete application 
profiles (Illinois Attorney General 2017). Algorithms are used here to control which information data 
subjects can provide, how personal data is analysed and classified, and they enable the automated and 
targeted addressing of specific groups of people.
50 Information provided by staff at The Danish Institute for Human Rights, by email to the author, March 2019.
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Case 7: Gender discrimination through job ads on Facebook
In 2018, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), law firm Outten & Golden LLP and the Communications 
Workers of America (CWA) union, together with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
filed a lawsuit against Facebook and 10 employing companies for unlawful discrimination based on gender, 
as job ads on Facebook were only posted to a male target audience, thereby excluding all women and non-
male users from receiving the ads.51
In addition to the three protected characteristics (location, age, gender) that advertisers had to select, 
Facebook provided numerous other categories for detailed targeting that differentiated explicitly or 
implicitly by gender, such as “[...] Single Dads, Single Moms, Soccer Mom, Working Moms, Working Mother, 
Bad Moms, Strong Single Moms, Proud Single Mother, The Single Moms Club.”52
Among the problematic practices cited in the indictment was the so-called “lookalike audience” service. 
Here, employers or employment agencies could transfer lists of their existing employees to Facebook. 
Facebook compared these with the data records on Facebook users and provided employers or employment 
agencies with lists of demographically similar Facebook users to whom targeted job advertisements could 
be sent. Facebook used features such as location, age, gender and interests in the processing. In the opinion 
of the complainants, this constitutes direct discrimination.53
In March 2019, in a total of five court cases,54 an agreement between the company Facebook and the plaintiff 
organisations was reached, in which Facebook pledged, among other things, to set up a separate area on its 
platform for advertisements on staff positions, housing and loans, in which it would no longer be possible 
to address people according to age and gender and settings correlating with protected characteristics. The 
targeted advertising approach based on postcodes or within a region below a 15-mile radius will be 
abolished. The categories used in the “lookalike audience” service will be limited to “country, region, 
profession and field of study”. Advertisers will also have to confirm compliance with anti-discrimination 
rights. The company also intends to set up a system of automated and human verification for correct 
identification and classification of advertisements.55
Case 8: Gender-biased unequal treatment in occupational classification
When it comes to online personnel searches and automated procedures of recruitment, the websites and 
online biographies of job seekers and professionals are becoming increasingly important. Likewise, whether 
and how these websites and biographies are found – and thus give job seekers access to employment 
positions – is also gaining in importance. Automated decision-making systems must be able to precisely 
record the jobs, skills, interests, etc. To this end, machine-learning methods should improve the assignment 
of persons to occupational group classifications on the basis of the descriptions (in particular the words 
used and their combinations) on the websites.
51 See information on the ACLU website, https://www.aclu.org/cases/facebook-eeoc-complaints (last retrieved on 28 August 2019), and 
in the indictment “Charge of discrimination”, available on the ACLU website https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/facebook-eeoc-
complaint-charge-discrimination (last retrieved on 28 August 2019).
52 See the indictment in footnote 51.
53 See the indictment in footnote 51.
54 According to Gillum & Tobin (2019).
55 Sherwin & Bhandari (2019) and information from the “Exhibit A – Programmatic Relief” agreement document, available on  
the ACLU website: https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/exhibit-describing-programmatic-relief-facebook-settlement (last retrieved  
on 28 August 2019).
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In a scientific study, DeArteaga et al. (2019) uncovered gender-biased unequal treatment in occupational 
classification based on existing gender inequalities in employment. The search engine Common Crawl was 
used to collect 397,340 online biographies. They tested three methods of machine learning for semantic 
representation with the outcome that scrubbing explicit gender indicators, such as first names or pronouns, 
was not sufficient in removing the gender imbalance, and that even in the absence of gender indicators the 
recognition rate (true positive rate) correlated with the existing gender imbalances in the occupational 
groups. Therefore, job classifications could further increase gender imbalances (DeArteaga et al. 2019: 2).
56 See for the agreement on the advertisements for jobs, housing and loans, which concerned several complaints at once (Case 7).
57 As of March 2019.
4.2 Real estate market
Case 9: Discrimination in housing ads on Facebook
Research by the journalists’ association ProPublica showed that the company Facebook allowed to 
discriminate on its social networks when advertising flat rentals. To this end, ProPublica had placed ads 
itself and used the settings for the targeted ads to ensure that they were not targeted at African Americans, 
mothers with high school children, people who needed a wheelchair ramp, people of the Jewish faith, 
people emigrating from Argentina and Spanish-speaking people. These groups of people are protected 
under the “Fair Housing Act”, the US anti-discrimination law for the housing market. Facebook approved 
all the ads, although their own company policies should have prevented this. As a result of the research, the 
U. S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which also monitors the prohibition of 
discrimination in housing and renting, took action (Angwin, Tobin & Varner 2017).
In March 2018, the National Fair Housing Alliance (NFHA) filed a lawsuit against Facebook. In March 2019, 
the court proceedings were concluded with an agreement. After this, NFHA now offers the company a Fair 
Housing training programme, Facebook’s advertising policy is regularly monitored and Facebook supports 
programmes to expand Fair Housing. Furthermore, Facebook has promised to set up a separate advertising 
portal for housing, employment and credit advertising with limited opportunities for targeted advertising 
(NFHA 2019).56
The HUD (US HUD 2019b) filed an additional lawsuit in March 2019.57 The indictment focuses on the role 
of Facebook in the selection of those Facebook users who are displayed an advertisement or not. This 
selection decision would be based as much as possible on conclusions and predictions about the likelihood 
of users responding to the advertisement. According to the HUD, the conclusions and predictions are based 
on an analysis of the data that the company has on the individual, as well as data on other users that 
Facebook considers similar, and data on the “friends” and other people associated with the individual 
through Facebook (“associates”). The analysis is carried out using machine learning or other prediction 
techniques. Facebook uses gender and proxies for other legally protected characteristics, such as the 
websites visited, what apps a user has, where a user goes during the day and what purchases a user makes. 
This information would also be used to determine the prices that advertisers would have to pay for the 
targeted placement of the ad. Facebook determines the selection of those who see the ad, not the advertisers. 
In addition, advertisers who want to address a broad audience cannot achieve this, because the Facebook 
system makes selective decisions based solely on the characteristics of people who are most likely to 
respond to the ad (US HUD 2019a: 5).
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Case 10: Unequal treatment on Airbnb based on ethnic origin
In a scientific study, Edelman and Luca (2014) point to unequal treatment based on ethnic origin on the 
commercial online marketplace for short-term rentals, Airbnb.com. In order to build reputation and trust, 
Airbnb enables landlords to place self-descriptions in the form of personal profiles, as well as allowing 
tenants to post ratings about landlords and landlords about tenants online. In a 2014 study analysing data 
on rentals in New York City, which establishes a correlation between the photos of the landlords and the 
rental prices, they show that non-black landlords can achieve twelve per cent higher rental prices for 
comparable offers as compared to black landlords. However, they cannot draw any clear conclusion from 
the outcomes as to whether this is a form of taste-based or statistical discrimination. They interpret the 
outcomes as unintended consequences of the mechanisms for building reputation and trust.
In another study using data on transactions via the platform Airbnb.com in the cities of Baltimore, Dallas, 
Los Angeles, St. Louis and Washington D. C., Edelman, Luca & Svirsky (2017) showed that the landlords 
accepted rent seekers with names that sounded “white” in 50 per cent of the rental requests, while they 
accepted seekers whose names sounded African American in only 42 per cent of the rental requests. 
Discrimination, i.e. the rejection of guests, results in “costs” for those offering properties on the site, in the 
form of lost profits due to rooms remaining empty. According to the authors, however, the study could not 
explain the mechanisms leading to discrimination, and this study also does not provide clear evidence on 
whether discrimination is taste-based or statistical (Edelman, Luca & Svirsky 2017: 17).
Case 11: Ethnicity-based unequal treatment on Airbnb
Based on the study by Edelman and Luca (see Case 10), Gilheany et al. (2015) show that Asian landlords on 
the rental service website Airbnb fetch 20 per cent lower prices than white landlords for similar rentals. To 
this end, they examined a total of 101 Airbnb landlords in the cities of Oakland and Berkeley who could be 
identified as white and “Asian”. However, the authors cannot clearly identify the causes of the differences. 
This example also shows that the identifiability of the provider leads to the risk of discriminatory behaviour 
by other beneficiaries. Questions arise as to whether platform operators could not better prevent this risk 
using their possibilities of managing and controlling what information is communicated via the platforms.
4.3 Trade
Case 12: Proof of price differentiation in electronic commerce
In a scientific study of e-commerce companies in the general trade and travel sector (Hannák et al. 2014), 
researchers used the accounts and cookies of 300 fictitious users to prove price differentiation, i.e. prices 
adjusted to some users, and price control, i.e. controlled arrangement of search results for particularly 
expensive or less expensive products in high rankings. They set up user accounts to find out the impact of 
different characteristics of the users, such as the type of web browser, operating system, the existence of a 
user account or the products purchased and viewed in the past. For the investigation, they used control 
accounts to separate actual personalisation from interference or noise. To measure this, they developed a 
metric for information retrieval. For the study, work services were purchased via the crowdsourcing 
platform Amazon Mechanical Turk. They found personalisations at nine of the 16 online retailers 
investigated. Two companies use price differentiation to grant reduced prices to “members”. Two companies 
use A/B tests (two variants of a website are shown for different groups of people), which lead a subgroup of 
users to more expensive hotels, two companies use personalised search results for mobile devices and one 
company personalises the search results based on past clicks and purchases (Hannák et al. 2014: 306). 
Although the example does not show discrimination in the legal sense, since no protected group of persons 
seems to be disadvantaged, it does illustrate that algorithm-based price differentiation can be proven 
“from the outside” without direct inspection of the algorithms.
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Case 13: Unequal treatment in logistics at Amazon
According to a media report, Amazon’s “Same Day Delivery” offer used an algorithm to calculate the areas 
in which the company was the first to introduce the then new form of delivery. Although the algorithm did 
not consider ethnic origin as an input, it excluded neighbourhoods with predominantly black inhabitants. 
According to Amazon, features that were considered in the algorithm included proximity to the nearest 
distribution centre and the number of people with a prime membership in an area. Presumably a correlation 
to the characteristic of ethnic origin was created. Journalists researched the case for six cities. They tested 
the availability of the service according to postal codes and compared the data and maps obtained with 
data from official population statistics. Following the reporting and protests, the company promised to 
extend the service to previously disadvantaged areas (Ingold & Soper 2016).
4.4 Advertising and search engines
Case 14: Stereotypes in search engine results
Noble (2018) used numerous examples to show how search engines contributed to the increase in racism 
by referencing disparaging stereotypes in the ranking of the output of links, in the images displayed or in 
word completions in the auto-complete search box (e. g. predominantly pornographic images when 
searching for the keyword “black girls”). She mainly used the search engine Google.
An early and much-cited example is described in a media report. According to this, a Google photo app 
automatically assigned a derogatory designation with the tag “gorillas” to photos of black people 
(Kasperkevic 2015).
Case 15: Gender differences in search results for images for occupations
In several scientific studies, Kay et al. (2015) examined the results of searches for images of occupational 
groups that were output by Google’s search engine and whether the search results reinforced stereotypes 
in representation and perception. Among other things, the investigations showed an under-representation 
of women in the search results for those occupational groups stereotypically dominated by men compared 
to the gender ratio of the official employment statistics for these occupational groups. This reinforces 
stereotypes. It was also shown that the quality of the presentation (particularly in terms of the professionalism 
shown) assessed by respondents was also higher for those occupational groups that corresponded to gender 
stereotypes. The researchers also showed that the perception of gender relations in search results has an 
impact on perceptions of actual gender relations in occupations. The authors discuss their findings with 
regard to possible amplification effects on inequalities in occupations, including the fact that this could 
also influence or limit the pursuit of careers in the occupations. However, they expect improvements in the 
automated marking of images (ibid., p. 3826).
Case 16: Unequal treatment in targeted advertising on Gmail
Through case studies, Lecuyer et al. (2015) show that the Google service Gmail also uses sensitive or legally 
protected characteristics for targeted advertising (e. g. health, religious affiliation and interests, sexual 
orientation or tight financial situation). The authors used the open source system “Sunlight” they developed 
for the investigation, which served to detect and statistically prove personalisation on the web, i.e. in the 
form of personalised advertising, recommendations or personalised content.
Case 17: Gender-biased unequal treatment in advertising on Google services
Another scientific study was devoted to the ad settings of Google’s services (Datta, Tschantz & Datta 2015). 
For the study, the authors used the “AdFisher” system, which served to investigate the interrelationships 
between user behaviour, Google’s advertising and user settings. The system collects large amounts of 
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personalisation results, such as personalised advertisements, using computer-simulated agents. They 
demonstrated that advertising for higher paid jobs had been shown comparatively more to men than to 
women when the gender was changed to women in the “Ad setting” settings, although the web browsing 
behaviour was identical. Since the investigation “from the outside” looked at a complex “ecosystem” of 
online advertising, the exact cause of the unequal treatment could not be uncovered.58
Case 18: Ethnicity-based unequal treatment in the placement of advertising
In an empirical study, Sweeney (2013) proves that advertisements for commercial products of the 
documentation of arrests, previous convictions, criminal offences, etc. (“arrest records”) in Google’s search 
engine results on web pages using the ad service are displayed differently, depending on whether the 
names searched for indicate a particular ethnic origin. For example, employers use this kind of 
documentation when evaluating jobseekers. In the survey, the ads for the products were more often found 
when searching for names that sounded “non-white” than for names that sounded “white”. The cause was 
seen in the algorithmic process that Google used in the Google AdSense service to display targeted ads for 
certain search queries. Behind this was an automated real-time auction mechanism that controls the prices 
and placement of advertisements. The mechanism included, among others, the (previous) rates of clicking 
on advertisements. The author has not (yet) been able to identify any clear causes for unequal treatment 
(ibid., p. 52), but the algorithm for the placement of advertisements is used to analyse the behaviour of 
users on the search engine website, i.e. the recorded click behaviour as well as past and current trends, and 
accordingly reflects societal unequal treatment.59
Case 19: Gender-biased unequal treatment in advertising on Facebook
Lambrecht and Tucker (2019) demonstrated gender differences in online advertising for STEM (Science, 
Technology, Engineering and Maths) careers in an empirical case study. They showed that the test ad, which 
was placed in 191 countries on the online “social” network Facebook, was shown 20 per cent more often to 
men than to women, although women were more likely to respond to the ad (“click through rates”). The 
authors interpret this to mean that the group “women” is more expensive for advertisers, since the 
algorithmic mechanism calculates prices according to the probability of users viewing the advertisement, 
i.e. the “click through rate”. The authors assume that advertisers lose more auctions for the target group 
“women” than for the target group “men”. A comparable unequal display of ads between women and men 
has also been demonstrated for the advertising providers Google Display Network, Instagram and Twitter. 
With these results, the authors illustrate that economic mechanisms – in this case the advertising auction 
mechanism of online platforms – in particular can lead to discriminatory outcomes of algorithm-based 
differentiations. The study of Ali et al. (2019) confirmed the results of the study (see Case 20).
Case 20: Gender-biased unequal treatment in advertising algorithms
Ali et al. (2019) examined selective or personalised advertising on the Facebook platform for possible 
discrimination. For this purpose, they used the “Custom Audience” customisation service that Facebook 
made available to advertisers60 and determined the target group with a list prepared according to telephone 
numbers (and randomly selected users for control purposes). They tested the image recognition algorithm 
58 For further analysis of the case, which leads to similar outcomes, and legal classification under US law, see Datta et al. (2018).
59 Guidance on explanation is given in the examinations of the Cases 19 and 20 below.
60 The authors group the various possibilities of targeted advertising on the Facebook platform, (1) by group-based selection according 
to demographic characteristics, such as age, gender, location or profile information of users, (2) by individual persons who can be specified 
to Facebook, such as in the form of lists of names, addresses, telephone numbers, birthdays, or in the form of persons who are recognised 
by web tracking tools (“custom audience”), or (3) certain groups of persons can be selectively addressed by referring to users who are 
similar to those who have already been selected (“lookalike audience”), cf. Ali et al. (2019: 4).
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by placing various advertisements with stereotypical images for women and men, with some of the 
advertisements showing “female” or “male” stereotypical features that could only be recognised by machine 
image recognition (e. g. construction machinery or military for men, bridal bouquets or perfume for 
women), while for human viewers these images were not recognisable. Nevertheless, the majority of the 
prepared images reached a “female” or “male” target group. The researchers therefore concluded that 
Facebook had analysed the image data and automatically assigned and delivered the ads according to 
stereotypically unequal gender. From their findings, they concluded that the company’s internal algorithm 
determined which advertisements were displayed to which users and that the algorithm could therefore 
be discriminatory. The algorithm acted independently of the settings that advertisers could define in the 
selection of target groups. However, the authors admit the limitation that their outcomes cannot be 
generalised.
The outcomes of the study point to possible legal consequences, as they show that not only those who 
place the advertisements are responsible, but also the platform company Facebook, which develops and 
uses the algorithms of the ad regulations. The outcomes can also be linked to the lawsuit filed by the U. S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) on housing claims (see Case 9) (Matsakis 2019).
4.5 Banking industry
Case 21: Ethnicity-based discrimination and the emergence of FinTechs
By comparing traditional lending with algorithm-based lending, Bartlett et al. (2018) show that ethnicity-
based discrimination has continued to exist in the US mortgage market (for African Americans and Latin 
Americans), even with algorithm-based lending decisions. However, algorithms and the emergence of 
FinTechs have changed the nature of discrimination from discrimination based on human prejudice or 
aversion to illegitimate applications of statistical discrimination using big data variables. Big data variables 
replace variables for risk assessment that are not or only poorly determinable with surrogate variables 
(e. g. the authors mention high school graduation for income increases as one of many variables). Algorithm-
based lending has increased competition, facilitated comparability between providers and also facilitated 
switching between them. In addition, FinTech companies do not discriminate by refusing loans, as 
conventional lenders do, but by setting higher prices or interest rates. In the latter case, however, the degree 
of discrimination (measured by additional interest rate premiums) was as high as in conventional lending.
Case 22: Multiple discrimination in online lending by Svea Ekonomi
According to the judgement document (YVTltk 2018), the National Non-Discrimination and Equality 
Tribunal of Finland (Yhdenvertaisuus- ja tasa-arvolautakunta) sentenced a credit institution in Finland for 
using an inappropriate statistical method, using protected characteristics and failing to perform an 
individual assessment of solvency (on the judgement, see YVTltk 2018).
The credit institution Svea Ekonomi AB had refused to extend the loan of a male applicant, who had applied 
for it on a website in connection with an online purchase. The person concerned reported the case to the 
anti-discrimination ombudsman, who brought the credit institution before the tribunal. The tribunal 
decided that the loan-granting procedure must no longer be used and imposed a fine of 100,000 euros. The 
tribunal based its decision on the fact that this was a case of direct multiple discrimination, as the legally 
protected characteristics of gender, mother tongue, age and place of residence had been used, and that the 
applicant had not been individually assessed with regard to his credit behaviour and creditworthiness; 
instead, formal and abstract credit data based on the credit behaviour of others had been used (YVTltk 
2018). In this case, the characteristics of statistical discrimination are clearly evident, i.e. eschewing 
individual assessments and instead using surrogate variables which, in the case in question, were the 
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protected characteristics of gender, mother tongue, age and place of residence, and constitute direct or 
indirect statistical discrimination.
A schematic credit decision was available, based on internal data of the credit company, the credit data file 
and score data. The score represented factors such as gender, language, age and place of residence and was 
based on statistical correlations calculated using data on other people. These indicated that men had 
repayment problems more often, which is why they received a lower score than women. Similarly, Finnish-
speaking residents received a lower score compared to Swedish-speaking residents. The plaintiff’s mother 
tongue is Finnish. If he had been a woman or had Swedish been his mother tongue, the score would have 
been enough for the loan. The ombudsman pointed out that the credit applicant had not defaulted (YVTltk 
2018: 7). Since the man also lived in a region that was assigned a value for unknown areas by the system, 
this was also seen as a disadvantage (YVTltk 2018: 6).
In the lawsuit, the ombudsman distinguished precisely that the credit scoring system cannot be used to 
obtain precise information on the actual situation of an individual applicant, as the system can only give a 
statistical assessment of how likely it is on average that applicants will match the profile of applicants with 
a poor credit score. He also pointed out that the applicant had not been treated as an individual, but instead 
as a “representative of statistical profiling”, based mainly on variables of the protected characteristics that 
the lender applies to all persons who fit the profile, such as men who live in a certain neighbourhood or 
have a certain mother tongue and are of a certain age (YVTltk 2018: 4f.). As a result of this method, people 
with a stable income and with evidence of the ability to repay the loan would be refused a loan (YVTltk 
2018: 5).
The defendant credit institution stated in its response that under anti-discrimination law, unequal 
treatment does not constitute discrimination if the treatment is based on legislation and has an otherwise 
acceptable objective and the measures to attain that objective are proportionate (YVTltk 2018: 8). Moreover, 
the credit procedure had complied with the Credit Data Act and the supervisory authority did not have any 
objections to the procedure. The credit decision procedure is a part of other operators’ online sales systems; 
this type of online financing is purchase-bound and is a fast and automated process. The individual credit 
assessment of credit-seekers using personal information and documents, such as salary or tax certificates, 
is not suitable for this type of financing process (YVTltk 2018: 10f.).
The tribunal nevertheless ruled that the procedure was not proportionate and therefore not acceptable 
under the applicable discrimination laws. The tribunal also ruled that the credit institution could not 
refute the presumption of discrimination (YVTltk 2018: 2). The judgement also states that assessments of 
solvency are increasingly based on assumptions generated with data collected from other people. These 
assumptions cannot be used to provide the credit applicant with acceptable reasons for refusing the loan, 
in particular if the credit applicant is not given an opportunity to clarify their actual ability to pay and the 
factors that affect it (YVTltk 2018: 17).
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4.6 Medicine
61 At the time of this study, only an abstract was available.
Case 23: Biased data records in a diagnostic system
Biased training data was found in a health care machine-learning system designed to predict the risk of 
mortality for patients with pneumonia. The system is intended to support decisions on whether patients 
can be treated as outpatients or inpatients. The system, based on a neural network, identified a higher 
chance of survival for patients with asthma, an assumption that in fact contradicted medical experience. 
The bias in the data set resulted from the fact that patients with pneumonia and a (long-term) asthma 
disorder were taken directly to intensive care units. As a result, better outcomes were achieved for patients 
with pneumonia and asthma than for patients who “only” had pneumonia. Although the system made 
correct predictions, the problem arose because this information about the context was not included in the 
decision support system (Caruana et al. 2015). The case also illustrates the problems that arise when 
contextual factors that are relevant but not represented in data sets are ignored in decisions (Cabitza, 
Rasoini & Gensini 2017: E1).
Case 24: Ethnicity-based discrimination in patient allocation
Obermeyer and Mullainathan (2019)61 describe finding evidence of ethnicity-based discrimination or 
“racial” bias in a widely-used commercial system for allocating patients in need of intensive medical care 
to a care management programme. The assignment to the “care management” programme is associated 
with a higher allocation of resources. White patients were more likely to be assigned to the programme 
than black patients in a comparable state of health. The allocation was made using an algorithmically 
generated risk score. The calculation included data on the total medical expenditure in a given year and 
fine-grained data on the use of health services in the previous year. The score therefore did not reflect the 
expected state of health, but instead predicted the cost of treatments. From the authors’ point of view, these 
cost predictions are also accurate and unbiased.
However, the problem is that, although treatment costs can be used as proxies for health status, this is 
insufficient surrogate information. This is because factors other than health status alone determine the 
cost level, such as ethnic origin. As such, black patients would cost less to treat, depending on their health 
status. An algorithm that correctly predicts the costs for individual ethnic groups inevitably provides 
biased predictions about health conditions. They attribute the problem to the determination of the 
objective function and the selection of labels, which unilaterally target cost optimisation and generate 
externalities with regard to health (Obermeyer & Mullainathan 2019).
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4.7 Transport
Case 25: Quasi-segregation in navigation services
The navigation service “Ghetto Tracker”, which was renamed “Good Part of Town” in the US, was suspected 
of pointing out “unsafe” areas with predominantly non-white inhabitants and was shut down again after 
protests. However, according to Silver, various other navigation services also have similar functionalities 
that warn of “unsafe” neighbourhoods (Silver 2013). Route planning is one of the most prominent examples 
of the use of modern algorithms, and the processed data sets with their discriminatory ratings and 
stereotypes are likely to be the main cause of risks of discrimination.
Case 26: Possibility of unequal treatment at the ride sharing company Uber
Using the case study of Uber, Rosenblat et al. (2017) illustrate that the system of rating drivers by customers/
users of the ride sharing service can be a source of discrimination based on ethnicity or “race”. The case 
study is based on qualitative field research with ethnographic studies and interviews with the vehicle 
drivers. The rating system is a fundamental element of the company’s quality assurance system for the 
individualised, scattered workforce. User ratings are a key factor in the company’s automated assessments 
and HR decisions, used to determine whether to “activate” the drivers or “deactivate” them with a temporary 
suspension or complete termination of the relationship, for example. They also have a direct impact on the 
drivers’ earnings and their chances of getting higher-paid work.
The authors assume that ratings given by users and customers are systematically characterised by unequal 
treatment according to ethnic origin and gender and refer to findings from similar areas. However, they 
lacked access to company data on user ratings and the composition of the group of drivers that would be 
required in order to provide accurate evidence. Because the user ratings have such a central place in the 
business model of the company and biased user ratings are incorporated into the company decisions, 
indirect discrimination is likely. The authors assume that such risks of discrimination are relevant to all 
platforms where a user rating system regulates a distributed workforce.
4.8 State social benefits and supervision
Case 27: Continued unequal treatment in forecasting systems of state supervision
Altenburger and Ho (2018) first show that ratings of Asian restaurants on the online platform Yelp were 
biased by the fact that visitors and customers rated Asian restaurants disproportionately worse than other 
restaurants. For the New York and King County regions in the US, they compared the evaluation on the 
platform and complaints to emergency services by customers and data on inspections by health authorities. 
The authors then demonstrate that such unequal treatment can be perpetuated through biased ratings 
from the private to the public sector, as the customer ratings are also used for public tasks of food and 
health inspections. According to the authors, this is a general development trend in state regulation, with 
state controls being replaced by big data analyses based on ratings data from platforms. Bias continue to 
occur when algorithm-based forecasting systems (“predictive analytics”) are used for state supervision, 
which are developed and operated on the basis of biased customer ratings. To demonstrate this, they 
estimated the consequences of using a machine-learning method for predictions based on biased ratings. 
If, according to their opinion, state food and health inspections of restaurants were to be replaced by 
forecasting systems based on the scores from biased customer opinions, they believe that biased algorithms 
will become regulatory instruments in the future.
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Case 28: Unequal treatment in a system for the prevention of child abuse
The Allegheny Family Screening Tool (AFST) is a system for predicting and identifying preventive 
interventions in potential cases of child neglect and abuse, which is used in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania 
(in operation since 2016, revised in 2018). For each telephone call, a risk assessment system assigns a score 
from 1 to 20 for each case, which is displayed to the person processing the call. A score of 20 indicates the 
highest risk. The calls or tip-offs usually come from the community, i.e. from neighbours or teachers.
Surrogate information or proxies are used to determine the risk scores (Eubanks 2017: 143-144). This is data 
on cases from the past, including, (a) new reports from the “community”, i.e. if, within two years, a new 
report was received on the same child for whom no further investigation was carried out on the first call 
(“screened out”), or (b) if removal from the family occurred (“child placement”) after a further investigation 
call, which resulted in the child having to be removed from the family and assigned to a care institution. 
The algorithmic conclusions thus reflect former “social” ratings of the families by the community, the 
authorities and the courts. The model could also only provide predictions about future clues and future 
removals from families, but not about the future actual abuse of children. In addition, important variables 
in the modelling, such as geographical isolation, are missing. The system assigns disproportionately high 
risk scores to families who have already made frequent use of social benefits and produces outcomes with 
ethnicity-based unequal treatment (Eubanks 2017: 143-144; Courtland 2018). A quality measure for 
classifications was determined for the prediction accuracy, the value for ROC AUC,62 which was given as 
76 per cent (Eubanks 2017: 145). As there were problems with previous versions of the system, it was revised 
and a group of researchers was commissioned to review it (Chouldechova et al. 2018). They see a risk of 
negative amplification effects in the use of predictive analytics, since more data of some regional 
communities, in particular poorer or specific ethnic groups, are stored in state institutions, e. g. because 
they are included in social assistance systems, and these communities are therefore identified as high-risk 
and checked more frequently (Chouldechova et al. 2018: 2).
Case 29: Risk of direct and indirect discrimination in a system for classifying 
unemployed persons
A study by the Polish non-governmental organisation Fundacja Panoptykon highlighted the risks of 
discrimination through a system of employment services (Niklas, Sztandar-Sztanderska & Szymielewicz 
2015). In 2014, the Ministry of Labour in Poland introduced a system of job placement that classified 
jobseekers into three categories (“Profiles I-III”) based on the creation of profiles and scores. The objective 
is to determine the “distance” from the labour market and the willingness to enter or re-enter the labour 
market (Niklas, Sztandar-Sztanderska & Szymielewicz 2015: 11). The classification of each jobseeker into 
one of the three categories determines the type of labour market programme to be applied (e. g. job 
placement, vocational training, apprenticeship). In the process, 24 characteristics are processed that are 
intended to characterise unemployed people. These characteristics are derived from the registration of 
jobseekers in the employment centres and the computer-assisted interviews with the caseworkers. The 
recorded and processed characteristics include age, gender and degree of disability (Niklas, Sztandar-
Sztanderska & Szymielewicz 2015: 5, 11) as well as information on periods of childcare and care of persons 
requiring assistance (ibid., p. 21). Information on the need and willingness to accept a job is also recorded, 
62 The so-called ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristic) curve is configured in a diagram in which the true positive rate is entered on 
the ordinate and the false positive rate on the abscissa. When comparing the quality of classifiers, the area under the curve (AUC) is 
considered. A perfect classifier has a value of 1 and would result in a point in the upper left corner of the diagram, and a completely 
random one would have a value of 0.5 or would represent the diagonal in the diagram (Géron 2018: 92-94). The objective is to obtain the 
highest possible ROC AUC value. The ROC AUC value illustrates the compromise between the hits or true positive classifications and the 
“cost” or false positive classifications.
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e. g. personal commitment to find employment, willingness to meet labour market needs, flexibility or past 
or current willingness to cooperate with the relevant labour market authorities (ibid., p. 11).
In the employment centres, the caseworkers handled the systems differently. For example, the computer 
system was seen as the final decision-maker, profiling was seen as part of a comprehensive investigation 
and attempts were made to adapt the profiles to the unemployed person’s expectations (Niklas 2018). 
According to the authors, one of the problems of the system is that legal provisions, e. g. to know the types 
and scope of data to be processed and to adapt the data and profile, have not been translated correctly in 
the functions and rules of the system and its operation. This makes it more difficult to adjust and correct 
entries, for example (Niklas, Sztandar-Sztanderska & Szymielewicz 2015: 17; Niklas 2018). According to the 
authors, the application can lead to both direct and indirect discrimination. Since the categories are also 
created using the protected characteristics of age, gender and disability, there would be direct discrimination. 
Indirect discrimination would result from the application of the characteristics “periods of childcare and 
other care”, which statistically affect women more often (Niklas, Sztandar-Sztanderska & Szymielewicz 
2015: 21). In real terms, jobseekers assigned to the least favourable category “Profile III” would then have a 
lower chance of receiving a support measure. This assessment of opportunities is based on statistical 
analyses and experience (Niklas, Sztandar-Sztanderska & Szymielewicz 2015: 25-27).
Furthermore, jobseekers do not have sufficient access to the data and analyses that make up their assessment 
and assignment to one of the three categories. This makes it difficult for them to assert their right to 
compensation in the event of discrimination. Indeed, even if the burden of proof is shifted to those accused 
of discrimination, those affected by potential discrimination must prove that there is a likelihood of 
discrimination (Niklas, Sztandar-Sztanderska & Szymielewicz 2015: 21). Furthermore, according to the 
authors, the system violates the right to procedural fairness, as there are no clear procedures for appealing, 
expressing the opinion of the persons affected and requesting re-verification of the assigned profiles 
(Niklas, Sztandar-Sztanderska & Szymielewicz 2015: 22f.). According to Niklas, however, there are plans to 
abolish the system (Niklas 2019).
Case 30: Risk of discrimination in the classification of unemployed persons
According to media reports, a system is currently being tested63 in Austrian job centres (Arbeitsmarktservice, 
AMS) that divides jobseekers into three categories indicating the likelihood of integration into the labour 
market (high, medium, low). On this basis, recommendations are to be made on the allocation of funds for 
qualification measures, such as training or additional courses (Fanta 2018). The likelihood of integration is 
calculated as the probability of accepting work. According to the company Synthesis Forschung GmbH, 
which developed the system, the computation of probabilities is based on a logistic regression model (Holl, 
Kernbeiß & Wagner-Pinter 2018). According to the AMS Management Board, the hit rate is 85 per cent, 
which means that about 50,000 people a year are misclassified. This system does not have a fully automated 
decision-making system, as the system only makes recommendations (Wimmer 2018b, 2018a).
One criticism was that the AMS administrators tend to adopt the recommendations of the system, because 
additional evaluations are required if the human evaluation of an administrator deviates from the 
computer recommendation and the person affected is to be downgraded (Wimmer 2018b). On the other 
hand, there is criticism that certain groups of persons could be disadvantaged, because the algorithm not 
only takes into account the protected characteristics of gender, age and nationality, but also implements 
weightings which, for example, assign women a lower number of points than men. Other controversial 
63 As of January 2019.
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characteristics are care responsibilities, such as time spent on childcare, or health impairments (Szigetvari 
2018).
However, AMS countered the criticism that classification in a category of labour market opportunities does 
not mean that the groups concerned are worse off in terms of qualification measures. In this context, 
strategies and programmes for the promotion of disadvantaged groups are receiving particular 
consideration and are taken into account in decisions on qualification measures (Wimmer 2018a; Salzburger 
Nachrichten 2019). It is also likely that the extent to which the criticism will have an effect – that the 
creation of the algorithm is based on the statistical analysis of past data, which could lead to a perpetuation 
of inequalities on the labour market – will only be assessed through the accumulated decisions on support 
funding with regard to the implementation of support programmes, which are allegedly aimed against the 
further disadvantaging of groups that are already disadvantaged.64
64 The Ombudsman Board therefore requested a review and parliamentary discussion of the AMS system. Cf. The Standard (2019). 
However, Fröhlich & Spiecker called Döhmann (2018), who regard the use of a lower weighting for women as discriminatory, are critical  
of this, as is Allhutter (2019), who assumes self-reinforcing processes, in particular for people who have several characteristics that are 
attributed lower labour market opportunities.
65 Information provided by staff at Défenseur des Droits, by email, November 2018 and March 2019.
66 Information provided by employees at Défenseur des Droits, by email, March 2019. Interpretive supplement in square brackets  
by the author.
4.9 Education
Case 31: Risks of discrimination in a system for allocating places in universities
According to the French equality body and the documentation of the public procedure, the French 
“Parcoursup” system of university place allocation requires prospective students to make 10 to 20 requests 
for university places and enter personal details in an online system. The system at national level matches 
the requests to the respective intake capacities of (public and private) higher education institutions. At local 
level, each higher education institution has its own system to manage requests and select students. First of 
all, the lack of transparency in the decision-making procedure has been criticised. Although the government 
made the source code of the matching algorithm public at national level, the sorting algorithms were not 
public at the local level of the respective higher education institutions. The personal data that must be 
provided when registering include income and place of residence, which led to concerns among the 
plaintiffs of discrimination against less wealthy prospective students or those from suburbs.65
An association of elected representatives, student representatives, teachers and lawyers presented the case 
to the French equality body Défenseur des Droits (DDD), which conducted a legal investigation. The 
investigation led to two decisions by DDD in the form of recommendations to the Ministry of Education: 
Decision No 2018-323 refers to the special consideration of students with disabilities.66
The second Decision no. 2019-021 of January 2019 refers to “local algorithms” and recommends that all 
information concerning processing, including that relating to algorithms, and the evaluation of application 
documents by the local commissions of higher education institutions should be published in advance. The 
aim of this measure is to ensure transparency of the procedure and allow applicants to make their decisions 
in full knowledge of the facts. The decision also recalls that the use of the applicants’ school as a characteristic 
in the selection process, in which certain applicants are favoured or others are excluded on the basis of the 
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geographical location of the school, may be considered a discriminatory practice if it leads to the exclusion 
of applicants on that basis.67
During the investigation, DDD did not have access to the algorithms of the “local level”, but did receive 
general information about their use. In principle, DDD has the legal means to collect all information that 
seems necessary for the facts that are shown to them. Restrictions on information due to the protection of 
secrets, which only apply to secrecy for national security, state security or foreign policy, were not relevant 
in this case. Systems at “local level” in individual higher education institutions have been introduced on a 
voluntary basis, without the introduction of an [overarching] system, and are designed to prioritise 
applications before the actual selection by the selection committees. The system can therefore be regarded 
as a decision-support service. DDD could not identify any system with fully automated data processing 
during their investigation. The equality body DDD cooperated with the French data protection authority 
CNIL (Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés).
From the legal situation for such admission decisions at higher education institutions, they concluded that 
examination commissions must be set up to answer applicants and that such decisions therefore cannot be 
fully automated. The “Parcoursup” system at “national level” is one of the algorithms that must be 
authorised by ministerial decision after the CNIL data protection authority pronounces and publishes its 
decision. After reviewing compliance with the legal provisions on transparency, the right to human 
intervention, the types of data collected and the categories of persons with authorised access to data, the 
CNIL issued an opinion in favour of the introduction of the “Parcoursup” system. However, the systems at 
local level were not sent to the CNIL for review and comment.68
67 See Décision 2019-021 of 18 January 2019 on the operation of the national platform for pre-enrolment in the first year of higher 
education (Parcoursup), available at https://juridique.defenseurdesdroits.fr/index.php?lvl=notice_ display&id=27285 (last retrieved on 26 
March 2019).
68 Information provided by employees at Défenseur des Droits, by email, March 2019. Interpretative supplements in square brackets by 
the author.
4.10 Police
Case 32: Reinforcing unequal treatment in a system of predictive policing
In a simulation study, Lum and Isaac examined the “PredPol” system for predictive policing, which predicts 
which areas will have a higher probability of crime (spatially based predictions). They assumed that bias in 
the (training) data sets lead to biased predictions of crimes and correspondingly to more operations in 
areas that are already overrepresented in police statistics. Due to the likelihood of increased deployments 
in the same areas, additional offences were observed, confirming the previous assumptions about the 
distribution of offences. The aim of the simulation study was to reveal the strength of this bias. Lum and 
Isaac underscore that police records are not a complete survey of all criminal acts, nor do they represent a 
random sample. In order to determine the extent of the bias in the police records, they correlated the 
police records with a complete set of crime statistics taken from the National Survey on Drug Use and 
Health. This data was simulated on the regional population composition of the city of Oakland, allowing 
estimates of drug-related crime at a regionally high-resolution level for individual areas of the city, which 
in their opinion provided a more accurate picture of drug abuse than police arrest data (Lum & Isaac 2016).
According to the results of the simulation, drug-related offences should have been scattered more widely 
across the city, but the actual arrests by police for drug-related offences were concentrated in a narrowly 
defined area. They used a publicly available version of the algorithm for the investigation of the PredPol 
predictive policing system. According to the company, only three data points are used for prediction: the 
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previous type of crime, the crime scene and the time of the crime. The algorithm was applied to the police 
statistics for a given year and showed the already “over-policed” areas as areas with high prediction values. 
In comparison with the simulated distribution of crime, where there was a distribution of areas with a 
higher proportion of white people, the predictions provided by the PredPol system affected fewer areas, 
particularly those in which a higher proportion of black people lived. In addition, they simulated a situation 
in which there were incentives for further police operations in “predicted” areas, with the outcome of 
confirming the above-mentioned effect (ibid.).
The study was criticised because the PredPol system was not developed to combat drug-related crime and 
the use of drug data was therefore incorrect, and because the system was not used in Oakland (Ferguson 
2017). The authors responded that the aim was to prove the possibility of the amplification effect, whereby 
the problematic issue is that the crime data used is generated by the police (virtually as a secondary activity) 
and that this is not a representation of all crimes, that the police are not notified of all crimes and that the 
police do not document all crimes to which they react. “Police-recorded crime data is a combination of 
policing strategy, police community relations and criminality.” (Isaac & Lum 2018: without page reference). 
Furthermore, the system was abolished after testing due to a lack of evidence of improvements in crime 
prevention (ibid.).
Case 33: Ethnicity-based discrimination in a predictive policing system
Brantingham et al. (2018) report on an empirical study (randomised controlled study) to uncover possible 
discrimination based on ethnic origin (or minorities), which was part of comprehensive accompanying 
research on the introduction of a predictive policing system in Los Angeles. To this end, the effects of police 
force deployment plans with crime forecasts for respective areas of deployment, which were created by the 
algorithmic system, were compared with those of a human planner. Police forces had been told that the 
areas of operation are the areas with the highest crime rates for their shift. In the comprehensive 
accompanying research, the reduction of the crime rate could be proven for both algorithmic and human 
prognoses, whereby the decrease in the crime rate was higher for algorithmic prognoses. The results of the 
study on risks of discrimination revealed that the use of the algorithmic system did not lead to differences 
in arrests of persons belonging to minorities. In contrast, the arrest rate increased in the areas where the 
algorithmic system was used (across all population groups).
Case 34: Data sets on discriminatory police practices in predictive policing systems
In the context of systems of predictive policing, Richardson et al. expands the notion of “dirty data”, which 
now includes “dirty” records based on corrupt, discriminatory or unlawful police practices, in addition to 
missing or incorrect data or non-standard representation of data. They may also have been created and 
changed through deliberate manipulation. It is especially problematic when the development and 
application of predictive policing systems are based on such “dirty” police data sets. These authors also 
emphasise that police data is not objective data, nor do they reflect actual criminal behaviour or patterns. 
Rather, they merely reflect the practices, policies and programmes, bias and political or financial needs of 
a particular department (Richardson, Schultz & Crawford 2019: 8).
Their study is based on the documents and outcomes of legal investigations commissioned by the 
government, or on court settlements under the supervision of the Federal Court of Justice, consensus 
agreements or other agreements based on legal investigations. They looked at 13 regional administrative 
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units or “jurisdictions”,69 which were using or had previously used predictive policing systems in trials 
during the periods under investigation. The distinctive feature here is that while the administrative units 
were under legal investigation or under judicial settlement procedures, it was discovered that their police 
authorities were engaged in corruption, ethnicity-based unequal treatment or other illegal practices. In 
nine of these, the authors collected evidence proving that the systems were used during periods of illegal 
police practices. Three administrative units (Chicago, New Orleans and Maricopa) were presented in 
detailed case studies leading to the conclusions on the problem of using dirty data (Richardson, Schultz & 
Crawford 2019).
The authors attribute these situations to a lack of supervision and verification measures in the collection, 
analysis and use of police data, which was neither carried out by an authority nor by the producers of such 
systems (ibid., p. 20). Furthermore, no evidence was found in the cases that manufacturers or providers of 
the systems independently verified the police data used (ibid., p. 7). Providers of these systems, which 
themselves point to biased police data records, would not sufficiently take into account the structural and 
systematic errors in this data. The authors added that detecting and correcting such errors would be too 
great a challenge (if not an insurmountable one), and this raises doubts as to whether a distinction can be 
made between problematic and less problematic categories of data. Even if a differentiation were possible, 
this would only be possible for one respective administrative unit and would hardly allow for comparative 
or aggregated conclusions (ibid., pp. 8f.). Moreover, without an “empowered and independent authority” 
(ibid., p. 24), it is to be expected that potentially unlawful and discriminatory police practices and data 
based on them could go untreated and uncorrected, particularly since there would be few political and 
institutional incentives for self-evaluation and reform (ibid., pp. 24f.).
69 These are Boston, Chicago, Ferguson, Miami, Maricopa County, Milwaukee, New Orleans, New York, Newark, Philadelphia, Seattle and 
Suffolk County.
4.11 Judicial and penal system
Case 35: Ethnicity-based discrimination in criminal recidivism systems
One of the most frequently cited cases of algorithmic systems for decision support is the COMPAS system 
(Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions) of the company Northpointe 
(renamed to equivant). It is used for risk prediction to assist judges in many US states to determine the risk 
of recidivism in case of early release. The COMPAS system uses a variety of personal characteristics and a 
proprietary algorithm that determines the probability of re-arrest for each person charged. Based on 
publicly available documentation and crime statistics, research by the journalist association ProPublica 
(Angwin et al. 2016) found that the predictions for black defendants systematically overestimated the risk. 
Of those who were not re-arrested, 45 per cent of the black defendants had been identified as high risk. In 
comparison, only 23 per cent of the white defendants who were not re-arrested had been put at high risk. 
With regard to the accuracy of the predictions they concluded that the probability of black people being 
falsely labelled as high risk is twice as high as for white defendants. In a reaction of the company, the 
statistical approach of ProPublica was criticised and its own computation methods were presented. They 
showed that people with similar risk scores, whether black or white, had the same probability of being 
arrested again (Dieterich, Mendoza & Brennan 2016). However, it was found that both parties used different 
approaches and fairness concepts, which could not be applied and fulfilled simultaneously (Chouldechova 
2017; Eckhouse et al. 2019).
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In 2016, the Wisconsin Supreme Court issued a court decision that found a “due process violation” in the 
use of the COMPAS system for risk assessment.70 The decisive factor in the dismissive court decision was 
the undermining of the right to a court ruling based on precise information (Freeman 2016; Citron 2016). 
Although the court confirmed that the evaluation of individuals on the basis of group data and generalising 
statistical evaluations is fundamentally legally problematic, the Supreme Court relativised this problem by 
stating that the risk scores of the COMPAS system are only one of several information bases used by the 
judges. The Supreme Court’s decision is criticised for not sufficiently taking into account the (possibly 
dominant) importance of computer recommendations for human decisions or the risk of automation bias 
(Citron 2016; Freeman 2016: 96). It was also previously stated that such systems were not continuously 
checked for accuracy (Klingele 2015) and had not been examined for hidden bias (Starr 2014), which was 
also critically discussed in the Supreme Court decision (according to Citron 2016).
Case 36: Comparison of risk analysis system with machine-learning methods
Tolan et al. (2019) compare the system SAVRY (“structured assessment of violence risk in youth”), a risk 
analysis system for predicting the probability of recidivism in juvenile justice, using machine-learning 
methods with regard to group fairness for the protected characteristics of gender and nationality. The 
SAVRY system calculates an overall score by entering assessments by evaluative experts on risk and 
prevention factors of the respective persons concerned. The assignment to risk classes in the final decision 
was also carried out by the experts and was therefore not algorithmic. The experts had been previously 
informed that the recidivism rates for male and female offenders were usually different.
The SAVRY system was compared with methods of supervised machine learning. The comparison was 
made on the basis of numerous input data on demographic information and the criminal history of the 
accused. A data set on juvenile delinquency in Catalonia was also used. As a result, it was shown that the 
SAVRY system is considered “fair” in terms of various measures of fairness,71 while machine-learning 
methods tended to discriminate against male and foreign defendants and those of certain nationalities.
In addition to data analyses, they also used tools for the interpretation of ML procedures. The researchers 
emphasise the tension between predictive accuracy, where ML methods perform better, and fairness 
measures, where they perform worse. One explanation is that the basic distribution of recidivists in the 
various population groups (“base rates”) affects the predictions of ML procedures. For example, the ML 
methods would adopt the empirical correlations between population characteristics and relapse rates.
In addition, they discuss possible technical countermeasures,72 which would actually lead to further 
deterioration. (a) Scrubbing protected characteristics would be useless because many other characteristics 
have correlations with them. (b) The use of different thresholds (of fairness measures) for various legally 
protected characteristics may lead to incorrect classifications, with the result that unidentified recidivists 
may endanger public safety or young people may be wrongly imprisoned. (c) Adaptation of the model or 
classification algorithm, e. g. by inserting some kind of correction variable without understanding the 
underlying mechanism, may in turn lead to other instances of discrimination, stigmatisation or injustice.
70 See judgement of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin “State v. Loomis”, (881 N.W.2d 749, 763-64 (Wis. 2016)).
71 The fairness measures of demographic parity and error rate balance were examined. See also Section 6.1.1 on fairness measures. In 
predicting recidivism probabilities, equal demographic parity means that any person with a protected characteristic has the same 
probability of being classified as a recidivist as a person in a reference group. An equal error ratio means that every person with a protected 
characteristic has the same probability of being falsely classified as a recidivist as a person in a reference group. The same false negative 
rate and the same false positive rate were examined. Cf. Tolan et al. (2019).
72 See also Section 6.1.1.
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4.12 General cases of artificial intelligence
73 “Crowdworkers” are people who provide and perform mostly minor computer work services via online platforms on the internet, 
such website or software testing, copywriting, photo categorising, the programming of software components or design work. In most 
cases, they are not permanent employees at a company. The activity of the crowdworkers is also assigned to an area called 
“crowdsourcing”, in reference to outsourcing.
Case 37: Unequal accuracy in facial recognition systems
The researchers Klare et al. (2012) demonstrate in an experimental study that six investigated facial 
recognition systems, which are used by law enforcement agencies in the US, systematically recognised 
images of persons with the markers “women”, “ethnic origin” and persons between the ages of 18 and 30 
with less accuracy. The systems included three commercial systems that were revealed to be less accurate 
in all tests. Based on the overall test results, the authors conclude that all groups of people subject to 
recognition by the systems at a later stage should be sufficiently represented when selecting the training 
data.
Regarding these outcomes, Garvie emphasises that the error rates in accuracy may in practice lead to more 
frequent controls of innocent persons from the less accurately recognised groups. In this context, the 
authors point out that facial recognition systems have hardly been tested for possible unequal treatment 
based on ethnic origin (Klare et al. 2012: 53-56).
Case 38: Adoption of gender-based stereotypes in machine text analysis
Bolukbasi et al. showed in a process of text analysis using machine learning of natural language (“natural 
language processing”) that gender-based stereotypes concealed in the texts are repeated in the outcomes. 
The text analysis method investigated, known as “word embedding”, converts text data into (number) 
vectors, which are made available for further machine processing. The method is trained with regard to the 
simultaneous occurrence of words in certain text corpora and the search for certain patterns of coherence 
between words. The geometry between the vectors displays the semantic connection between the words, 
which reveals the stereotypes in the form of calculated word associations (Bolukbasi et al. 2016).
In the study, the publicly available method “Word2Vec” was examined using the Google News text corpus, 
which contains three million English words. The assumption was that it would contain little gender bias as 
it was mainly written by professional journalists. However, stereotype-like outcomes of the machine-
learning process were demonstrated in two ways. (a) For assigned job titles, it was shown that the word 
“she” was accompanied by words such as “homemaker”, “nurse”, “receptionist”, “librarian”, “socialite”, and 
“social worker”, etc., whereas the word “he” was associated with words such as “maestro”, “skipper”, “protege”, 
“philosopher”, “captain”, etc. Crowdworkers73 were tasked with assessing whether the computationally 
assigned terms were female, male or neutral stereotypes. (b) When analogous pairs were created by machine 
in the form “man is to king as woman is to queen”, the method produced words that were considered to be 
gender stereotypes in 29 of the 150 analogy words, while 72 of the 150 words were judged to be gender-
consistent. This assessment of the computational assignments was also carried out by commissioned 
crowdworkers. They also present a procedure to reduce gender bias. To this end, they changed the gender 
link for certain words; for example, this produced a female and male connotation for the term “nurse” 
(Bolukbasi et al. 2016).
Machine text analysis is used in a wide range of applications, such as the automated analysis of documents, 
resumes or written communication in social networks, and automated ranking in search engine results, 
product recommendations or machine translations. If the “embedding” algorithms thus generated, which 
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have adopted stereotypical word relationships, are used in such applications, problematic outcomes can 
occur in that traditional gender roles are perpetuated.
Case 39: Adoption of cultural stereotypes in machine text analysis
Researchers (Caliskan, Bryson & Narayanan 2017) demonstrated that common machine-learning methods 
(in this example, word embedding) can “learn” everyday cultural stereotypes from text files. The machine 
learning methods were trained on a text corpus with normal human language from the internet, the 
“common crawl” corpus. The researchers showed that when machine-learning methods are applied to 
texts, the outcomes are just as stereotypical as was previously demonstrated by other researchers for 
human behaviour using association tests. This was demonstrated by the fact that machine-determined 
associations between words were similar to those of humans. For example, they revealed that the ML 
methods associated female names more frequently with words for “family” than for “career”, as compared 
to male names. (Similar results were obtained for words such as “mathematics” or “science”, which were 
associated with male terms, and “arts”, which was associated with female terms.) They also confirmed 
previous research results that European-American names were more frequently associated with terms for 
“pleasant” than African-American names.
Based on these results, they conclude that AI systems that learn and reproduce the characteristics of 
language adopt cultural conceptions from the past, some of them stereotypical. This is particularly 
problematic if these systems are used in current applications, such as online text translation, or if decisions 
are left to them, such as the reviewing of CVs, where systems with inherited cultural stereotypes would 
produce outcomes that are biased (Caliskan, Bryson & Narayanan 2017).
Case 40: Adoption of gender and ethnic stereotypes in machine text analysis
Similar to the previous example, Garg et al. (2018) demonstrated that the machine-learning procedure 
“word embedding” is also suitable for quantitatively recording widespread gender-related stereotypes and 
attitudes towards ethnic minorities and their changes over time in large quantities of text and over 
historical time sequences. They demonstrated this with texts from the 20th and 21st centuries in the US, 
including the Google Books/Corpus of Historical American English and the New York Times Annotated 
Corpus. For example, in 1910, the word “women” was associated with such words as “charming”, “placid”, 
“delicate”, “passionate”, “sweet”, “dreamy”, “indulgent”, “playful”, “mellow” or “sentimental”. For 1990, these 
were “maternal”, “morbid”, “artificial”, “physical”, “caring”, “emotional”, “protective”, “attractive”, “soft” and 
“tidy”. The authors point out that stereotypes learned automatically become problematic when they are 
used in “sensitive” products and services, such as search engine ranking, product recommendations or 
automated translations (Garg et al. 2018: E3635).
Case 41: Unequal accuracy by gender and dialect in automatic subtitles of the 
video service YouTube
In a scientific study, Tatman showed that the YouTube platform’s service for generating automatic subtitles 
on uploaded videos (“automatic caption”) has varying levels of accuracy, with significantly lower accuracy 
in recognising female speech and for videos featuring people who speak in a Scottish dialect. The service is 
based on a machine-learning process. As one of the possible reasons, the author suspects insufficient 
training data (Tatman 2017: 57).
Case 42: Ethnicity-based unequal accuracy in speech recognition systems
Blodgett et al. examined four common speech recognition systems or speech recognition cloud services 
(langid.py, IBM Watson, Microsoft Azure and Twitter’s internal identification service) using the dialect of 
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African-American English used in the Twitter social network.74 They used a publicly available Twitter 
corpus with 59.2 million tweets. As a result, they found differences in the accuracy of speech recognition, 
with greater accuracy for text messages assigned to white authors than text messages assigned to African-
American authors. The differences are particularly high for short text messages. Since data from social 
networks is often used for sentiment and opinion analysis on products or political figures, the fact that the 
opinions of African Americans are less well captured than those of white participants constitutes a social 
problem, according to the authors (Blodgett & O’Connor 2017: 3).
Systems of speech recognition are used in personal assistance systems (e. g. Siri, Alexa, Amazon Echo), 
chatbots or automated telephone systems. In the case of insufficient training data sets, in which certain 
population groups are not sufficiently represented, their dialects or accents cannot be sufficiently learned; 
as a result, the members of these population groups are less easily recognised or understood in applications.
Case 43: Unequal detection rates by gender in machine opinion and sentiment analysis
A study of machine-learning methods for the recognition of opinions and sentiments (“sentiment analysis”) 
based on texts revealed inequalities between the genders, with the methods being better suited to 
determining the sentiments of women than those of men. The data basis was compiled from hotel and 
restaurant ratings on the travel platform TripAdvisor.com for the United Kingdom. The gender differences 
revealed appear to indicate that women’s opinions are slightly overrepresented in opinion and sentiment 
analyses, as a higher proportion of male sentiments are not recorded (Thelwall 2018). However, the author 
admits that the outcomes for this specific data set cannot be generalised. That being said, he showed that 
biases were not present in the data set, but only came about as the outcomes of seemingly objective 
machine-learning processes. Therefore, when reviewing the algorithms, he argues for testing not only the 
input in the form of the data and algorithms, but also the output of the system, including the different 
groupings, e. g. by gender, ethnic origin, etc. (Thelwall 2018). Automated opinion and sentiment analyses 
are used in marketing to evaluate products or services and can record the sentiments of a large number of 
users, e. g. social networks, in almost real time.
Case 44: Unequal detection in 219 sentiment and opinion analysis systems
Kiritchenko and Mohammad, together with cooperating institutions of the evaluation study SemEval, 
examined over 219 systems of natural language processing for sentiment analysis, some of which achieved 
different results depending on gender or ethnic origin. The data basis was a uniform corpus of texts, the 
“equity evaluation corpus” (EEC), which was compiled from 8,640 English sentences. A network of 
cooperating institutions carried out the tests on the systems. The study was based on a systematic 
quantification of inequalities by gender and ethnic origin. The outcomes were presented in the form of 
systematically higher or lower sentiment intensity scores (Kiritchenko & Mohammad 2018).
Case 45: Unequal recognition according to skin colour in pedestrian detection systems
Wilson et al. tested the inconsistent prediction quality of object detection using machine-learning 
techniques for detecting pedestrians with different skin colours. They investigated whether the unequal 
prediction rates were due to the time of day (or light conditions), the degree to which the individuals were 
concealed, or weightings in the objective function of the machine-learning process. Their results showed 
that standard models of object detection trained on standard data sets have a higher accuracy for images 
74 A previous publication by Blodgett, Green & O’Connor (2016) describes the data production. To do this, they had to assign the tweets 
to different ethnic population groups by comparing the location of the target region of the Twitter message with the demographic data of 
the official population statistics. The study of the three speech recognition systems langid.py and two internal Twitter systems with poorer 
recognition of African-American dialect was also presented.
524. Cases of Unequal Treatment, Discrimination and Evidence
containing persons with “light” skin (skin types lower on the Fitzpatrick scale) than for “dark” skin. This 
inequality even increased when researchers removed covered persons (as a possible source of the differences 
in accuracy) from the images (Wilson et al. 2019).
Case 46: Unequal recognition according to skin colour in commercial facial 
recognition systems
Buolamwini and Gebru conducted experiments with commercial face recognition systems from Microsoft, 
IBM and Face++ revealing that facial recognition worked with varying degrees of efficiency for different 
genders and people with different skin colours (classified according to the Fitzpatrick scale for skin types). 
The systems generally detected male faces (with an error rate of 8.1 per cent) better than female faces (with 
an error rate of 20.6 per cent). Likewise, they detected “light-skinned” faces (with an error rate of 11.8 per 
cent) better than “dark-skinned” faces (with an error rate of 19.2 per cent). For the tests, they compiled their 
own comparative data set with the personal images of 1,270 African and European parliamentarians, the 
“Pilot Parliaments Benchmark” (PPB). In their opinion, existing comparative data sets for determining the 
accuracy of the systems were characterised by an over-representation of male and “light-skinned” person 
types and an under-representation of female and dark-skinned person types (Buolamwini and Gebru 
2018).
The publication of the paper by Buolamwini and Gebru has led to reactions from companies. For example, 
IBM adapted the data set for optimising its software to the Pilot Parliaments Benchmark (Puri 2018). Other 
manufacturers also improved their facial recognition accuracy. These reactions were analysed and 
discussed in another study by Raji and Buolamwini, which examined the systems of IBM, Microsoft, Face++, 
Amazon and Kairos (Raji & Buolamwini 2019).
Case 47: Unequal recognition by skin colour in a commercial facial recognition system
During a test of the facial recognition system “rekognition” of the company Amazon, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) discovered that the system incorrectly recognised 28 members of the US Congress, 
i.e. falsely recognised them as wanted persons, and that the rate of false recognition in PoC (People of 
Colour) was disproportionately high. In testing the system, which is publicly available via an online service, 
the images were compared with a database of 25,000 publicly available photos of people who have been 
arrested. According to the civil rights organisation, Oregon police forces are using the system to match 
pictures from “body cams” to a database of mug shots. At the time of reporting, a protest campaign was 
underway against the use of the monitoring system (Snow 2018).
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5. Causes of Risks of 
Discrimination
75 Other authors make similar classifications, cf. Citron & Pasquale (2014), Zarsky (2016), Crawford et al. (2016: 6 7), Britz (2008: 120-136), 
Gandy Jr. (2010), Eckhouse et al. (2019).
By way of illustration, two types (albeit interrelated) of discrimination risks are distinguished below:
(1)  risks of discrimination resulting from the use of algorithms due to their special technical properties 
(see Section 5.1) and;
(2)  risks that arise through the use of algorithmic and data-based differentiations and decision-making 
systems themselves and occur as societal risks (see Section 5.2).75
In this context, Powles and Nissenbaum point out that the current focus on technical solutions for issues 
caused by algorithms and AI is also associated with societal dangers: (1) Societal unequal treatment is a 
social issue and attempts to solve it using the technical logic of automation are always inadequate. (2) Even 
if technical problems are successfully solved, this does not say anything about the legitimacy of the 
intended use. For example, if the problem that persons with a certain skin colour are less easily recognised 
by a facial recognition system were to be solved, the facial recognition or identification system could still 
be used for surveillance activities with disproportionate restrictions of fundamental rights of personality 
protection. (3) Finally, a unilateral focus on technical solutions can divert attention and (research) resources 
from solving the actual societal issues of unequal treatment (Powels & Nissenbaum 2018).
5.1 Risks in the use of algorithms, models 
and data sets
Risks of discrimination can result from the special technical properties of the procedures of algorithm-
based data analysis and automated decision procedures, whereby the following focuses primarily on data 
mining and machine learning (according to Calders & Žliobaitė 2013; Barocas & Selbst 2016; Kim 2016; Lehr 
& Ohm 2017; Zweig, Fischer & Lischka 2018; Schweighofer u. a. 2018; Zuiderveen Borgesius 2018; Favaretto, 
De Clercq & Elger 2019; Tolan 2018; FRA 2019).
5.1.1 Risks in the development of algorithms and models
In data mining and machine learning, the purpose of analysis is usually determined, i.e. what to predict or 
estimate and how to measure it. From verbal descriptions of the purpose of the analysis, a calculable 
objective function needs to be determined, which is to be optimised on the basis of historical or other data. 
In this context, an objective function is a mathematical expression of the objective of the entire process, 
usually in the form of target variables (or outcome variables) that are minimised or maximised (Lehr & 
Ohm 2017: 671). If the processes are used in organisations such as companies or authorities, the objectives, 
provisions and requirements of the organisation must be transformed into calculable functions and values. 
Specifications such as the “creditworthiness” of applicants, the “efficiency” of employees or the “value” of 
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customers must be analysed or determined and converted into calculable values or formalised. System 
developers and analysts are therefore tasked with determining what constitutes “good creditworthiness” 
or “good employees”, for example (Barocas & Selbst 2016: 678f.).
To determine what constitutes a “good” employee, for example, there are usually multiple and varied target 
variables available. The example of personnel selection can be used to illustrate that risks of discrimination 
can already arise when selecting the target variables (Barocas & Selbst 2016: 680). For example, when 
decision-making systems for personnel selection are based on target variables formed by evaluating 
seniority, certain groups that usually have a higher employment turnover rate (such as women) are 
systematically disadvantaged, even though they can perform equally well or better. The problem is also 
illustrated in Case 24 of a computer system for assigning patients to treatment programmes, in which an 
objective function that is unilaterally aimed at costs and fails to sufficiently reflect health aspects led to 
ethnicity-based discrimination. In other words, it can be stated that the very selection and determination 
of the target variables can become a risk of discrimination that is virtually “programmed” into algorithms 
and computer systems.
Risks of discrimination may also arise from the selection and determination of the labels of the categories 
(“labels” or “class labels”). This is important for the later phase of application (to new records), because the 
automated assignment of persons to categories or groups is carried out with these labels. Normally, when 
selecting and determining the categories or labels, all possible values of the target variable are divided into 
mutually exclusive categories. Since the selection of the objective function with target variables and the 
labelling of the categories already influence the outcomes of the machine-learning process, they form the 
basis for risks of discrimination in the other steps of the data mining or machine-learning processes 
(Barocas & Selbst 2016: 678, 680). The decision-making rules formed on this basis tend to reflect existing 
prejudices and bias through the subjective decisions and systematically lead to disadvantages (Barocas & 
Selbst 2016: 682): (a) Objective labelling is less likely to cause such bias because there is agreement between 
different stakeholders on whether the characteristic is met or not and individual interpretations are not 
necessary (Calders & Žliobaitė 2013: 48). For example, everyone can clearly identify and understand the 
characteristics “loan repaid or not” or “tested for alcohol or not”. In particular, however, if (b) the selection 
of labels contains subjective interpretations, risks of discrimination may arise. For these characteristics, not 
everyone can clearly and unanimously understand or share how to define the characteristic or make it 
measurable, such as the characteristic ‘a good fit’ of applicants for a position (Calders & Žliobaitė 2013: 48).
Furthermore, there may be risks in the selection of influencing variables when training models. Data 
mining or machine-learning methods generate models that can also contain a large number of influencing 
variables (referred to here as “features”, also called predictors). A feature selection is necessary when it is 
technically impossible to include all influencing variables. However, the selection decisions can produce 
models that no longer have a sufficient level of detail to detect critical differentiation points. This can lead 
to systematically higher error rates in the detection of certain groups of persons who may also have 
protected characteristics. Although the characteristics used may be statistically sufficient, they may simply 
be inappropriate for the group of persons not sufficiently recognised. In other words, they are not 
universally valid.76 At this point, the peculiarities and problems of statistical discrimination become 
especially clear. In favour of efficiency objectives, surrogate variables are used for differentiation which are 
too coarse to do sufficient justice to the characteristics of the data subjects. This results in an injustice by 
generalisation (for further details, see Section 5.2.1).
76 Cf. Barocas & Selbst (2016: 688) with reference to Schauer (2003).
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5.1.2 Risks in the compilation of data sets and characteristics
In statistics and computer science, it has been known for some time that biased data sets lead to 
discriminatory models. They also occur in data mining and machine-learning methods (Custers 2013; 
Barocas & Selbst 2016: 680-690; Lehr & Ohm 2017; FRA 2019). Under-representation or over-representation 
of groups of persons and the reproduction of previous unequal treatment in the used data sets and 
correlations of surrogate variables or proxies to protected characteristics can lead to risks of discrimination 
in the outcomes of the differentiation systems.
Risks of discrimination arise from intentional or unintentional under-representation or over-representation 
of groups of people or the complete scrubbing in evaluated data sets or training data – in other words, 
when data on certain groups of people is not available in a ratio that would be required for correct 
representation (Calders & Žliobaitė 2013: 47-49; Barocas & Self 2016: 684-686). Possible causes for this are:
(1) The data relates to situations in which unequal treatment and unequal distribution of groups of 
persons existed or currently exist. For example, if a model were to be built by analysing data on existing 
or historical employment relationships, perhaps in order to establish a correlation between being “a good 
fit” for a job and certain characteristics from job applications or personnel records, and if women were 
under-represented in these employment relationships – for example, because they were denied access to 
these employment relationships – then this imbalance is also to be expected in the composition of the 
characteristics of the model (Calders & Žliobaitė 2013: 50). This issue can be found in Case 1 of Amazon’s 
personnel search system, in which the models were trained with data sets that were biased to the 
detriment of the proportion of women. Or, if historical data sets are used for modelling, the data may 
correctly reflect previous inequalities. However, if the conditions have changed in the meantime, the 
models do not reflect the current conditions correctly. For example, if a model based on historical data on 
income ratios between women and men were to be used, for example, to target advertising towards 
economically promising female customers, the historical inequalities in income ratios would be correctly 
reflected. However, if occupational activities and income relations have changed in the meantime, the 
generated selection and relations of characteristics would not correctly reflect the current conditions in 
the model (Calders & Žliobaitė 2013: 50f.).
Many of the examples in Chapter 4 featuring analyses or uses of machine learning or data mining 
methods reveal risks of discrimination due to biased (training) data sets that reflect (previous) unequal 
treatment, stereotypes and discrimination.77
The example of the image search engine results that reinforce stereotypes (Case 15) also shows that 
qualitative bias in the data records can occur if the image data are labelled as stereotype-laden. The 
special study on the data bases of systems of predictive policing in the US (Case 34) makes it clear that the 
mapping of irregular police practices in the data sets could call into question the legitimacy of the 
systems as a whole.
77 See cases 1, 8, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 45 and 46.
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(2) In addition, data may originate from the use of services or products that certain groups of people use 
less or not at all (Lerman 2013). This may be the case, for example, for evaluations of the use of certain IT 
services (e. g. online services or broadband use), in particular data sets originating from online social 
networks (Hargittai 2015). (3) Similarly, for cost considerations data collection may be deliberately limited 
or data sets are used that are available at low cost but are unsuitable. (4) Also for reasons of data 
protection or privacy, certain surveys cannot be carried out (Calders & Žliobaitė 2013: 52f.). (5) Over-
representation of a population group may occur when activities involving data collection are 
disproportionately concentrated on a specific group of people and thus a disproportionate number of 
survey subjects are covered (Calders & Žliobaitė 2013: 51). The latter is the case with police activities, for 
example, which, as an outcome of data analysis, take place in areas that are already heavily controlled and 
can thus lead to amplification effects (Case 32).
The simple removing of protected characteristics with the intention of avoiding discrimination can itself 
create risks of discrimination (Calders & Žliobaitė 2013; Žliobaitė & Custers 2016). Models that have 
apparently “neutral” features or proxies instead of protected characteristics can also lead to risks of indirect 
discrimination if there is a correlation between the proxies and the protected characteristics (Barocas & 
Selbst 2016: 720-722). For example, in a model designed to determine creditworthiness, there may be a link 
between place of residence and ethnicity.
Even if the legally protected characteristic “ethnicity” were to be removed, it might be possible to infer 
ethnic origin from the place of residence if a majority of persons of the same ethnic origin inhabit that 
place of residence. In these situations, the use of “neutral” factors would also penalise groups that are 
actually protected. In general, the problem arises when the characteristics are not independent of each 
other, as it is then impossible to determine which characteristic contributes to the model and to what 
extent (Calders & Žliobaitė 2013: 47). The problem is also illustrated in Case 8, where the scrubbing of 
gender indicators did not improve inequalities in occupational classifications and where, in the authors’ 
opinion, the use of machine-learning methods can further increase gender disparities.
Overall, more variable types or dimensions can be processed with data mining and machine-learning 
methods than with “classical” statistical methods. This also increases the risk of (unnoticed) correlations to 
protected characteristics. Furthermore, sensitive personal data may be necessary precisely in order to 
identify and compensate for discrimination, if necessary in an aggregated state by means of statistical 
studies (e. g. FRA 2018: pp. 9f. on the characteristic ‘ethnic origin’).
Similar problems may arise when models or systems contained in them are applied in other areas of life or 
contexts and the original population used for the modelling does not match the population of the new 
scope.78 This raises fundamental questions about the transferability and (commercial) tradeability of such 
systems. For example, Schweighofer points out that the COMPASS system (Case 35) was originally intended 
to assist with probation decisions but is also used for criminal sentencing in some states (Schweighofer et 
al. 2018: 39).
78 This can lead to poorer recognition of certain groups of people in AI-based facial or speech recognition systems, for example. See 
cases 37, 42 or 46.
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5.1.3 Risks with online platforms
Online platforms differ from ‘simple’ websites in that they bring together different actors and offer them 
an opportunity for social and economic exchange by providing the means of communication (e. g. in online 
social networks) or the trading function or ʻmatchmakingʼ (e. g. in online platforms for employment 
services). Many examples79 revealed unequal treatment and discrimination in online platforms. This was 
caused in part by allowing users to rate and select other users. As Edelman and Luca aptly put it, “Full of 
salient pictures and social profiles, these platforms make it easy to discriminate [...]” (Edelman & Luca 2014: 
10).80 Algorithms can perform the analysis of personal data and the categorisation or ranking of individuals 
or administer the information that is adjustable or visible and usable for the participants of the interactions 
and transactions.
In addition, algorithms have other discrimination-related functions in connection with online platforms. 
In Case 2 it is suspected that, on one of the employment agency’s online platforms, the ranking of search 
results is also based on the reviews and ratings of employers provided by applicants. As the ratings were 
already gender and ethnically biased, the bias in the ranking of the search results will continue. Being 
found on online platforms can have considerable economic consequences on access to jobs and income 
opportunities. Case 27 illustrates that biased restaurant ratings can continue to exist in unequal treatment 
in the algorithm-based risk prediction of state control. The continued algorithmic bias and discrimination 
can thus lead to societal accumulation and amplification risks (see Section 5.2.2).
In addition, certain online platforms, in particular search engines or “social” online networks, are companies 
whose aim is to generate attention and that rely on individual or group advertising as their main source of 
income. Algorithms also enable the pricing and market mechanisms (e. g. auction mechanisms) for 
advertising and customer selection. Case 17, Case 18, Case 19 and Case 20 show that these algorithmic 
marketing mechanisms can be the cause of unequal treatment and discrimination. Algorithms can lead to 
discrimination even if users have not actually made discriminatory settings, as in Case 20, for example, 
where the selection of target groups for advertising is algorithm-based.
5.1.4 Intentional discrimination and obfuscation in and 
by computer systems
All of the sources of risk mentioned could also be used by developing and applying entities to disguise 
intentional discrimination, i.e. the data sets could be knowingly selected with bias or the very ones known 
to reflect former unequal treatments could be used. Similarly, models with characteristics that do not 
correctly detect individual groups prone to discrimination could be deliberately chosen (Barocas & Selbst 
2016: 692; Dwork & Mulligan 2013; Kim 2016). Since data mining and machine learning allow legally 
protected characteristics from data sets that do not contain them to be derived, decision-makers can 
potentially discriminate even with data sets without protected characteristics. If they were called to 
account, they could claim to have used only “non-protected” characteristics. In areas where it is already 
79 See cases 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 26.
80 For example, in a scientific study, researchers reveal unequal treatment in “peer-to-peer lending”, i.e. the granting of loans via online 
platforms. They use data on transactions in the online marketplace Prosper.com as an example. Their findings include the fact that 
credit-seekers who have an African-American appearance in their profile pictures are less likely to have received financing, with a 
probability of 25 to 30 per cent. However, since it was also possible to prove preferential treatment for African-American credit applicants 
in terms of net interest rates, the authors were unable to draw any clear conclusions about the existence of preference-based or statistical 
discrimination. However, in this example, algorithms do not appear to be the cause of discrimination (Pope & Sydnor 2011).
585. Causes of Risks of Discrimination
difficult to prove indirect discrimination, such as employment, such practices could make it even more 
difficult to prove (Barocas & Selbst 2016: 692f.).
5.1.5 Insufficient incentives for revision or abolition
Kim uses the field of employment to illustrate that a competitive approach, market-economy interests and 
the efficiency-mindedness of the users cannot provide sufficient incentives to question the application of 
analysis and decision-making systems and, if necessary, to change or abolish them, even if they lead to 
discrimination. She explains this by citing the following reasons: (a) Systems with a risk of discrimination 
can still be “accurate” enough so that their application is not questioned; (b) feedback effects can stabilise 
the “accuracy” of the system and; (c) systems can even be efficient because they discriminate (Kim 2016: 
892 897).
For example, the accuracy of one criterion may mean that the verification of the suitability of the entire 
system is neglected. Methods for machine-learning analysis also only have a limited amount of data with 
limited characteristics. Therefore, the resulting models also represent only a limited range of criteria 
potentially relevant for decisions. In particular, the more “successful” (in the sense of accuracy with one 
criterion) an analysis and decision-making system is, the more the focus can be on this criterion. The 
entities applying the system then no longer have an incentive to question its conclusions and mechanisms, 
even if it systematically causes discrimination. Above all, they will not question whether completely 
different decision-relevant criteria are relevant and need to be considered (Kim 2016: 894f.).
5.2 Societal risks of algorithmic differentiation
Even if risks of discrimination through algorithms and data were to be avoided to the greatest possible 
extent, societal risks of discrimination can result from the use of algorithmic differentiation methods and 
automated decision-making systems themselves. They cannot be eliminated through technical solutions, 
but require societal solutions through appropriate forms of political handling and, if necessary, regulation. 
Such risks are also called unintended consequences, negative consequences, social costs or externalities 
(Gandy Jr. 2010: 36-39) because the applying entities do not take them sufficiently into account when 
deciding on the use of differentiation methods and they are incurred by affected persons or third parties. 
However, the societal risks can be drastically increased and intensified if additional systematic errors in 
algorithms and data sets are present.
5.2.1 Group membership and injustice by generalisation
As illustrated, algorithmic and data-based differentiation decisions often involve the phenomenon of 
statistical discrimination, since differentiations take place along surrogate information that either consists 
of the protected characteristics or has correlations to them (see Section 3.3). Typically, the surrogate 
information is often generated by analysing data on groups of people. This is largely the case with the 
procedures of data mining and machine learning. This raises the question of whether it is fair for individuals 
to be assessed using data about other people, i.e. on the basis of groups to which the individuals concerned 
need not necessarily belong themselves (e. g. Eckhouse et al. 2019: 198f.).
The fundamental problem of statistical analyses with the use of aggregating parameters or measured 
variables is that they are merely statements about characteristics of a certain population or an aggregation 
of persons. They should actually refer to only one aspect of the population, but the parameters are often 
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used as if each member of the grouping had the characteristic. This gives the parameters the features of 
stereotypes (Gandy Jr. 2010: 34).
In the case of prediction algorithms, such as the computation of risk scores in particular, the prediction 
outcome is not the probable future behaviour or condition of the persons concerned, but usually an 
extrapolation of previous ratings of other persons by other persons. This becomes particularly evident in 
Case 22 on risk scores in the Finnish case of online lending and Case 35 on the COMPAS system with risk 
scores on the probability of recidivism.81 In the court decisions it was pointed out that the ratings of 
individuals based solely on statistical analyses of data, which in turn reflect ratings of other individuals or 
are group data, are legally problematic. This is particularly the case when other information about the 
individuals is not used in their assessment. The case studies on rating data for the Uber transport service 
(Case 26), risk assessments with restaurant ratings (Case 27) or risk assessments with quasi neighbourhood 
ratings in child protection (Case 28) also illustrate the problem.
This causes risks of misinterpretation and wrong conclusions82 on the basis of (supposed) group membership 
(or group membership by region) (Schauer 2018; Lippert-Rasmussen 2007; Kamp & Weichert 2005: 51; SRP 
2018: 48; Zweig, Fischer & Lischka 2018: 25). They are particularly problematic when this leads to 
stigmatisation due to misattribution of negative personal characteristics, like in cases of statistically 
determined “unreliability” in credit decisions (Britz 2008: 124) or the “propensity to commit crimes” in 
sentences of imprisonment (Eckhouse et al. 2019).
Such statistical and algorithm-based decisions then do not do justice to the individual case. Adverse effects 
result from the fact that an assumption is made about one or more persons who possess a certain 
characteristic, which may apply to the majority of those who possess the characteristic, but does not 
necessarily apply to the specific person or persons in the individual case (according to Britz 2008: 120f.). 
From a constitutional point of view, with regard to the principles of equality of the Basic Law (Article 3 
GG)83 in statistical discrimination, injustice by generalisation occurs when “atypical” persons are excluded 
from certain occupational activities, for example, according to a surrogate characteristic (e. g. age), but 
would actually still be able to perform these activities (Britz 2008: 2 11). In the same way it is possible to 
speak of an incompatibility with doing justice on an individual case basis, since, “In cases of statistical 
discrimination, a person is judged and treated on the basis of stereotypical perceptions of a person because 
of a certain (proxy) characteristic, without any appreciation of his/her actual characteristics.” (Britz 2008: 
12, translated from the German original)
It is therefore a question of unequal treatment when specific features of the individual case are disregarded. 
Since this is done – as is characteristic of statistical discrimination – to overcome information deficits in a 
cost-effective manner, and since risks of injustice are thus almost “accepted”, it leads to situations in which 
the values of efficiency and equity, which are actually incommensurable, are weighed against each other 
(Gandy Jr. 2010: 36f.). These can hardly be solved by technical or organisational improvements, but require 
societal considerations and decisions to be made in political and law-making processes.84 The universally 
81 This also applies to risk scores in the social sector, as illustrated by Case 28.
82 Here, the risks described in Section 5.1 are directly related.
83 “(1) All persons shall be equal before the law. (2) Men and women shall have equal rights. The state shall promote the actual 
implementation of equal rights for women and men and take steps to eliminate disadvantages that now exist. (3) No person shall be 
favoured or disfavoured because of sex, parentage, race, language, homeland and origin, faith or religious or political opinions. No person 
shall be disfavoured because of disability.” Article 3 GG (translation by Deutscher Bundestag 2019).
84 See also Section 6.4.2.
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binding balancing should actually be provided by law, in particular by the AGG. Due to the relatively 
unspecific, general clause-like exemptions of the AGG (Britz 2008: 72) and whenever new forms and 
applications of statistical discrimination emerge, the question of legitimacy must always be posed anew for 
each individual situation. To this end, algorithmic procedures would have to undergo the usual 
proportionality test for their legitimate purpose, their suitability, necessity and appropriateness (Britz 
2008: 151-179).
In doing so, the particular characteristics of the respective differentiation situations have to be taken into 
account, in particular whether differentiations are based on group data or on recordings of individual 
behaviour, but also the degree of accuracy of the algorithmic outcomes or the error rates and other 
technical risks as well as knowledge about causal relationships85 or the extent or severity of the disadvantage 
resulting from the wrong conclusions in differentiation decisions (e. g. refusal of a loan, non-employment, 
higher insurance rates).
The degree of disadvantage, for example, is determined by the goods that the disadvantaged person is 
deprived of and the severity of the restriction of the person’s opportunities for development (Britz 2008: 
125). For example, decisions on imprisonment and deprivation of liberty and decisions on the distribution 
of opportunities for personal development (e. g. on educational or occupational access) must be assessed 
differently from decisions on the selection of targeted advertising for consumer goods. Nevertheless, for 
financial reasons, algorithm-based systems are also used to support decisions with serious consequences 
for the development of personality in court proceedings (Eckhouse et al. 2019).
5.2.2 Accumulation and amplification effects
The risks and negative effects of economically rational differentiation can accumulate and intensify. 
Overall, there may be cumulative disadvantages in the sense of limiting life chances and personal 
development, income inequality, the degree of political involvement and the enforcement of justice in the 
legal system (Gandy Jr. 2010: 37). These are not fundamentally new risks first caused by algorithms, but the 
risks of discrimination caused by the use of algorithms can also contribute to accumulation and 
amplification effects. Risks and effects occur in particular when a characteristic prone to discrimination is 
used as surrogate information for differentiation decisions, and there is a mutually reinforcing effect of 
stigmatisation, impairment of self-representation,86 discrimination through false assignments to categories 
and the resulting difficulty in accessing goods that serve to develop personality.
A further amplification effect results if existing unequal treatments are perceived within the population 
and those affected are disincentivised, e. g. to obtain further qualifications. If future discrimination is 
anticipated, investment in skills may no longer appear to be worthwhile (Britz 2008: 126f.). This is illustrated 
by Case 15, in which the risk is discussed that stereotype-enhancing image search results for occupational 
groups can impair the career aspirations of the groups concerned. In general, such amplification effects are 
likely to come mainly from systems that exhibit imbalances in the representation of groups of people or 
representation risks (“repressive harms”) (e. g. Tolan 2018: 17).
Other types of algorithm-based accumulation and amplification effects result when algorithms based on 
already biased or discriminatory ratings of humans by humans are formed (and continuously adjusted) 
85 See Schauer (2018: 46).
86 See Section 5.2.5.
615. Causes of Risks of Discrimination
and used for other functions, as shown in Case 28 and Case 32 for the formation of risk scores based on 
human ratings or assessment practices. This is also illustrated by Case 27, in which biased ratings of 
customers of various ethnic restaurants are used as the basis for algorithms of forecasting systems in state 
supervision.
5.2.3 Differentiations against socio-political ideas
Even if there would be efficiency gains from the use of differentiation with surrogate information, it may 
be desirable from a socio-political point of view that differentiation is abandoned in order to achieve 
objectives of equality and equal treatment, such as equality in court, equal access to infrastructure, equal 
educational and career opportunities and equal treatment with respect and dignity. Likewise, possible 
differentiation can be prevented if groups that were previously discriminated against or particularly prone 
to discrimination are to be protected and promoted (Schauer 2018: 50).
Specifically, an economically rational differentiation or disadvantage of certain characteristic carriers can 
be rejected if (a) there is a desire for compensation for past discrimination injustice or structural disadvantage 
of certain characteristic carriers, precisely in order to break through accumulation and amplification 
effects. Furthermore, differentiation should not be applied if (b) differentiation would make it more difficult 
for members of a structurally disadvantaged group to access goods, resources and positions that they 
would need precisely to overcome their disadvantaged group status (e. g. access to employment or credit). 
Furthermore, an economically rational differentiation can be rejected in order to (c) avoid expanding 
stereotyping, as if differentiation is associated with the attribution of a negative characteristic, this can lead 
to expanding stereotyping, in particular if a grouping is affected that is confronted with negative stereotypes 
anyway. Finally, (d) other rationales, such as health or social policy objectives, may speak against 
economically rational differentiation, e. g. in health or car insurance tariffs (Britz 2008: 127-130).
Societal risks could arise in the future if societal considerations about differentiation made possible or 
improved by algorithms and appearing economically sensible are unilaterally in favour of efficiency 
objectives and at the expense of equality or socio-political objectives. The danger can increase if cost 
reductions through automation in algorithmic and data-based differentiation make differentiation in 
many new application areas possible and displace other forms of governing and management.
5.2.4 Treatment as a mere means and psychological distancing
The use of algorithmic differentiation increases the risk that people are no longer considered as individuals 
or in recognition of their constitutionally granted human dignity and their unique individual subject 
quality,87 and rather only as a mere object or means. It is true that according to the prohibition of 
instrumentalisation or the object formula, it is possible to treat other people also as means for one’s own 
ends, but according to this moral principle it is forbidden to use them exclusively as mere means or to 
degrade them as mere means for one’s own ends. Treating people as a mere means entails treating them in 
a way that they do not agree to. This can be the case, for example, with a false promise if the persons 
concerned do not know what is actually intended for them. Similarly, they may not consent to treatment 
87 Cf. Wiegerling (2016) and Hänold (2018: 130f.). See also Härtel (2019: 60) demands that the basic principle of the protection of human 
dignity should permeate all regulations on digital transformation. She refers to the categorical imperative of Immanuel Kant, “Act in such 
a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at 
the same time as an end.” (Kant (1786/1977: 60, translation by Atwell J.E. (1986) The principle of humanity. In: Ends and Principles in Kant’s 
Moral Thought. Nijhoff International Philosophy Series, vol 22. Springer, Dordrecht).
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because they do not have reason or if it would seem irrational to do so. Respecting the dignity of other 
persons means then to treat them in a way that gives them the possibility to reasonably agree or disagree 
with what is done to them (Schaber 2012: 40-42).
Entities applying economic applications want to record and analyse the behaviour and conditions of 
persons concerned primarily in order to obtain or increase the monetary value from customer relations 
and not to find out the actual rationales for the behaviour (Yeung 2018: 30). Algorithmic data analyses of 
data mining, big data analysis or machine learning typically generate correlations and not causal 
relationships. As a result, the decision-makers lack the basis for sufficiently explaining the rationales for 
their decision to the persons concerned, e. g. if they are sorted out. This means, the persons concerned do 
not have the opportunity to consent or refuse the treatment they are undergoing. This risk became 
particularly clear in Case 22, where the use of the system did not sufficiently explain the refusal of the 
credit to the person concerned, which was included in the justification of the discrimination.
In addition, there is a risk that algorithm-based decision-making procedures could lead to a psychological 
distancing of the controllers from the decisions and the persons concerned. The risk posed by the 
interposition of computers as “moral buffers” and an apparent shift of moral responsibility for decisions to 
computers has so far been discussed mainly for autonomous weapon systems (e. g. Cummings 2004b; 
Brundage et al. 2018: 17), but it can be seen to have negative consequences for all semi- and fully automated 
decision-making procedures with negative consequences for the persons concerned.
Data protection law has developed the prohibition of automated individual decision-making to reduce 
such risks. This is intended to prevent disadvantageous differentiation decisions from being made solely by 
automated processing, and to ensure that “[...] no one may become the mere object of an assessment of 
personal data based solely on algorithms” (Scholz 2019: GDPR Art. 22 point 3, translated from German 
original; also, Martini 2018: GDPR Art. 22 point 1). The prohibition of automated decisions is discussed in 
more detail in Section 6.2.3 and its loopholes are pointed out, which make it questionable whether the 
actual protection objective is still being achieved.
5.2.5 Endangering the free development of personality and 
the right to self-expression
In addition to the equality rights of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (see above), the 
phenomenon of statistical or algorithmic and data-based discrimination also affects the constitutionally 
granted rights of personality, in particular the free development of personality granted by Article 2 (1) of 
the Basic Law.88 The problem results from the fact that evaluators form a certain image of the persons 
concerned by one or more characteristics. Persons concerned are confronted with externally-produced 
constructions of their identity and how other perceive a person, i.e. with external images (Britz 2008: 
pp. 179f.; Fröhlich & Spiecker aka Döhmann 2018).
“Statistical discrimination deprives the person concerned of the opportunity to present themselves to 
their counterpart and thus to influence the way they are perceived. Instead, the detection of statistically 
significant features almost automatically leads to conclusions about certain characteristics of a person. 
Statistical discrimination puts prefabricated personality profiles over the persons concerned, which they 
88 “Every person shall have the right to free development of his personality insofar as he does not violate the rights of others or offend 
against the constitutional order or the moral law.” Article 2 para. 1 GG (translation by Deutscher Bundestag 2019).
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are largely defencelessly at the mercy of (Britz 2008: 124f., translated from German original). If, in addition, 
misjudgements are made in statistical differentiation, the persons concerned are unjustifiably attributed a 
certain characteristic, “[...] without being able to defend themselves against this in the process of the 
development of this personality profile on their own (counter-) representation.” (Britz 2008: 180, translated 
from the German original).
In this way, the right to self-expression of the persons concerned is taken away, which derives from the 
right to free development of personality.89 According to Britz, self-representation is the means by which an 
individual can influence how other people see him or her (Britz 2008: 179-207). The right to self-expression 
serves the free development of personality in two ways:
(1) Through self-representation it can be achieved that others get a “favourable” image of an individual 
and thus make decisions favourable to the preservation of his or her scope for decision and action 
(external development). This is true especially considering that the image of an individual is always 
decisive when their scope for action depends on the willingness of others to cooperate. The image of the 
individual determines whether the willingness to cooperate is shown to the individual at all and whether 
this opens up room for manoeuvre for them, e. g. whether they are offered a contract or membership at 
all. Likewise, the individual can anticipatively limit their freedom of action if they do not know what 
external images of the individual have been created. If one has no influence on what data and 
information is included in the public image, the mere anticipation of public images can have a 
prohibitive effect (Britz 2008: 190f.).
(2) Furthermore, in the sense of inner development, the individual can, with “self-representation”, ensure 
for him or herself “a sufficient share in the mutual process of constituting his or her identity in order to 
be able to understand his or herself as a voluntarily chosen personality” (Britz 2008: 195, translated from 
the German original). Although personality development in social contexts always takes place in 
interactive processes of external expectations and attributions (external images) on the one hand and 
one’s own self-images, ideas and desires on the other, the core guarantee of the right of personality is to 
“provide mechanisms that integrate the individual into the processes of the constitution of personality in 
such a way that he or she can understand his or her personality as freely chosen [...]” (Britz 2008: 191, 
translated from the German original).
This is primarily a matter of protection against increased forms of heteronomy, which make the 
development of personality inhibited. This happens when intensive external images, i.e. those characterised 
by a special quality and density, are “imposed” on a person, thus depriving them of the options to form 
their own ideas about themselves. This can (a) be the case with comprehensive data-based personality 
profiles, where the evaluators’ side is so comprehensively informed about the personality of the individual 
concerned that there is no possibility left for the own interpretation of roles in social contexts. This danger 
is also addressed in particular by the right to informational self-determination, in which self-representation 
is also seen as a condition for the development and preservation of personality (see also Section 6.4.2).90 
Also (b) the use of a single surrogate variable in the case of statistical discrimination does not perceive the 
persons concerned themselves, but a stereotypically constructed personality (Britz 2008: 193f.).
89 For the formulation of the right to free development of personality and the right to self-expression see also Britz (2007).
90 Cf. Britz (2008:193), Hoffmann-Riem (1998), Trute (2003), (1998), Britz (2010) and Albers (2017).
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In order to protect the development of personality, prohibitions of discrimination are derived not only 
from the fundamental principles of equality, but above all from the right to self-expression and the 
underlying guarantee of the free development of personality. Prohibitions of discrimination are thus also 
to be understood as protection against inadmissible external images and attributions by others (Britz 2008: 
pp. 200ff., 204).
5.2.6 Creation of structural advantage
Algorithmic methods of analysis, usually based on artificial intelligence procedures, can increasingly 
identify personality traits, character traits and emotional states automatically (see Section 2.2.2). They 
could be used to identify and exploit a person’s affinity with a product, service, resource or position, thereby 
increasing the structural superiority of those offering it. The effect can be enhanced if the providers also 
have access and control points of large volumes of personal data and personal profiles, which is an 
advantage in machine-learning methods. This is because the volume of data in this case also influences the 
quality of the generated models or algorithms. In addition, network effects,91 especially in the case of online 
platforms or IT systems, can further increase the structural advantage of the providers, because network 
effects mean (sometimes prohibitively) high switching costs for the individual users. This reduces the 
number of choices and alternatives.
The risk of structural advantage or disadvantage is also increasingly taken into account for private 
circumstances, for example, with the Federal Constitutional Court’s case law on structural inferiority, 
including the decision on guarantee agreements on structurally unequal negotiating power (BVerfGE 89, 
214 (1993)) or the decision on stadium bans (BVerfGE 148, 267 (2018)). They may become relevant for areas 
of digitisation with large power asymmetries (Hoffmann-Riem 2017: 25; Schweighofer et al. in 2018: 78 80; 
Härtel 2019).
Admittedly, the constitutionally protected ‘private autonomy’ still applies, according to which “[...] it is part 
of the freedom of every person to decide according to their own preferences with whom they want to 
conclude contracts and under what conditions” (BVerfG 2018: Guiding principles, translated from the 
German original). However, according to the decision, the scope of the principle of equality under Article 3 
(1) GG can also extend to private sector areas for specific constellations. For example, private parties may 
not use their “[...] discretionary powers, which [...] might potentially arise from a monopoly or a position of 
structural advantage [...] to exclude specific persons from such events without factual reasons.” (BVerfG 
2018: point 41, translated by the Federal Constitutional Court). The events addressed are those events that 
mean “participation in social life” for the persons concerned (BVerfG 2018: point 41). From this, Schweighofer 
et al. (2018) derive the characteristics of structural advantage, i.e. the opening of the service to a wide range 
of traffic, the reliance on the service and the unilateral power of disposal of the offering company or person 
(ibid., p. 79).
In algorithmic decision-making systems, structural advantage is not presumed per se, but rather, “when 
the algorithmic judgement of persons is used to generate, reinforce or exploit the dependency of a person 
upon [...]” a product or service (Schweighofer et al. 2018: 79, translated from the German original). This may 
be the case in particular if the algorithmic procedure is used to identify those contractual partners who are 
dependent on the service (ibid.). According to Härtel, this could be the case with dynamic prices or price 
differentiation, credit scoring or online platforms with market power (Härtel 2019: 58). In the aforementioned 
constellations, this can result in a requirement for equal treatment in accordance with the principle of 
equality under Article 3 GG from the point of view of structural advantage with the main characteristic of 
91 For network effects, see p. 4.
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being dependent on a product or service. However, the prerequisites and arrangements for giving sufficient 
consideration to structural advantage are still largely unclear (Schweighofer et al. 2018: 80).
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92 Sometimes with different understandings of the term “transparency” from disclosure to explanation. See, for example, Castelluccia & 
Le Métayer (2019: 26-30).
93 For the umbrella concept of “algorithmic accountability” with US-American origin, see Diakopoulos (2014), World Wide Web 
Foundation (2017), for classification in the European context Bush (2018) and EDPS (2018).
Almost at the same time as discrimination risks of algorithms are beginning to be detected, the search for 
possible solutions has begun. Many recommendations or proposals for options for action or instruments 
emerge from the international arena and cannot be directly transferred to the local institutional framework. 
For example, it has been proposed that developers and practitioners carry out self-inspections for risks of 
discrimination, the implementation of human rights impact assessments (UN GA 2018; Yeung 2018: 65; 
Council of Europe 2019) or algorithmic impact assessments (Reisman et al. 2018). In the case of these 
instruments, however, the relationship with existing data protection law would have to be aligned, in 
particular with the provisions for data protection impact assessments (Art. 35 GDPR), which are necessary 
when processing special categories of personal data or data with particularly sensitive characteristics or 
characteristics prone to discrimination (according to Art. 9 GDPR), as well as the relationship with the 
requirements for automated individual decision-making (Art. 22 GDPR), which should also serve anti- 
discrimination law.
6.1 Transparency and proof of discrimination
A detailed discussion has developed on the transparency of algorithms.92 Some authors emphasise that 
algorithms and computer systems are characterised by opacity and incomprehensibility or have so-called 
“black box” properties (e. g. Pasquale 2015; Castelvecchi 2016; Kitchin 2017). Almost as an antidote to this, 
the demand for transparency has arisen. The discussion revolves around questions about what, for which 
persons, for what purpose and in what form transparency should be created or should be avoided (Citron 
& Pasquale 2014; Mittelstadt et al. 2016; Ananny & Crawford 2018; de Laat 2017).
Demands for transparency can range from the explanation of the most important functions to the 
disclosure of the programme code or the possibility of inspection. In addition, transparency should fulfil 
very different functions, ranging from its function as an information instrument for consumer protection, 
to the creation of accountability in the sense of Algorithmic Accountability93 to various stakeholders 
(Hacker & Petkova 2017).
In this context, different aspects have to be distinguished regarding the causes of the lack of transparency 
of algorithms and computer systems (according to Burrell 2016): (1) In many cases, the lack of transparency 
is due to the behaviour of developing and using entities who refuse to disclose algorithms, programme 
structures or even the programmed decision-making rules and criteria to external parties for reasons of 
protection of trade and business secrets, copyright protection, data protection (when computer systems 
contain personal data of third parties) or out of caution against targeted behavioural adjustments by the 
persons concerned (“gaming the system”) (de Laat 2017).
(2) The different abilities and previous knowledge of the observer can also create an impression of 
opaqueness. A programme code that implements algorithms is not comprehensible without prerequisites 
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and in very few cases can be completely gauged and understood. Knowledge of the programming language 
is required as a basic prerequisite to be able to reproduce algorithms in a “raw” state. Therefore, disclosure 
of the programme code to persons concerned without prior knowledge would not be very productive, but 
disclosure for inspection by specialists can be useful (see below on testing software systems).
(3) A differentiated view emerges with regard to the lack of transparency caused by the technical properties 
of algorithms and software systems. For example, it is pointed out that the opaqueness can increase with 
the increasing complexity of algorithms and software systems (e. g. Yeung 2018: 15; Wischmeyer 2018: 47).
This includes above all machine-learning algorithms, as well as adaptive or dynamic systems whose rules 
are constantly adapted through the continuous analysis of data streams (Desai & Kroll 2017). In contrast, 
the view is also held that algorithms are fundamentally comprehensible technical elements and that 
inscrutability arises primarily from the interest and power structures of the development processes of 
software systems (Kroll 2018). Since the algorithms programme the decision-making rules and these rules 
must be specifically formulated for this purpose, Kleinberg et al. (2019) even consider the rules to be in 
principle more comprehensible than rules enforced by humans. This is because with simulations, the 
outcomes of the decision-making rules can be assessed more clearly than in cases of human decision-
making.
6.1.1 Technical options for transparency, traceability and 
non-discrimination
Numerous proposals are currently being made to create transparency and traceability. Of the very rapidly 
developing research and development trends, with partly unclear conceptual delimitations and wide 
overlaps, only selective excerpts can be reproduced here.94
For the technical analysis of algorithms, in particular of machine learning and thus the generation of 
explainability, different approaches can be distinguished: (1) Approaches with “open” systems (a “white box 
approach”), where it is possible to analyse the programme code. (2) From this approach the “closed” system 
approaches (“black box approach”) have to be distincted, in which the behaviour of a system is analysed 
without taking note of the programme code. Explanations are constructed by observing both the input 
and the output. (3) In addition, a distinction can be made between the “constructive approach”, which aims 
to implement explainability as early as during the development of the programme code (Castelluccia & Le 
Métayer 2019: 47-54). The research initiatives of “explainable AI” (e. g. Dosilovic, Brcic & Hlupic 2018) should 
also be seen in this context. For example, Ehsan et al. (2019) present an IT system that is supposed to be able 
to explain its steps in natural language (“automated rational generation”).
With regard to technical analysis, Schweighofer emphasises the possibilities of testing software systems, 
which have existed for a long time as a component of “System and Software Engineering”, and which also 
serve as standard procedures, in particular for quality assurance. They have similarities to auditing (see 
below). During testing, a software system receives a pre-defined input and aims to generate an output from 
it (Schweighofer et al. 2018: 58 64).
Currently, some software systems for testing machine learning and automated decision-making systems 
are available mostly as open source programmes (Sanchez-Monedero & Dencik 2018: 12f.). Examples 
94 Overviews are provided, for example, by Guidotti et al. (2018), Schweighofer et al. (2018), Castelluccia & Le Métayer (2019) or Dosilovic, 
Brcic & Hlupic (2018), each with a different structure.
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include the Themis system for testing fairness in software (Galhotra, Brun & Meliou 2017), the FairTest tool 
for investigating relationships between application outcomes and sensitive or protected characteristics of 
users (Tramèr et al. 2017) or the comprehensive “AI Fairness 360” system, which integrates a whole range of 
tools (Bellamy et al. 2018).
Kleinberg et al. (2019) point to the special ability to check decision-making rules for discrimination when 
they are implemented in algorithms. Since relevant decision-making rules are programmed in the 
algorithms, experiments and simulations are possible to investigate the effects of the decision-making 
rules on affected groups of people, e. g. by varying the data inputs or the decision-making rules themselves. 
However, the prerequisite for verification is access to the algorithms and the data sets. In contrast to 
algorithms, humans are the “ultimate black box” (ibid., p. 10). Therefore, the authors demand that in 
particular the decisions made by humans in the development and application process, such as the selection 
of data sets or influencing variables, be documented. This would make the effects of algorithms more 
comprehensible and discrimination could even be proven more easily in court proceedings, compared to 
(conventional) proof with statistics (Kleinberg et al. 2019). 
Tests and analyses are associated with technical approaches to prevention of discrimination, which start 
with the design and use of the systems. In data mining, Romei and Ruggieri differentiate between (1) the 
naive approach of removing protected characteristics, although they also point out potential problems 
with this.95 They also mention (2) the controlled disturbance or modification of the training data set (the 
“pre-processing” approach), (3) the modification of the learning algorithm for classification during training 
(the “in-processing” approach), (4) the modification of the model for classification after training (the “post-
processing” approach) and (5) corrective interventions in the application of the prediction algorithm or 
model (Romei & Ruggieri 2014: 622-624).96 However, Case 36 illustrates that some of these corrective 
options in ML procedures, which make discriminatory risk prognoses in juvenile justice, would not lead to 
satisfactory outcomes or would trigger new discrimination.
In addition, non-discriminatory machine-learning algorithms are also being developed that can be used 
for data sets containing legally protected characteristics. This often results in a conflict of objectives 
between fairness or avoidance of discrimination (measured by fairness criteria, see below) on the one hand 
and accuracy on the other. Various discrimination-reducing algorithms perform differently in terms of 
fairness or accuracy (overview and test in Friedler et al. 2019).
Metrics are also being developed to measure fairness (fairness criteria/measures or metrics). According to 
Berk et al., the following fairness criteria can be distinguished, (1) overall accuracy equality, (2) statistical 
parity, (3) conditional procedure accuracy equality, (4) conditional use accuracy equality, and (5) treatment 
equality (Berk 2018; Schweighofer et al. 2018: pp. 39f.).97 However, Chouldechova points out, using the 
example of the algorithms for computing recidivism rates in the judicial system (Case 35), that the fairness 
criteria cannot be fulfilled simultaneously (Chouldechova 2017).
Which fairness criteria should be used in which situations and for which differentiation purposes cannot be 
decided in computer science or by applying entities, but requires political treatment and decisions (Berk et 
al. 2018; Castelluccia & Le Métayer 2019: 55). Furthermore, when considering fairness criteria, the application 
of the system itself is not questioned, but is instead a given assumption. Societal risks of discrimination that 
arise from the application of differentiation systems themselves are not solved in this way.
95 See also Section 5.1.2.
96 See also Friedler et al. (2019) or Castelluccia & Le Métayer (2019: 46-47).
97 A further overview is given in Verma & Rubin (2018).
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6.1.2 Improving the evidence of discrimination
6.1.2.1 Empirical investigations and evidence
Empirical investigations and statistics have long played an important role in the discovery and proof of 
discrimination (e. g. Supik 2017). They are also available for decisions of algorithmic differentiations to 
capture and evaluate the consequences and outcomes. With the increasing digitisation of administrative 
and private interactions, there is potentially much more data available for statistical analysis to detect and 
prove discrimination.
Romei and Ruggieri (2014) provide a comprehensive bibliographical overview of the most common 
empirical analyses of discrimination with references to exemplary studies. In doing so, they differentiate 
the studies according to the possibilities that the researchers have to influence the influencing variables (or 
independent variables) in the statistical analyses. (1) In observational studies, researchers have no control 
over the influencing variables. They collect data from observations by means of surveys or interviews on 
specific situations, conditions, structures of economic or life areas, such as labour or credit markets, or the 
treatment of groups of people who are prone to discrimination. In (2) quasi-experimental studies, 
researchers only have control over some influencing variables. This type of study includes (2a) auditing 
studies in which individuals are sent as test pairs in decision-making situations and discrimination can be 
derived from comparisons of treatments. (2b) In situationtestings, the subjects have contact with the 
decision-maker and can make (hidden) records of possible unequal treatment. (2c) Correspondence-
testings attempt to identify discriminatory behaviour in the responses, mainly through written questions, 
e. g. fake applications and CVs. This type of study in particular is used in the online sector, e. g. to investigate 
online recruitment services. (3) In experimental studies, researchers have control over all influencing 
variables. A distinction can be made between laboratory experiments and natural experiments (Romei & 
Ruggieri 2014: 591-621). They also point out that data mining is also suitable for detecting discrimination 
(Romei & Ruggieri 2014: 621-624) e. g. to detect gender discrimination in research proposals (Romei, 
Ruggieri & Turini 2013).
6.1.2.2 Algorithm audits
Algorithm audits are methods and tools designed to enable researchers and protective institutions to 
investigate systems with algorithmic and data-based differentiations and to help understand the effects of 
algorithms, including discrimination, on all types of persons concerned (Sandvig et al. 2014; Hannák et al. 
2017: 2; Schweighofer et al. in 2018: 64-73). In part, they correspond to the research methods of testing 
software systems or the “classical” empirical studies of discrimination (see above). According to Sandvig’s 
classification (2014), which refers to online platforms, there are (1) code audits, which correspond to the 
testing of the programme code with full inspection,98 (2) Another form collects data on the interactions of 
platform users and does not require insight into the code of the system (“non-invasive user audits”). 
(3) Furthermore, data is collected with repeated requests to a platform (“scraping audits”). (4) Fictitious test 
persons generated by computer programmes can also use the service under investigation to collect data by 
carrying out repeated uses (“sock puppet audit”). (5) Finally, test persons hired via crowdsourcing services 
can use the service to generate relevant data (“crowdsourced audit” or “collaborative audit”).
98 For comparison see Schweighofer et al. (2018: 70).
706. Needs and Options for Action
In some of the cases described in Chapter 4, algorithm audits were used to detect unequal treatment on 
websites, online platforms and online marketplaces, e. g. for online labour markets (Case 2), for price 
differentiation in retail (Case 12) (see also Mikians et al. 2012, 2013) or for online facial recognition services 
(Case 46).
The procedure in the above-mentioned cases for the detection of unequal treatment and discrimination 
with the help of algorithm audits has the character of scientific investigations that require expertise and, 
above all, resources for the empirical investigation of interactions in the online sector (e. g. use of crawlers, 
handling of fictitious accounts) and, above all, statistical analysis. They mostly use information that can be 
obtained on the internet. For this purpose, the necessary data is partly collected with web crawlers, partly 
by extensive automated queries to search engines or online platforms with the help of software or by 
“crowdworkers” (e. g. via Amazon Mechanical Turk).99 It is also becoming apparent that a growing number 
of researchers are making the identification and investigation of discrimination – in particular in the 
online sector – the subject of their research and are further developing the methodological toolkit for this 
purpose.
Case 16, which highlights the “Sunlight” system and Case 17, which highlights the “AdFisher” system, also 
provide tools for automated data collection and the analysis of online transactions (partly with machine-
learning methods), which can be used to investigate personalisation or potentially discriminatory 
differentiations. Such tools can be used to perform algorithm audits (in particular type 2 and type 3).
99 See, for example, Case 2, Case 8, Case 12, or Case 38.
100 See cases on employment services in Poland (Case 29) and Austria (Case 30).
101 See, for example, Case 47.
Conclusions
 — Research results and cases show that proof of unequal treatment and discrimination based on 
algorithmic and data-based differentiations can also be achieved without the access and direct 
inspection of the algorithms. This is made possible by observing, recording and evaluating the 
outcomes and consequences of the differentiation applications, often by taking on the role of 
test users, and can also be done via automated uses and queries.
 — Similarly, cases100 show that, in particular in automated decision support systems, it may be 
important to look at the overall outcome, i.e., which actual consequences are triggered by human 
decisions in light of computer recommendations. This is also relevant for the many cases where  
AI systems are less able to detect certain groups of persons with protected characteristics (in 
Section 4.12). In those cases, discrimination would only become apparent if certain practices and 
decisions based on poorer detection were considered (and these would lead, for example, to 
disproportionately more police or border controls, disproportionately fewer staff being recruited 
or inadequate consideration in marketing strategies). However, the form of evidence of identifying 
outcomes also requires expertise, particularly in statistics and programming, as well as financial 
and human resources to carry out the investigations. Therefore, this form of providing evidence is 
unlikely to be suitable for affected individuals without specialist knowledge. For equality bodies, 
particularly in cooperation with research institutes, the forms of verification can be suitable 
instruments and are also used by them in the beginning.101
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 — Another requirement is that the relevant communication and transactions relating to the 
differentiations must also be statistically recordable, as seems to be possible for many online 
applications and online platforms that have public offerings. However, such option of proof  
can no longer be acquired wherever these transactions and communications are not publicly 
recordable, such as in the case of closed administrative procedures or exclusively individualised 
commercial offers.
 — Furthermore, these methods cannot reveal the exact causes of discrimination when several causes 
may lie within a complex system or in the complex interplay between data sets, algorithms and 
human decision-makers.102 This can be done by investigating the practices of data generation used 
(as in Case 34) and the possibilities of testing software systems and simulating variations of input 
data or components of decision-making rules, and also by investigating how human decision-
makers deal with computer recommendations.
6.1.3 Legal situation
6.1.3.1 Data protection information obligations and rights of access
Data protection law includes various information obligations for the controllers or operators of data 
processing vis-à-vis the persons concerned or data subjects respectively (Articles 12, 13 and 14 GDPR) as 
well as information rights, which the data subjects can assert vis-à-vis the controllers (Article 15 GDPR). 
The purpose of the information requirements is to ensure that data subjects are aware of the data processing 
so that they can effectively exercise their rights. They should also form the basis of the consent of the data 
subjects, which (among other reasons) determines the lawfulness of the data processing (Art. 6 para. 1 
GDPR). This is why it is also referred to as “informed consent”. With the rights of access, data subjects have 
the right to obtain information on the purpose and scope of the data processing in order to ensure that 
they can check whether the data has been processed lawfully (Busch 2018: 37-41). Extended information 
requirements apply to the existence of automated decisions (see Section 6.2.3).
In practice, the information obligations and the concept of informed consent are usually specified in the 
”privacy policies” (also called data protection statements), although their design is criticised. Critique is 
directed at the ambiguities of the terms used, the use of legal language that is not easy to understand, the 
inadequacies of the information provided, cognitive barriers to understanding it and the effort and time 
constraints that prevent reading and understanding the privacy policies (Milne & Culnan 2004; Solove 
2013; Cate & Mayer-Schönberger 2013; Reidenberg et al. 2015; Reidenberg et al. 2016; McDonald & Cranor 
2008; Van Alsenoy, Kosta & Dumortier 2014; Martin 2013; Moll et al. 2018; Kamp & Rost 2013; Orwat & 
Schankin 2018; Kettner, Thorun & Kleinhans 2018; Hänold 2019).
While the privacy policies must specify the purpose of the data processing,103 it is doubtful that this 
information can be used to assess the consequences of the differentiation decisions based on the data 
processing in terms of unequal treatment by the data subjects. Since the purpose is only to provide 
information on the existence of an intended purpose of processing and not on its consequences, it can be 
102 This is shown, for example, in Case 17.
103 According to Art. 13 para. 1 lit. c GDPR.
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assumed that this legal instrument does not provide the necessary evidence for an anti-discrimination 
action.
6.1.3.2 Burden of proof and circumstantial evidence under the General Equal 
Treatment Act (AGG)
Section 22 AGG provides for the burden of proof to be eased for the persons concerned by placing the 
burden of proof on the party accused of discrimination to prove that there has been no violation of the 
provisions on protection against discrimination. According to Ebert, the facilitation of evidence is linked 
to three conditions: (1) The person claiming to have been discriminated against must prove that they have 
been treated differently from other persons and (2) the person claiming must prove that they differ with 
regard to one of the protected characteristics (pursuant to Section 1 AGG). (3) Furthermore, the person 
must produce evidence which shows with a substantial degree of probability that the characteristic referred 
to in Section 1 was the cause of the discrimination (Ebert 2019: Section 22 AGG point 1 and 2). With regard 
to risks of algorithmic discrimination, these requirements are problematic:
From the perspective of the persons concerned, the poor traceability of the effects of algorithms makes it 
difficult or even impossible for the persons concerned to demonstrate that they have suffered discrimination 
due to algorithms. In the case of personalisation and the targeted, exclusive offering of information, 
services or products – in particular in online offers and on online platforms – a single, potentially affected 
person may have difficulty in proving that he or she is treated less favourably than comparable persons. 
This is even more difficult to prove if the offers change dynamically. Still more serious is that it is impossible 
for an individual without in-depth expertise to prove unequal treatment with regard to the legally protected 
characteristic, precisely through the unintentionally or intentionally concealed use of surrogate variables 
or proxies that correlate with the protected characteristic (Section 5.1). Thus, the individual can hardly 
provide the necessary evidence. This is indicated, for example, by the extensive empirical studies and 
algorithm audits in the cases, which are necessary for discrimination to be proven at all (Chapter 4).104 In 
addition to these problems, (anticipated) dependencies (such as in the selection of applicants) or the high 
risk of legal costs may be obstacles to taking action against any discrimination perceived by the persons 
concerned.
104 See similarly Hänold (2019) with regard to algorithms, profiling and scoring in the insurance industry. See also Fröhlich & Spiecker 
aka Döhmann (2018).
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105 See also the legal proceedings in the US; see AI Now Institute (2018).
Conclusion
One possible solution would be collective redress with the class action suit, which has long been 
demanded for the anti-discrimination action (Berghahn et al. 2016: pp. 141ff., 159-162; Ponti & 
Tuchtfeld 2018; Straker & Niehoff 2018). However, the need remains for someone to perceive potential 
discrimination as possible damage in the first place who can then take the initiative to bring a collective 
action. For the barely perceivable risks of algorithmic discrimination, (supplementary) regular surveys 
carried out by equality, research or similar institutions or specialised authorities (in particular also in 
collaborations) would be more suitable in the absence of any concrete damage. Moreover, legally 
safeguarded information rights for equality bodies can facilitate such a procedure for the provision 
of evidence, which is not yet available.
6.1.3.3 Documentation
From the reversal of the burden of proof, Dzida and Groh conclude for the field of labour that in the case 
of a dispute in which a court suspects discrimination, even those who implement algorithms have difficulty 
in proving that there is no discrimination or that the use of the system is proportionate to the differentiation 
task, such as personnel selection (Dzida & Groh 2018). For example, while the proportionality test may be 
able to demonstrate the suitability of the system for the differentiation task, e. g. by means of scientific 
studies, the differentiation objective in question may not be achieved by “other equally appropriate but less 
intervening means and the procedures may not unduly prejudice the legitimate interests of disadvantaged 
persons” (ibid., pp. 1920f., translated from the German original).
For the duty to prove that there is no discrimination, it may be necessary for applying entities to take 
precautions to ensure the comprehensibility of algorithms or artificial intelligence, so that in cases of 
litigation it can be proven how a decision and its outcomes or consequences for persons concerned came 
about, or according to which decision-making criteria and weightings differentiation decisions were made. 
According to Yeung, these requirements may also result from the principle of procedural fairness, according 
to which persons in court proceedings have a right to know the reasons for decisions that adversely and 
significantly affect them (Yeung 2017: 23).105
For example, protocol obligations regarding the programme procedures or characteristics used in the 
differentiation decisions are proposed to serve as evidence in cases of dispute (Martini 2017; Ernst 2017: 
1032; Brauneis & Goodman 2018). Furthermore, the provisions on the records of processing activities 
(according to Article 30 GDPR) as well as on the codes of conduct and certification (Articles 40-43 GDPR) 
should be further developed to take account of the specific features of algorithmic decision-making 
procedures.
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6.2 More detailed regulation of algorithmic 
decision-making rules
106 See also Raabe & Wagner (2019 in progress)
107 For discussion of the catalogues of characteristics, see e. g. Däubler (2018: AGG Section 1 point 6-10).
In view of the problems of information duties and rights of access, which do not allow for sufficient self-
protection against disadvantages and discrimination, and given how difficult, if not impossible, it is for 
persons concerned to prove discrimination (without expertise), consideration should be given to stricter 
regulation of differentiation decisions.106 Regulations of differentiation decisions based on the analysis of 
personal data are not new. They can be found in the law relevant to anti-discrimination and informational 
self-determination and its institutional implementation in relevant authorities and institutions. For 
example, the AGG can also be understood as a form of regulation of decision-making rules, in which the 
use of certain decision-making characteristics is excluded.
6.2.1 Prohibitions of discrimination and legally 
protected characteristics
The General Equal Treatment Act (Allgemeines Gleichbehandlungsgesetz, AGG) was intended to prevent, 
in principle, decisions about persons on the basis of certain widespread generalisations and differentiations 
according to characteristics that are particularly prone to generalisation and that can lead to discrimination 
(Britz 2008: 4). Thus, in principle, the direct use of the protected characteristics is inadmissible under 
Sections 7 para. 1 and 19 para. 1 AGG, even in differentiation decisions using algorithms or computer 
systems.
Similarly, indirect discrimination, which is common in algorithmic decisions, i.e. where an apparently 
neutral feature is used but persons are disadvantaged with regard to the protected characteristics, is 
prohibited pursuant to Section 3 AGG unless the use of the feature is justified by a legitimate aim and the 
means of achieving that objective are appropriate and necessary (proportionality test) (according to Ernst 
2017: 1032).
The existing catalogues of protected characteristics of the AGG107 should be reviewed in order to determine 
whether they cover the characteristics that can be identified by (new) algorithmic methods and whether 
new grounds of discrimination are created. This is because systems with machine learning and other forms 
of AI make it possible to identify and differentiate according to characteristics that are not yet included in 
the catalogues of anti-discrimination law (cf. also Zuiderveen Borgesius 2018: 20). The systems can include 
analysis options for detecting sentiments, naivety and suggestibility, identifying cognitive weaknesses or 
psychological and emotional states (such as depression), the respective social status or character traits (see 
Section 2.2.2). These can be, for example, the characteristics “biometric features”, “political opinion” or 
“state of health”, which are regulated in the GDPR as a special category of personal data (see below), but not 
in the AGG.
At the moment, the societal consequences can only be conjectured, since knowledge about the actual use 
of the systems and the changes triggered is still largely lacking. To this end, research is needed to examine 
potential applications of such systems, mechanisms of action and potential risks for equal treatment and 
free personal development. However, there is already a risk that such identified personality traits could be 
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exploited to differentiate persons according to their dependence on a good, a resource or a position (e. g. a 
job), thus the increase in structural advantage108 of the providers of such goods, positions, etc. can be 
difficult to dismiss.
Anti-discrimination law could be used with the extension of the catalogue of protected characteristics to 
protect against abuse of structural advantage.
Furthermore, it must be examined in this context whether the provisions of Article 9 GDPR are sufficient 
for protection against algorithmic discrimination. This provision prohibits the processing of sensitive 
personal data, which reveals “[...] racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, 
or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biometric data for the purpose of uniquely 
identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual 
orientation [...]” (Article 9 para. 1 GDPR) to be prohibited, unless one of the numerous exemptions allows it. 
For example, the processing of sensitive data is permitted if the data subject gives his or her explicit consent 
(Article 9 para. 2 lit. a GDPR). Here, too, the data subject would in principle have to estimate the partly long-
term individual consequences, also in terms of unequal treatment, at the time of giving consent, which can 
be a major challenge. It is doubtful whether a realistic chance of self-protection of the persons concerned 
from algorithmic discrimination will arise from this.
108 See Section 5.2.6.
109 Franke & Schlichtmann (2018: Section 20 AGG point 17) interpret this provision as allowing only a few differentiations by this.
Summary and conclusion
The catalogues of protected characteristics laid down in the GG and AGG are to be examined to see 
whether new methods of analysis, in particular with artificial intelligence algorithms, for the automated 
identification of personality characteristics require their extension. This also makes characteristics 
identifiable and accessible for differentiation, which can be used to identify and use the dependency  
on a good, resource or position in order to establish or increase structural advantage. The still largely 
unknown connections between technically feasible and potentially endangered protection objectives 
should be researched and their legitimacy should be assessed from a societal perspective.
6.2.2 Exemptions justified on objective grounds or by the 
use of recognised methods
Pursuant to Section 20 para. 1 AGG, there is no violation of the prohibition of discrimination if there is an 
objective ground (or objectively justified or factual reason). The vague term “objective ground” is clarified 
in its dimension by the examples given in the following sentences, but not exhaustively (Schrader & 
Schubert 2018: AGG Section 3 points 68ff.). According to this, an objective ground exists, for example, if (a) 
it is a matter of avoiding risks, preventing damage or the like, e. g. if certain groups of persons are excluded 
from using certain equipment or vehicles due to safety obligations. However, it is debatable to what extent 
this also includes an economic threat, e. g. in the form of loss of sales.109 (b) Similarly, there may be an 
objective ground if certain persons are excluded in order to protect the private life or personal security of 
other persons (e. g. if the opening hours of swimming pools or saunas are separated according to gender). 
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(c) Another example of an objective reason is special advantages or benefits and where there is no interest 
in enforcing equal treatment, such as discounts granted for social reasons (e. g. for students) or favourable 
sales promotions that only affect certain groups of people (e. g. lower prices for men in dance courses where 
there is a surplus of women, or vice versa) (Franke & Schlichtmann 2018: AGG Section 20 points 12-21). If 
none of these objective grounds exist, the only remaining option is to clarify the matter on a case-by-case 
basis, whereby a consideration must be made according to the principles of proportionality (Schrader & 
Schubert 2018: AGG Section 3 points 68ff.). The legal situation, however, provides for uncertainties of 
interpretation in advance, for example, when the design of decision-making systems is concerned with 
which features can or cannot be used.
Section 20 para. 2 Sentence 2 AGG regulates unequal treatment in insurance contracts with regard to the 
characteristics of religion, disability, age and sexual identity (differentiation according to all other protected 
characteristics is prohibited by Section 19 AGG). It is permissible if it is carried out according to “recognised 
principles of risk-adequate calculations” (Section 20 para. 2 Sentence 4 AGG, translated by the Federal Anti-
Discrimination Agency 2009), in particular if it is based on an “assessment of risk based on relevant and 
accurate actuarial and statistical data.” (Section 20 para. 2 Sentence 2 AGG, translated by the Federal Anti-
Discrimination Agency 2009).
Schiek (2000: Section 20 AGG point 8) believes insurance discrimination, with the continuing formation of 
stereotypes and prejudices through the collection of statistics linked to legally protected characteristics, to 
be an objectively unjustified breach of the right to equal treatment. She considers an extended application 
of this form of legitimation to other areas of life, such as banking services, to be inadmissible. Berghahn et 
al. also demand the restriction of this form of unequal treatment (Berghahn et al. 2016: 122ff.). Nevertheless, 
in the practice of scoring, e. g. in online trading, legally protected characteristics with reference to economic 
interests are used as objective grounds (e. g. Moos & Rothkegel 2016).
Conclusions
With the increasing spread of algorithmic computations and the implementation of differentiation, 
including scoring, it should be examined whether the admissibility of the calculation methods, the 
justifications, the characteristics, the fields of application and differentiation purposes should not be 
regulated more clearly and made mandatory. This should also apply to the recognition procedures for  
the “recognised principles of risk-adjusted calculation” or “scientifically recognised mathematical-
statistical procedure”. In view of the rapidly increasing number of algorithms, machine-learning 
procedures, concretisation of “sufficient” forecast accuracy, fairness criteria and quality or error measures, 
it is likely that assessments of their respective suitability and adequacy may also diverge, so that it is no 
longer possible to speak of a generally recognised method. Clearer and generally mandatory clarifications 
in this regard could create stable expectations among developing and using entities and, where 
appropriate, persons concerned.
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6.2.3 Prohibition of automated decisions
One of the most important regulations to protect against risks of algorithmic discrimination is the 
prohibition of automated decisions in data protection law. The purpose of the provision is already found 
in the Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46/EC) and the old Federal Data Protection Act 
(Bundesdatenschutzgesetz, BDSG old version), where it serves to protect human individuality as an element 
of the right to free development of personality and autonomous shaping of one’s own life (Ernst 2017: 
1030; Martini 2018: GDPR Art. 22 point 8; Hoeren & Niehoff 2018: 53). According to Article 22 para. 1 GDRP, 
a data subject has the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing, which 
produces legal effects for him or her or significantly affects him or her in a similar way. It is not clear from 
the GDPR which types of automated decisions are actually covered. This can only be derived indirectly 
from the wording of the legal norm:
(1) On the one hand, this are automated decisions with decisions based exclusively on automated data 
processing. This is interpreted to mean that this is the case if a natural person has not made a substantive 
assessment and decision based on it, or if the natural person involved has no final decision-making 
authority (Ernst 2017: pp. 1029f., 1031; Bush 2018: 31). Martini stresses that it is decisive whether a person 
has an influence on the decision, i.e. its content. In doing so, people can prepare decisions manually, because 
whether the prohibition applies does not depend on the preparation but on the decision itself. If a person 
has a substantive power of decision, they actually exercise this power of decision, and if there is regular 
intervention, i.e. there is no random control and moreover no single case of human intervention, it is no 
longer possible to speak of an exclusively automated decision and the prohibition does not apply (Martini 
2018: GDPR Art. 22 points 17-19).110
(2) On the other hand, all those types of automated decisions are covered, which “produce legal effects or 
significantly affect the person in a similar manner” (Scholz 2019: GDPR Art. 22 points 31-37, translated 
from the German original). The nature of the effects is therefore decisive.111 The “legal effect” is to be 
assumed if the legal position of the data subject changes, such as when a contract is terminated, and a 
“significant impairment” is always given if the economic and personal development of the data subject is 
significantly disturbed, such as when a favourable interest rate fails to materialise (Busch 2018: 33).
If there are automated decisions that are permitted under the above-mentioned articles of the GDPR, then 
further regulations must be complied with (Weichert 2018: 131; Hoeren & Niehoff 2018: 54f.): Article 14 
para. 2 lit. g GDPR regulates the right to be informed, meaning that where automated decision-making 
exists, the controller must provide the data subject with “[...] meaningful information about the logic 
110 See also Weichert (2018: 128-135, in particular pp. 133f.), for whom banned automated decisions are considered to be also situations 
in which the natural person only examines documents prior to the decision or is purely formally involved in the decision-making process. 
Similarly Hoeren & Niehoff (2018: 53) as well as Scholz claim, “An exclusively automated decision is to be assumed not only if no review by 
a human being is intended from the outset and no such review takes place, but also if the human being – without making any 
considerations of their own – merely confirms or accepts the automated prescription” (2019: GDPR Art. 22 point 26, translated from the 
German original).
111 Weichert (2018) provides another interpretation with reference to Buchner (2018: Art. 22 point 18) and Reichwald & Pfisterer (2016: 
pp. 211f.), which sees the prohibition as being determined in particular by the degree of lack of transparency and lack of influence for data 
subjects. Thus, only automated decision-making systems in which the decision-making process is no longer manageable for data subjects 
and which lack controllability and revisability for data subjects are covered by the probition. This may be the case if the algorithms are not 
fully documented or in the case of automated decisions by means of learning algorithms or artificial intelligence (Weichert 2018: 130). 
However, as shown in the examples of discrimination, even comparatively “simple” algorithms, without the involvement of people and on 
a contractual basis, can have legally disadvantageous or significantly detrimental effects that would not be covered by the prohibition 
according to this interpretation.
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involved, as well as the significance and the envisaged consequences of such processing for the data subject.” 
(see below for further details). The rights of access of the data subject are regulated in Article 15 para. 1 lit. 
h GDPR and provide, with the same wording, for information on the logic and consequences involved.
In addition, for automated decisions, a data protection impact assessment112 is required pursuant to Article 
35 para. 3 lit. a GDPR if a “systematic and extensive evaluation of personal aspects relating to natural 
persons which is based on automated processing, including profiling, and on which decisions are based 
that produce legal effects concerning the natural person or similarly significantly affect the natural person”. 
This makes it clear that the legislator ascribes a high risk to automated decisions. The controller must use 
the data protection impact assessment to assess these risks in advance, as well as whether the processing 
operations are necessary and proportionate, and the remedial measures planned to deal with the risks 
(Article 35 para. 7 lit. b to d GDPR). This means, for example, that the controller also refrains (or must 
refrain) from using machine learning or artificial intelligence procedures if the risk is assessed as 
disproportionate to the purpose of processing and less risky alternatives to the decision-making procedure 
are available or the procedure in question is not absolutely necessary for the (differentiation) purpose. If 
high risks are identified, a report must be submitted to the supervisory authority (pursuant to Article 36 
GDPR). In such cases, the supervisory authority may prohibit the processing (pursuant to Article 58 para. 3 
lit. f GDPR).
6.2.3.1 Exemptions
Exemptions to the prohibition of automated individual decisions are regulated in Paragraph 2. They exist 
when the automated decision is necessary to conclude or perform a contract, is permitted by legislation of 
the European Union or the member states, or by explicit consent113 of the data subject. However, according 
to Article 22 para. 4 GDPR, these exemptions do not apply if decisions on the processing of special categories 
of personal data of Article 9 GDPR (“sensitive data”), which is explicitly intended to serve anti-discrimination 
(Buchner 2018: GDPR Art. 22 point 44). However, this prohibition is again restricted if the data subject has 
given his or her explicit consent (Article 9 para. 2 lit. a GDPR), or if the processing is necessary for reasons 
of substantial public interest (Article 9 para. 2 lit. g GDPR).
If one of these two exemptions applies to the processing of particularly sensitive data, the admissibility of 
the automated decision also depends on whether the exemptions of Article 22 para. 2 apply, i.e. whether it 
is necessary for the conclusion or performance of a contract or whether the data subject has given his or 
her explicit consent (Buchner 2018: GDPR Art. 22 point 45f.; Bush 2018: 35). In this context, von Ernst 
points out a potential dilemma here, highlighting that although consent to data processing is possible 
pursuant to Article 22 para. 2 lit. c GDPR, this conflicts with the AGG, which excludes discrimination even 
if consent to unequal treatment has been given (Ernst 2017: 1033; Schrader & Schubert 2018: Section 3 AGG 
point 47).
112 More detailed provisions on data protection impact assessment are provided by the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, WP29 
(2017b).
113 The term “explicit consent” is not explained in the GDPR. The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party’s Directive on Consent 
provides guidance on this; see WP29 (2017a: 18f.). Scholz elaborates on this: “Even if, formally speaking, this does not involve consent to 
individual data processing steps, but rather the use of a data processing procedure, this consent will also have to be measured against the 
requirements of Art. 4 No. 11 and Art. 7. [ ...] From the perspective of the data subjects, the need for protection is comparable. Consent is 
therefore only effective if it is given unambiguously, voluntarily, specifically and in an informed way [...]. The latter presupposes that the 
data subject must receive all information necessary to correctly assess the reason, purpose and consequences of the processing before 
giving consent” Scholz (2019: GDPR Art. 22 point 52, translated from the German original).
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6.2.3.2 Appropriate measures
Also, in the exceptional cases of Article 22 para. 2 lit. a and c GDPR, i.e. in the presence of “contract” and 
“consent”, i.e. the situations in which automated decision-making is permitted, the automated decision 
should be made with appropriate measures taken by the controller to safeguard the rights, freedoms and 
legitimate interests of the data subjects. These include at least the right of the data subjects to obtain direct 
intervention by a person of the controlling authority, as well as the right to express one’s point of view and 
to contest the decision (Article 22 para. 3 GDPR).114 The objective of these regulations is not only to protect 
against discriminatory automated decisions, but also to ensure transparency and fairness in the decision-
making process itself (Scholz 2019: GDPR Art. 22 points 3, 56).
As regards the right of the data subject to “human intervention” or the resulting possibility to object to the 
automated decision at any time (“opt out”), is, however, still unclear. Martini and Nink and also Busch, for 
example, interpret this so narrowly that the intervention of a person can only be demanded if there are 
justified reasons and in individual cases (Martini & Nink 2017; Busch 2018: 36). However, the paragraphs 
could also be interpreted differently. Direct intervention and contesting are the preliminary stage for the 
subsequent exercise of the rights to present one’s point of view and to obtain a review of the decision. 
However, Recital 71 GDPR states that these rights must be granted “in any event”.
With the option to express his or her point of view, the data subject should be given the opportunity to 
present the specificities of the individual case from his or her point of view, which would not be taken into 
account in an automated decision. Martini and Nink explain that the controller is obliged to actually take 
the aspects presented into account so that the authority does not degenerate into a “meaningless phrase” 
(Martini & Nink 2017: 4). The controller is then required to review the decision and deal with the content 
of the aspects brought forward (ibid.). However, the rights of direct intervention and the right to express 
one’s point of view are weakened in that data subjects must be aware of the situation and of the potential 
harm that automated decision-making may cause.
6.2.3.3 Information requirements
The right to put forward one’s point of view implies the need to provide the data subject of the decision-
making procedure with information, either in advance or during the decision-making process, in sufficient 
detail to enable the data subject to express a meaningful opinion. This is ensured by the information 
requirements of Article 13 para. 2 lit. f and Article 14 para. 2 lit. g GDPR. “According to this provision, the 
controller must both inform at an early stage about the existence of automated decision-making and 
provide meaningful information on the logic involved and the scope and intended impact of such 
processing on the data subject [...]. According to Article 12 para. 1, this information must also be provided 
in a precise, transparent, comprehensible and easily accessible form in clear and simple language [...]” 
(Scholz 2019: GDPR Art. 22 point 58, translated from the German original).
For the “logic involved”, Scholz specifies: “The term ‘logic’ shall be understood to mean information on the 
organisation, structure and operation of automated data processing [...]. The information must therefore 
include the basic functional principles of the application programmes and the basic decision-making 
114 Also described in Recital 71 GDPR: “In any case, such processing should be subject to suitable safeguards, which should include 
specific information to the data subject and the right to obtain human intervention, to express his or her point of view, to obtain an 
explanation of the decision reached after such assessment and to challenge the decision.”
806. Needs and Options for Action
criteria. However, the technical details of the (analysis) software used or the source code do not have to be 
communicated. In this respect, processors can generally rely on the protection of their business and trade 
secrets. [...] However, the data subject must be able to understand how certain ratings and classifications are 
derived and what meaning and weighting these values have for the automated decision (Scholz 2019: 
GDPR Art. 22 point 54, translated from the German original).
Bäcker makes similar comments, claiming: “This information refers to the methods and criteria used in 
data processing, such as the functioning of the algorithm used to calculate a score” (Bäcker 2018: Art. 13 
points 53-54, translated from the German original). Hoeren and Niehoff (2018: 56f.) also argue for the 
disclosure of the algorithm in the form of the presentation of “[...] rules of action and programme sequences 
with the corresponding weightings [...]” (ibid., p. 57, translated from the German original). This would also 
not jeopardise the business secrets115 of the controller, since the source code would also have to be available 
for such a threat. With regard to the special forms of automated decision-making with artificial intelligence 
systems, they point out that the actual decision-making criteria are often not comprehensible in the case 
of AI procedures. However, additional technical procedures can make it possible to have the criteria that 
are particularly relevant to the decision revealed, which can then be presented to data subjects. However, 
these are approximate values, so that data subjects would also have to be informed about the uncertainties 
of the procedures (Hoeren & Niehoff 2018: 57-60). Further information and claims, which would mean a 
detailed explanation in each individual case of a decision, cannot, according to Wischmeyer (2018: pp. 51f.), 
be derived from the provisions of the GDPR.116
Nevertheless, the article is valuable in terms of anti-discrimination in that it clarifies that, in addition to the 
obligation to provide information on the functioning or ‘logic’, it also clarifies “the significance and the 
envisaged consequences of such processing” (Article 13 para. 2 lit. f GDPR and Article 15. para. 1 lit. h GDPR) 
or information must be provided. According to this provision, a controller must describe “[...] what is to be 
decided on the basis of the data processing, what choices are available and what processing outcomes lead 
or may lead to which decision” (Bäcker 2018: Art. 13 point 55, translated from the German original).
115 In this context, the authors (ibid., pp. 56f.) refer to the so-called SCHUFA ruling of the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) rejecting an 
action for disclosure of the score formula used by the company SCHUFA to calculate creditworthiness with the prevailing importance of 
business secrecy over transparency requirements (BGH ruling of 28 January 2014, BGH (2014)).
116 For a discussion on the so-called “right to explanation”, see Goodman & Flaxman (2017), Wachter, Mittelstadt & Floridi (2017), 
Wischmeyer (2018), Edwards & Veale (2017).
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Conclusion
In view of such a duty to provide information where automated decisions exist, it should in future be 
required to provide information not only on the decision-making rules but also on the scope and effects 
of the differentiation decision, including the risks of discrimination. Since the information must be 
provided ex ante, i.e. before the decision is made, data subjects potentially affected by the risks would 
have the option to refuse consent. As a result, the controller would also have to address the risks of 
discrimination in the first place in order to be able to provide information about them.
It should also be investigated whether such an obligation to provide information about the scope and 
effects of automated decisions could effectively supplement insufficient rights to information under 
the AGG, such as in situations involving job applications in the field of human resources.
6.2.3.4 Criticism and need for further development
Overall, Scholz criticises the provisions of Article 22 GDPR, noting that “This provision neither regulates 
the highly relevant question of whether and under what conditions a personal profile may be created and 
used, nor does it generally provide for the non-discriminatory and transparent use of algorithms” (Scholz 
2019: GDPR Art. 22 points 8-11, translated from the German original). Martini is equally critical of the fact 
that the legislator has placed greater emphasis on the exploitation of potentials of value creation and 
economic innovation than on the protection of privacy. Automated decisions that “make the individual 
the mere object of an algorithmic analysis carried out without human intervention” are only prohibited to 
an extremely limited extent (Martini 2018: GDPR Art. 22 point 8, translated from the German original).
Furthermore, it should be considered that if algorithmic procedures are used by the controller and it is no 
longer possible to comprehend the path of the decision, this should be interpreted as an exclusively 
automated decision, even if a human being were involved in the decision-making process. The prohibition 
would apply in these cases. This would mean considering whether the criteria set out in the GDPR, 
according to which a decision is exclusively automated, should also be supplemented and substantiated to 
include the ability of the decision-makers to comprehend the decision recommendations of the computer 
system and to be able to explain them to the data subjects.
Summary and conclusions
 — Overall, many crucial points of the prohibition of automated decisions under the GDPR remain 
unclear from a legal point of view, in particular the extent and scope of the exemptions, and above 
all with regard to cases where legally protected characteristics are used as well as the specific 
information obligations. The legal provision does stipulate that information must be provided in a 
precise, transparent, comprehensible and easily accessible form in clear and simple language. This 
also refers to the so-called involved logic, which is interpreted as the structure and procedure of 
automated data processing. Furthermore, information would also have to be provided on the 
scope and intended impact of such processing, which would also have to provide information on 
the risks, including risks of discrimination. Further mandatory clarifications provided in advance 
would be helpful in this respect and would serve to reduce ambiguities of interpretation before 
any court rulings in the event of damages.
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 — The criteria for applying the prohibition should take into account whether the lack of traceability 
and explanation of “decisions” of the computer systems is substantiated by the controller as the 
criterion for the existence of an automated decision.
 — It can be seen as particularly problematic that automated decisions based on protected 
characteristics are also permitted if data subjects have given their explicit consent. However, 
doubts are increasing as to the effectiveness of consent in data protection.117
6.2.4 Communicative processes in differentiation decisions
On the grounds of the objective to protect the free development of the personality and the right to self- 
representation,118 any differentiation decisions concerning the development of personality must be 
designed as communicative processes (Trute 1998: 825; Britz 2008: 185). The risks of statistical or algorithmic 
discrimination could be mitigated through communicative processes in differentiation decisions. 
According to this, instead of a unilateral assessment of persons and the attribution of characteristics, the 
communicative processes should provide the option, in accordance with the right to self-representation, 
of enabling one’s own self-image to contribute to the process of generating the image of a person and of 
creating possibilities for comparing and correcting the external images.
Neither anti-discrimination law nor the right of informational self-determination currently operationalised 
in data protection law119 establish an adequate basis for ensuring that data subjects in decision-making 
situations always have the opportunity to shape the personality profile in a communicative process. The 
prevailing approach in both discrimination and data protection law, namely to have the opportunity to 
correct external images only after damages have been perceived or errors have been discovered, if necessary 
by means of laborious self-protection measures or legal proceedings, cannot comply with the right to self-
representation in order to safeguard the right to free development of personality.120 This is illustrated, for 
example, by Case 22 on multiple discrimination in online lending, where the data subject had no opportunity 
to provide information on his or her actual ability to repay before the credit decision was taken.
The basis for communicative processes is the understanability and comprehensibility of the decision-
making rules, which include the criteria of the decision and the relations between the criteria and the 
conclusions drawn from them. This is required in order for the data subject to know whether and in what 
way the criteria apply to his or her life situation and whether completely different circumstances or criteria 
in his or her life situation do fulfil the differentiation objective, thus allowing him or her to recognise that 
this must be communicated to the decision-making body. The data subject must also have the chance to 
recognise not only that he or she has the option in principle to present his or her own point of view, but 
also when and why it is important to do so. Decision-making procedures would have to provide for the 
possibility that the data subject can also ensure that criteria within communicative decision-making 
procedures are relativised, supplemented, adapted or revised before a decision is taken. This fundamental 
possibility of reducing the disadvantages of the phenomenon of statistical discrimination promoted by 
algorithms should be maintained and also implemented electronically.
117 See Section 6.1.3.1.
118 See Section 5.2.5.
119 Also despite the right to contribute one’s own point of view in automated decisions, see Section 6.2.3.2.
120 This is made even more difficult by the fact that many offers are subject to non-negotiable contractual and data processing 
conditions unilaterally defined by the providers, to which the data subjects must agree or waive the service or product altogether.
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In order to maintain the efficiency gains, such communicative processes can also be automated. Instead of 
using automation to automatically generate external images of an individual, even by means of a quasi 
secret121 enforcement of decisions on an individual, IT-supported facilitation of the presentation of one’s 
own point of view or self-representation can also be sought. Likewise, the introduction of the self-image 
can be improved by allowing self-selection or assigning the persons concerned to differentiation categories. 
In terms of the protection of personality, it would make more sense to use openly comprehensible, 
differentiated typologies of persons or categories of products and services to which customers, etc. can 
assign themselves, instead of secret identification and classification into customer segments.
6.2.5 Design of online platforms
It can generally be assumed that online platforms could also limit the risks of discrimination via algorithmic 
systems that they harbour (see Section 5.1.3), and that they could achieve even better results than in 
conventional markets and exchange relationships. The operators of online platforms are able to centrally 
and efficiently control unnecessary or undesired information flows, e. g. about certain characteristics of 
persons (e. g. gender or ethnic background), in the interactions and transactions taking place on the 
platform (Edelman & Luca 2014: 10) and act as a neutral intermediary (Hannák et al. 2017: 1914). While the 
direct visibility of the characteristics of persons in conventional face-to-face trading and exchanges can 
promote stereotypical behaviour, online markets could in principle also conceal characteristics that are 
sensitive or particularly prone to discrimination.122
Using the example of the online platform Airbnb, Edelman et al. make suggestions on how to improve 
online platforms with the aim of reducing the risks of discrimination, such as preventing the name of 
participants from being displayed or avoiding checking people before booking (Edelman et al. 2017: 117ff.). 
Similarly, Hannák et al. propose that online marketplaces for employment services should function 
without demographic data, i.e. requests for work services should only be addressed to individuals and to 
selected groups. They also state that the operators of the online platforms could make adjustments in order 
to offset biased ratings (Hannák et al. 2017).
Chen et al. also conclude from their research results (see Case 3) that online employment services could 
play an active role in overcoming structural inequalities in labour markets by having their ranking 
algorithms present outcomes according to the criterion of group fairness, i.e. according to the distribution 
of the relevant groups (e. g. women and men) in the population, rather than reflecting structural inequalities 
(Chen et al. 2018: 10). The tasks of the equality bodies can also be based on the design of the algorithmic 
differentiation rules of online platforms (see below).
121 In principle, under the law of informational self-determination, the secret collection and processing of data are associated with 
certain dangers. “On the one hand, secrecy deprives person concerned of the possibility of avoiding the disclosure of information and the 
associated risks of disadvantage by adapting their behaviour in order to protect themselves. On the other hand, the possibility of 
subsequent legal protection, in particular the subsequent correction of incorrect information, is excluded.” Britz (2010: 579, translated 
from the German original).
122 Levy and Barocas (2017) present additional possibilities and examples of online platform design that can reduce discriminatory 
behaviour by users.
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6.3 Possibilities for equality bodies
123 According to Article 13 of Directive 2000/43/EC.
124 Pursuant to Article 12 of Directive 2004/113/EC and Article 20 of Directive 2006/54/EC.
125 Furthermore, Article 20 of Directive 2006/54/EC adds as a description of tasks the exchange of available information at the 
appropriate level with the relevant European bodies. Similarly, under Article 12 of Directive 2000/43/EC, Article 14 of Directive 2000/78/
EC, Article 11 of Directive 2004/113/EC and Article 22 of Directive 2006/54/EC Member States are required to promote dialogue with 
appropriate non-governmental organisations that have a legitimate interest in the categories of discrimination covered by the Directives 
and are involved in combating discrimination.
126 See Section 6.1.1 above.
127 See Section 6.1.2 above.
6.3.1 Mission and competencies
European anti-discrimination directives require Member States to designate bodies to promote the 
principle of non-discriminatory equal treatment of all persons123 and, additionally, to analyse, observe and 
provide support.124 The German legislator has decided to set up a central body, the Federal Anti-
Discrimination Agency, to implement these directives. The relevant guidelines include three core tasks, 
which Germany has addressed with Sections 25ff. AGG, in particular Section 27 AGG: (1) to provide 
independent assistance to victims of discrimination in pursuing their complaints about discrimination; 
(2)  to conduct independent surveys on discrimination; (3) to publish independent surveys and make 
recommendations based on them.125 In contrast to some other EU countries (e. g. the United Kingdom, 
Belgium, Romania), the AGG does not provide for a right of action for the German anti-discrimination 
body nor for a right of action by associations. Moreover, it has no own authority to conduct investigations 
or demand disclosures.
6.3.2 Possibilities for investigations and evidence
It is worth considering whether the technical transparency and testing instruments described above126 are 
suitable, useful or necessary for the work of equality bodies. Within this context, it must be noted that the 
direct testing of algorithms and computer systems requires a high level of expertise in computer science. 
If the testing for risks of algorithmic discrimination is to be carried out externally, there may be a case for 
concentrating such knowledge. However, knowledge of facts, the actors and persons affected and their 
interests, the conditions of the relevant sectors or industries, the considerations, regulations and provisions 
already established for differentiations are equally important. In particular, knowledge of previous unequal 
treatment, situations at risk of discrimination and groups at risk of discrimination play a role, as do practices 
and (economic) motivations for differentiation and potential abuse. This expertise is necessary, for example, 
to understand and verify the assumptions underlying the selection and application of algorithms, models 
and criteria of differentiation or to question or confirm the legitimacy of the approach. In addition to the 
knowledge base, issues concerning legally authorised access to the necessary data, algorithms and systems 
are a prerequisite.
Irrespective of the question of direct inspection and access to the systems, equality bodies or researchers 
can also use “classical” empirical investigations and discrimination analyses for the application of 
algorithms, which can be supplemented with specialised algorithm audits.127 These examine mainly the 
outcomes and consequences for persons concerned in terms of unequal treatment or generated inequalities 
resulting from algorithmic and data-based differentiation decisions.
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In principle, as communication, interactions and transactions in the private and public sectors become 
increasingly computerised and networked (or “digitised”), the volume of data for statistical studies on 
inequality and unequal treatment can also be expected to grow. Within this context, it is more a question 
of access rules to the data, i.e. to what extent they can be made available for investigations by equality 
bodies. This could include specific or extended obligations for the provision of information by the applying 
entities to recognised equality bodies. For the public sector, the possibilities arising from the Federal Act 
Governing Access to Information held by the Federal Government could also be taken into account and, if 
necessary, expanded (e. g. Fink 2018).
In many of the examples in Chapter 4, online platforms, e. g. for housing rentals or job advertisements, 
were examined in terms of their outcomes and consequences and the resulting unequal treatments. They 
demonstrate that means such as empirical investigations and audit studies appear suitable for examining 
online platforms with their algorithm-based transaction rules and decision-making rules for discriminatory 
practices. It can be assumed that, given the techniques available for online procedures, such as automatically 
repeated queries or the uses of web crawlers or the uses with fictitious persons or accounts,128 it may even 
be easier to obtain data compared to an offline procedure. Some example investigations129 have also shown 
that, in addition to the users, the algorithms of the online platforms have also given rise to risks of 
discrimination, which were revealed “from the outside” without direct access to the programme code. 
However, Case 26 of the case study of the transport service provider Uber shows that the investigation of 
online platforms can also encounter access problems to the relevant data.
Furthermore, some algorithms and machine learning and artificial intelligence systems can be used as 
online services and tested with different data sets, as in Case 46, which describes the facial recognition 
services of Microsoft, IBM and Face++, or in Case 47 describing the facial recognition system of Amazon. 
The direct inspection of the algorithm and the programme code did not seem to be necessary, but unequal 
treatment or discrimination was identified by analysing the outcomes of the online services.
However, it is not (yet) possible to draw general conclusions from the cases, as they are too heterogeneous 
and do not originate from a systematic survey.130 This is because other examples show that unequal 
treatment and discrimination could only be identified and (partially) proven in legal disputes, where the 
procedure of data analysis and evaluation of the decision-making criteria had to be (partially) disclosed 
(e. g. Case 2 and Case 31). Case 30 of the system of the Austrian Arbeitsmarktservice also demonstrated that 
risks of discrimination were made accessible to a public discussion by publishing documentation on 
computation formulas.
6.3.3 Experiences and suggestions from other equality bodies
Equality bodies in the EU countries have little experience in dealing with risks of algorithmic and data- 
based discrimination. There are also only a few specific cases of discrimination to date. A number of EU 
128 See Section 6.1.2.
129 See, for example, Case 17, Case 19 or Case 20.
130 The fact that there are many research results on online platforms and online systems may be because, compared to direct access to 
the programme code, online systems and online platforms may relatively well to investigate, for example, because problems of direct 
access to algorithms or programme code did not arise (e. g. due to protection of trade secrets or copyright issues) or the research effort with 
statistical analyses may still have been justifiable.
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equality bodies with some previous experience in the field were asked about the possibilities of investigating 
and authority to do so:131
 — Knowledge is required of how algorithms work and in which areas of life and conditions they are used 
and have an impact on protected groups of people. In this regard, personnel with knowledge of data, 
data use and anti-discrimination law are needed, more so than technical tools. Instead of expertise in 
computer science or data science within the body, the body could benefit from structural partnerships 
with computer or data scientists to avoid discrimination, uncover cases of discrimination or obtain 
evidence on the cases. Audit studies and discrimination testing are considered to be suitable for 
detecting unequal treatments involving computer systems and algorithms.132
 — One example of a case of discriminatory insurance rates in the Czech Republic highlights the 
importance of access to statistical data and actuarial methods of the insurance companies. Without 
access and the obligation to provide data and information on the request of the Czech equality body, it 
would not be possible to handle the case and assess whether or not discrimination had occurred.133
 — The case of suspected discrimination in job advertisements in the “social” online network Facebook (see 
Case 4) underscored that it was not possible for the persons concerned to become aware of the unequal 
treatment because they could not see the advertisements. Other persons who were able to see the 
advertisements informed the equality body, and this is the only reason the body was able to process 
the case. As the protected characteristics “age” and “gender” were used in the case, it was relatively easy 
to discover, examine and produce evidence. In order to achieve a comprehensive understanding and be 
able to take legal action against the use of certain algorithms, computer specialists would be needed to 
analyse systems and algorithms in detail. The exact analysis would also only be possible if the 
algorithms were made fully accessible for investigation, which is considered unlikely due to the 
protection of trade and business secrets. The statistical studies commonly used in anti-discrimination 
research and analysis of discrimination cases are also considered suitable for studying inequalities 
caused by algorithms and computer systems.134
 — Statistics, and in particular equality data, are considered a key element in the analysis of alleged cases 
of discrimination using algorithms and computer systems. This may include reforms of the legal 
framework aimed at alleviating structural problems, such as lack of data or lack of consequences when 
fails to respond to requests by the equality body. Changes in the legal framework could include, for 
example, the obligation for certain public bodies to collect equality data, the obligation to report to 
equality bodies on automated decision-making systems, mandatory cooperation between entities using 
the systems and bodies responsible for equality data and legal consequences if entities using algorithms 
do not provide the data to the equality bodies on request.135
131 A number of European equality bodies were asked about this issue by email.
132 Information provided by employees of the Belgian equality body Unia, by email to the author, March 2019.
133 Information provided by employees of the Czech equality body Office of the Public Defender of Rights, by email to the author, 
April 2019.
134 Information provided by employees of the equality body The Danish Institute for Human Rights, by email to the author, March 2019.
135 Information provided by employees of the Slovenian equality body Advocate of the Principle of Equality, by email to the author, 
April 2019.
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6.3.4 Preventive approach and cooperation possibilities
In many instances, the legal instruments of discrimination and data protection are based on the fact that 
harm or injustice has already occurred. As explained above, algorithmic discrimination can also take place 
unnoticed or be deliberately disguised, occur unintentionally via correlations to protected characteristics, 
or it can be extremely difficult to prove discrimination.
For entities developing and using algorithms and computer systems, the legal framework also offers 
insufficient guidance in the design of non-discriminatory algorithms and systems, as there are too many 
uncertainties and possible interpretations that could only be clarified by court rulings, if at all. Uncertainties 
about legality can cause misinvestment or prevent innovations from being realised. As such, there is a 
strong case for a preventive approach. To this end, equality bodies or supervisory institutions could assume 
a variety of tasks, but they need the appropriate equipment.
The author asked certain equality bodies whether a preventive approach to risks of discrimination through 
the use of algorithms and computer systems is more appropriate or even necessary (such as studies initiated 
by the institution). The equity bodies responded with the following proposals (notes of the author in 
brackets):
 — Awareness must be raised at an early stage among the developers and the responsible controllers when 
creating algorithms in order to bring together legal, ethical and technical points of view. This can also be 
achieved, for example, by increasing employee diversity at the developers’ organisations so that thought 
and argumentation processes are not carried out exclusively by a majority group. As expertise in the 
field of algorithms continues to grow, and on the basis of possible audit studies, a strategy to raise 
awareness about the risks of discrimination through algorithms may become important. In addition to 
the preventive approach, it is important to continue the work on high-quality equality data,136 as the 
quality of the algorithms may also depend on the availability of non-biased and accurate data, in 
particular data representing groups at risk of discrimination.137 (In addition to the statements of the 
equality body Unia, it should be noted that equality data can also help to better identify risks of 
discrimination in relation to specific groups. This can also support the proof of discrimination in the 
context of algorithms.)
 — In view of the increasing use of automated decision-making tools by providers of goods and services, 
the preventive approach is considered important, particularly in terms of increasing awareness and 
knowledge of ethical handling. The best way to do this is by informing the persons and companies 
preparing to use such techniques in their business and practices. On the other hand, complaint 
mechanisms should also be accessible to people affected by discrimination through automatic decision-
making systems.138 (In addition to the statements of the equality body Advocate of the Principle of 
Equality, it can be noted that also in the workplace, internal complaints procedures under Section 13 
AGG should give employees the opportunity to address risks of discrimination through algorithms.)
136 See also Baumann, Egenberger & Supik (2018).
137 Information provided by employees of the Belgian equality body Unia, by email to the author, March 2019.
138 Information provided by employees of the Slovenian equality body Advocate of the Principle of Equality, by email to the author, 
April 2019.
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For example, the Belgian equality body Unia provides a website where companies can perform a relatively 
quick scan to uncover any problems in terms of diversity and developments using a questionnaire to be 
filled in at their premises (“Quick scan of diversity”).139 Taking into account specific challenges in terms of 
methods, technical issues, workload and ethical questions, a similar tool could also be offered for decisions 
on the use of algorithms, for example.140
It also appears worthwhile for equality bodies and online platforms to cooperate on a preventive approach 
(see also Section 6.2.5). In this context, a balance can be sought between, on the one hand, the objective of 
the platforms to provide as much information as possible about users and, on the other, the protection of 
the bearers of protected characteristics. The latter would be achieved not only by avoiding direct use of the 
characteristics, but also by preventing conclusions from being drawn about surrogate variables and 
correlations. Through the mass impact of online platforms, non-discriminatory practices could thus be 
implemented for comparatively many people at once. Case 9 shows a cooperative approach between the 
National Fair Housing Alliance (NFHA) and the company Facebook, where the NFHA offers a training 
programme for the company.
Furthermore, Zuiderveen Borgesius proposes cooperation between data protection institutions and 
equality bodies, as well as for public bodies wishing to use artificial intelligence algorithms an obligation to 
consult equality bodies in advance and to involve them in public procurement processes (Zuiderveen 
Borgesius 2018: 31).
139 See website in French: https://www.ediv.be/site/fr/ediv-quickscan-non-discrimination-et-egalite-des-chances or in Dutch: https://
www.ediv.be/site/nl/ediv quickscan non discriminatie en gelijke kansen (last retrieved on 28 August 2019).
140 Information provided by employees of the Belgian equality body Unia, by email to the author, March 2019.
Conclusion
A preventive, cooperative approach between equality bodies and entities developing and using algorithms 
and computer systems could include several elements, such as (1) advice on the legitimate or prohibited 
use of protected characteristics depending on decision-making situations and groups of persons 
concerned, (2) interpretation and advice on the use of proxies, surrogate information or variables with 
correlations to protected characteristics or of apparently neutral criteria in the case of indirect 
discrimination, or (3) interpretation and investigation of the possibilities of implementing justice and 
fairness criteria for different differentiation situations.
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6.3.5 Proposals for the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency
The following proposals for the Federal Anti-Discrimination Agency (FADA) can be derived from the 
preceding findings:
 — Anti-discrimination law is relevant to all those algorithmic and data-based differentiation 
decisions that can lead to worse treatment on the basis of a characteristic protected in the AGG in 
the areas of working life and access to goods and services. The AGG already prohibits these types 
of discriminations, regardless of whether or not they are made using algorithms.141 A further-
reaching legal prohibition therefore does not appear necessary within the scope of labour and civil 
law. However, developments in algorithms, in particular artificial intelligence, need to be further 
observed and researched in order to make adjustments to the protected characteristics of the AGG 
where necessary.
 — However, the AGG has weaknesses, as it is limited to the individual enforcement of rights. As such, 
discriminatory practice cannot be prohibited, only individual victims can claim damages or 
compensation in civil lawsuits. The approach of a merely selective procedure in individual cases 
does not seem appropriate in view of the potentially systematic worse treatment of many persons 
concerned by algorithmic differentiations. The right of collective action by associations would be a 
necessary response to the mass phenomenon142 of possible algorithmic discrimination and the 
poorer perceptibility and provability of algorithmic discrimination.
 — In order to be able to prove discrimination through algorithm-based decisions (in court) and justify 
claims for repayment for damages or compensation, documentation obligations should be 
imposed on artificial intelligence systems or systems that are particularly discriminatory. In 
specific cases of suspected discrimination, the equality body should be given access to such 
documentation for identification purposes. Access to or release of the documentation would have 
to be regulated by law in such cases. Furthermore, it would be worth considering whether access 
or release could also apply to data sets143 and algorithms themselves and how the protection of 
secrets could then be safeguarded.
 — From the perspective of the persons concerned with regard to complaints and legal support, 
ambiguities about jurisdiction can lead to a situation where different responsibilities and 
procedural channels would be established for algorithmic and non-algorithmic differentiation 
decisions. This is especially true given the increasing difficulty of making this distinction precisely 
in practice. Different responsibilities should also be avoided, as this could lead to different levels 
of protection.
141 See also Section 6.2.1.
142 See p. 23 for more on the mass phenomenon.
143 The many described cases of risks of discrimination arising from the (further) use of data sets reflecting previous unequal treatment, 
particularly in the development of risk assessment systems (see, for example, Case 27 or Case 34), would support this. A basic 
understanding of the practices pertaining to how and by whom the data is generated and analysed appears necessary in order to be able to 
assess the risks of discrimination arising from the use of the systems. However, this presupposes the high skill requirements described in 
Section 6.1.2.
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 — The legal mandate for a national equality body to be responsible for the implementation of the 
European anti-discrimination directives imposes a responsibility for investigations and evaluations 
under discrimination law. In order to fulfil the legal mandate, technical expertise should be 
developed or acquired through cooperation with research institutions. Moreover, this legal 
mandate should be considered and embedded in the further design of the regulatory framework 
for algorithmic differentiations and decision-making systems.
 — In order to fulfil its statutory research mandate, the equality body should also conduct reviews 
without suspicion (testing or algorithmic audits) of the outcomes of differentiation decisions, e. g. 
for online platforms. It could also do this in cooperation with research institutions (see above).
 — The equality body should also make preventive offers to avoid algorithm-based risks of 
discrimination (see above) and cooperate with companies to this end. Other useful measures 
include mandatory provisions for consultation of the equality body in the procurement and prior 
to the use of computer systems by public authorities that are prone to discrimination, such as 
certain AI systems.
6.4 Need for societal considerations and decisions
Beyond the more concrete needs for action and options for the purpose of optimising existing regulatory 
structures, there is a need for societal considerations and political and legislative decisions that 
fundamentally call into question the suitability of existing regulatory and institutional approaches in view 
of the developments in algorithms, applications and practices. This concerns the approach of self-
protection and the resulting burdens on the individual and the legitimacy of algorithmic and data-based 
differentiations with regard to the weighing of advantages and societal risks.
6.4.1 Burdens on the affected individuals
Both the right to informational self-determination and anti-discrimination place the burden of 
responsibility on the affected individual to identify and take action against unlawful data processing and 
unjustified unequal treatment. However, questions arise as to whether these basic legal concepts are still 
appropriate at all, given the increasing amount of data and algorithm-based and automated decision-
making procedures and their special characteristics. This is because such burdens of responsibility require 
very high knowledge cognitive and temporal prerequisites on the part of the affected individual in order 
to (a) be able to perceive the many situations involving data processing and differentiation at all, (b) process 
the information resulting from the information obligations of data protection (such as the “logic involved” 
in automated decisions) as well as information, correction or deletion rights and, above all, (c) assess the 
individual consequences resulting from data processing and diverse (potential) differentiation decisions 
for themselves and to detect the risk of possible discrimination for themselves.
For example, many data processing operations only lead to differentiation decisions after a long time, 
which requires high prognostic abilities from the individual. In any case, it is nearly impossible for the 
individual to assess the consequences of using data for external decision-making purposes and in other 
contexts. The scepticism is further reinforced by the increasingly perceived inadequacy of informed 
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consent,144 which requires the above-mentioned assessments of the individual at the time of consent, and 
by the difficulty in detecting and proving discrimination by the (potentially) affected individuals.145 A 
number of instances in which personal data are collected (such as web tracking) during the use of 
smartphones and their apps or the analysis of communication in “social” online networks are carried out 
more or less without the knowledge of the users; as a result, the possibilities for self-protection are also 
severely limited.
The limited possibilities for self-protection of the (potential) persons concerned must also be taken into 
account in proposals for regulating risks of algorithmic discrimination, such as the proposal for a labelling 
requirement when using automated decisions. As this would only point to the existence of automated 
decision-making systems, but not to their consequences, the instrument would not improve the problem 
of insufficient self-protection.
In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, this may lead to calls for a more representative approach 
by protective institutions such as equality bodies, consumer protection and data protection bodies or 
specialised authorities, either with (further) help for individuals or an approach instead of individuals, 
which seems even more effective. Another shift of responsibility for avoidance measures to the entities 
developing and using algorithmic and data-based differentiations (which, however, requires supervision) 
would also be debatable. To this end, for example, the obligations under data protection law to document, 
to carry out data protection impact assessments or appoint a data protection officer could be expanded or 
supplemented internally by anti-discrimination provisions.
The procedure by representative institutions can also be needed, in particular by the increasing structural 
advantage146 of the entities developing and using algorithmic differentiation against persons concerned. 
This can arise particularly through the reinforcement of dependency on a certain service or product, which 
in turn can be caused by network effects of online platforms or other monopolisation tendencies or can be 
increased by the fact that personality traits can be more thoroughly researched and exploited. Structural 
advantage can also be increased by reducing the number of alternatives in the form of offline or analogue 
alternatives.
In addition, there is the recurrent problem that data protection law is conceptually based on the individual, 
but algorithmic differentiations often relate to groups without necessarily having to identify an individual 
unambiguously by name or in any other way. In cases of doubt or legal disputes about the personal 
reference, the right could thus prove to be “toothless” (Barocas & Nissenbaum 2014; Mantelero 2016; 
Zuiderveen Borgesius 2016). This would require clarification through clear legal provisions. The problem 
also justifies action by representative institutions instead of the affected individuals.
6.4.2 Legitimacy of differentiations
As described in Chapter 5, algorithmic and data-based differentiations generate societal risks in addition to 
technical risks. With regard to societal risks, technical improvements to algorithms or data sets are of no 
help. Instead, it is for societal considerations and decisions to determine the significance of societal values 
and objectives as well as the desired or undesired practices of differentiation, in order to avoid societal 
risks. The handling of statistical discrimination has until now also been the subject of societal considerations 
and decisions, above all through the design of anti-discrimination law. However, due to a number of 
144 See Section 6.1.3.1.
145 See Section 6.1.3.2.
146 See Section 5.2.6.
926. Needs and Options for Action
developments in data processing and algorithmic applications, the advantages and disadvantages need to 
be re-evaluated by means of societal consideration processes:
(1) The legitimacy of the algorithmic differentiations is partly justified by cost considerations and 
efficiency goals, which justify the use of surrogate information or proxies in differentiation decisions 
primarily with the efficient solution of information deficits. The alternative case-by-case individual 
assessment may be too costly for many differentiation decisions or may itself lead to problems of privacy 
protection or stigmatisation (Britz 2008). Abandoning forms of statistical or algorithmic differentiation 
can result in societal costs in the form of relative inefficiencies or lost instrumental benefits. In concrete 
terms, this would be expressed in the form of the costs of individual case assessments (Schauer 2018: 50). 
 
On the other hand, there are the risks of injustice by generalisation due to inappropriate or incorrect 
surrogate information.147 The necessity and appropriateness of algorithmic differentiation must therefore 
be considered when weighing the advantages and disadvantages, as well as the question of whether less 
risky alternatives are available. Aspects such as clear evidence of consistent improvement in the accuracy 
of predictions or objectivity of decisions, determinations of fairness and error rates acceptable for 
different risks, contexts of use and areas of life148 as well as provisions on scientifically recognised 
procedures149 of data analysis and algorithm-based decision-making procedures must also be clarified in 
this context. 
 
However, these considerations also raise questions about how efficiency gains and societal costs or risks 
of algorithmic differentiation are distributed in society, e. g. whether they affect all or only a few, and 
whether those who benefit from efficiency gains are also those who bear the risks or whether the risks are 
externalised. For example, one should bear in mind that in statistical differentiation by private 
companies, resources are not conserved for the collective benefit, but merely in one’s own self-interest 
(Britz 2008: 49f.). Furthermore, the distribution of efficiency gains must also be assessed in light of the 
increasing concentration of the relevant markets and the dominance of a small number of companies.
(2) Due to the fact that data on the affiliation to certain categories of persons as well as algorithms and 
software systems containing them are now available comparatively easily and cheaply, it is likely that 
such data and decision-making procedures based on them are “overused” (Schauer 2003). As a result, 
algorithmic and data-based differentiations are being realised in many areas where equal treatment 
previously prevailed, or even individual assessments and other decision-making regulations can be 
systematically pushed back, even if they would be possible with reasonable effort:
(a) Algorithmic differentiations can penetrate into areas where differentiations were previously 
unwanted from a view of societal equality objectives or socio-political goals.150
(b) Algorithmic differentiation is increasingly being used for decisions that have a significant impact on 
human dignity and the free development of personality (such as imprisonment, the extent of state 
controls, and access to housing, jobs, education opportunities or credit). In actual automation 
147 See Section 5.2.1.
148 See Section 6.1.1.
149 See Section 6.2.2.
150 See Section 5.2.3.
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practices, people can increasingly be treated only as mere means, because the persons concerned are 
effectively no longer able to consent to the practices.151
(3) Algorithmic and data-based differentiations are in many cases based on the collection and analysis of 
large amounts of (increasingly sensitive) personal data, which can undermine the right of informational 
self-determination. 
 
The protective goals of the free development of personality are primarily realised through anti-
discrimination law and the right to informational self-determination. They are (according to Britz 
2010),152
(a) to guarantee external freedom of development by ensuring freedom of conduct and protection 
against adverse decisions by others, by ensuring that the potentially restrictive decisions of others 
can be influenced by the persons concerned in such a way that they are in their favour to the greatest 
possible extent,
(b) to guarantee inner freedom of development through the fact that the personality development in 
interactive processes can still be perceived by the individual as free and belonging to oneself, and 
that individuals can still assert themselves against public images and,
(c) to protect the uninhibitedness of individual behaviour by reducing the freedom-inhibiting effects 
of “abstract uncertainty” or avoiding intimidation. The latter arise from information inventories and 
data processing purposes that are no longer clear to the individual.153
For example, algorithmic differentiations can increasingly be based on comprehensive and detailed 
personality profiles154 which, as an enhanced form of heteronomy, are suitable for “imposing” an external 
image on a person, without the person concerned having a chance to develop their own personality and 
role interpretation in social contexts.155 Therefore, developments of concern in data protection also need to 
be further examined in terms of their impact on protection against algorithmic and data-based 
discrimination. These include the problematic merging of personal data records, in particular through data 
trading or data brokerage, or the (company internal) merging of data and the softening of the purpose 
limitation of the data use156 and the transfer to new purposes. Furthermore, societal considerations must 
take into account who (the entities using algorithmic differentiation or the persons concerned) will benefit 
from increased tracking, data analysis and differentiation and to whom disadvantages will be externalised.
Considerations, decisions and implementation in regulatory measures should be based for individual 
decision-making situations and contexts in each case according to the specific level of risk of injustice by 
151 See Section 5.2.4.
152 See also Section 5.2.5.
153 These intimidation effects are expected not only from incomprehensible data bases but also from the misuse of personal data. For 
example, people may refrain from using applications that are actually beneficial if they have to fear that the data collected when using the 
application and related to them could be used in other contexts and for other purposes that are not in their interest (see Yeung 2018: 33). 
These intimidation and self-restraint effects are also examined under the term “chilling effects”; see, for example, Baruh (2007), Schwartz 
(1999), Das & Kramer (2013), Lang & Barton (2015), Marder et al. (2016), Marthews & Tucker (2017), Penney (2016), (2017), Orwat & Schankin 
(2018).
154 See Section 2.2.2.
155 See Section 5.2.5.
156 See Raabe & Wagner (2016) on purpose-limitation in the GDPR.
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generalisation, on the extent of the threat to human dignity and the free development of personality, as 
well as on the possibilities and limits of self-protection and the possible overburdening of individuals. In 
instrumental terms, this can involve the detailed regulation of decision-making procedures157 and also – 
depending on the extent of the risk – prohibitions158 or contain regulations on the use of certain algorithms, 
data processing and decision-making procedures, forms of differentiation or decision-making criteria. 
Further instruments can be the legal requirement to assess the societal risks for objectives of euqality and 
personal development by developing and implementing entities or their obligation to take protective 
measures in terms of avoiding discrimination. These can extend to strengthening the competencies and 
authority of specialised institutions for discrimination and data protection.
157 See Section 6.2.
158 An example of a ban on algorithmic systems is the ban on facial recognition systems imposed by the city of San Francisco. See 
Conger, Fausset & Kovaleski (2019).
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